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I. INTRODUCTION
2006 marks a big year for changes to the Florida Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (RPC). This article will set forth the changes and explain
the process of how they evolved. Part II gives a brief history of the Flor-
ida Rules of Professional Conduct. Part III explains the procedure for how
these changes were implemented. Part IV explains the general changes
throughout the rules, as well as the changes to the preamble, scope, and
[Vol. 31
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terminology section. Part V explains the relevant changes in detail. Part
VI concludes the article.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
In 1987, the Florida Bar adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are found in Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.'
These rules were patterned after the American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) .2 Prior to 1987, Florida law-
yers were governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility, but the
Code lacked guidance in many matters and was unclear in many in-
stances.3 The rules have been amended over the years, but the changes
that went into effect in May of 2006 mark a large overhaul. The amend-
ments reflect several years of research and collaboration of many of Flor-
ida's top experts on ethics and are based on major changes that were made
to the Model Rules in 2002. 4
III. PROCEDURE
In 1997, the American Bar Association (ABA) formed the Ethics
Commission 2000.' The purpose of this organization was to review the
Model Rules and to recommend changes.6 The proposed changes were
made final at the end of the ABA February 2002 Midyear Meeting.7 The
* Judicial Staff Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. B.A.,
1996, University of Kentucky; J.D., magna cum laude, 2000, Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. The author expresses her gratitude to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert,
Ethics Counsel for the Florida Bar, for her invaluable help in the writing of this article.
1. Florida Bar, Board Information Paper: Lawyer Solicitation (2004),
http://www.floridabar.org (follow "Media Resources" hyperlink; then follow "Issue Papers"
hyperlink; then follow "Rules of Professional Conduct" hyperlink).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Florida Bar, Special Committee to Review the ABA Model Rules,
http://www.floridabar.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Bar Reports" hyper-
link; then follow "Special Committee to Review the ABA Model Rules" hyperlink) (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2007).
5. American Bar Association, Ethics 2000 Commission, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
6. Id.
7. Id. In 2002, the rules were further amended to encompass changes recommended by
the Multi-jurisdictional Practice Commission and the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility. Id. They were also amended in 2003 based on the House of
Delegates debate regarding the Task Force on Corporate Responsibility. Id. This article does
not address those changes.
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Florida Bar then created the Special Committee to Review the ABA Model
Rules 2002 ("Committee").8 It was charged with analyzing "the changes
to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, compar[ing] them with
the existing Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, and consider[ing] whether
the Florida Bar should adopt the recommended changes."9 The Commit-
tee not only considered the changes adopted by the ABA, but also re-
viewed the existing Model Rules to determine how they differed from
Florida's rules.' 0 After an exhaustive review, the Committee submitted its
proposals for amendment of the Rules of Professional Conduct ("RPC") to
the Florida Bar Board of Governors. " The Board approved the proposals,
with the exception of minimal changes to rules 4-1.8 and 5-1.1.12 The
changes were then published in the October 15, 2004 edition of The Flor-
ida Bar News.' 3 On December 1, 2004, after hearing comments, the Flor-
ida Bar submitted its Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar14 to the Supreme Court of Florida.' 5 The Court heard oral arguments
on the petition in June 2005.16 On March 23, 2006, the Supreme Court of
Florida issued In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Florida
Bar, 7 incorporating most of the Bar's amendment suggestions. 8 The new
rules became effective on May 22, 2006.19
8. Special Committee to Review the ABA Model Rules, supra note 4. This Committee
was chaired by Adele I. Stone. Petition app. D at 2, In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the
Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2006) (No. SC04-2246), http://www.floridabar.org (follow
"Publications" hyperlink; then follow "Bar Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Special Commit-
tee to Review the ABA Model Rules" hyperlink) [hereinafter Appendix D]. Other members
were Andrew S. Berman, Randolph Braccialarghe, Timothy P. Chinaris, Mark K. Delegal,
Timothy W. Gaskill, Charles P. Pillans, III, The Honorable Ronald J. Rothschild, and D.
Culver Smith, III. Id. Elizabeth Clark Tarbert served as counsel to the committee. Id
9. Special Committee to Review the ABA Model Rules, supra note 4.
10. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 2.
11. In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2006).
12. Id. at 418.
13. Id.
14. Petition, In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417 (Fla.
2006) (No. SC04-2246), http://www.floridabar.org (follow "Publications" hyperlink; then
follow "Bar Reports" hyperlink; then follow "Special Committee to Review the ABA Model
Rules" hyperlink; then follow "Download the Petition" hyperlink) [hereinafter Petition].
15. Special Committee to Review the ABA Model Rules, supra note 4.
16. Supreme Court of Florida, Oral Argument Schedule, http://www.floridasupreme-
court.org/clerk/oralargument_cal/2005/OAJune2005.pdf.
17. 933 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2006).
18. Id. at 417-18. The court issued a revised opinion on June 29, 2006, changing only
scrivener's errors and denying a rehearing. Id. at 417.
19. Id. at 420.
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IV. CHANGES TO THE PREAMBLE, SCOPE, AND TERMINOLOGY SECTIONS
A. General Changes Throughout the Rules
Two changes were made that pervade throughout the RPC, both of
which deal with consent. First, the rules change the term "consent after con-
sultation" to "informed consent. ' 20 The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission sug-
gested this change because it believed it "clarified and strengthened the re-
quirement of communication with clients regarding consent."21  The
amended rules defined "informed consent" as "agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably avail-
able alternatives to the proposed course of conduct., 22 In its Petition, the
Florida Bar stated that it agreed with the ABA that "the lawyer's duty of
communication to the client is more clearly delineated by this definition.,
23
Based on the recommendation of the ABA, the Florida Bar also sug-
gested that consent be "confirmed in writing," in certain rules.24 This con-
sent need not be signed by a client, but if oral consent is obtained, the attor-
ney must send a written statement to the client confirming he or she gave
consent. 25 The Florida Bar did not adopt this change with regard to as many
rules as suggested by the ABA. 26 Rather, it confined the change to RPC 4-
1.7, 4-1.11, and 4-1.12.27
After reviewing relevant comments and holding oral argument, the Su-
preme Court of Florida declined to adopt the change to RPC 4-1.7 as set out
by the Florida Bar.28 Instead, the Court modified the new rule to allow con-
sent to be given, alternatively, "by clear statements . . . on the record at a
hearing," rather than the more restrictive requirement that the consent be in
writing.29 This change was prompted by the dissent voiced from public de-
20. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 4.
21. Id. at 4.
22. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 424.
23. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 4.
24. Id at 5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. RPC 4-1.7 was formerly titled "Conflict of Interest: General Rule" and is now
called "Conflict of Interest; Current Clients." Appendix D, supra note 8, at 5. RPC 4-1.11
was formerly titled "Successive Government and Private Employment," and is now titled
"Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current Government Officers and Employees."
Id. RPC 4-1.12 was called "Former Judge or Arbitrator" and is now titled "Former Judge or
Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral." Id.
28. In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 2006).
29. Id.
2006]
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fenders across the state who claimed it would be an onerous request to obtain
written consent from all of the clients whose cases may pose a conflict of
interest.3° Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida declined to adopt the
Florida Bar's suggestions for RPC 4-3.3-Candor Toward the Tribunal, RPC
4-3.6--Trial Publicity, RPC 4-3.8-Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,
and RPC 4-4.1-Truthfulness in Statements to Others. 3
B. Changes to the Preamble
Many of the changes in the preamble to the Rules of Professional Con-
duct are made to conform to the changes in the Model Rules, while others
reflect the amendments in the substantive rules.32 References to a lawyer as
an intermediary are deleted, conforming to the deletion of RPC 4-2.2, dis-
cussed infra.33 In its place are references to lawyers as third-party neutrals,
consistent with the references found in RPC 4-1.12 and a new rule added this
year, RPC 4-2.4, which is discussed infra.34 The preamble also instructs
lawyers to seek improvement in accessing and furthering public knowledge
of the legal system. 5 Finally, the preamble adds further instructions to law-
yers on resolving conflicts.36
C. Changes to the Scope of Rules
The scope section adds language notifying lawyers that the comments to
the rules may be used to alert them to responsibilities they may have under
other laws. 37 It also makes references to new rule 4-1.18, which deals with a
lawyer's duties to prospective clients. 38  Further, this section clarifies the
relationship between the RPC and causes of actions against lawyers, specifi-
cally stating that a violation of a rule does not mean a lawyer should auto-
matically be disqualified from a case.39 Language is also deleted that ap-
pears elsewhere in the rules. 40 The paragraph stating that it is a lawyer's
30. Petition, supra note 14, at 15-16.
31. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 418. These rules are
discussed infra in more detail.
32. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 11.
33. See infra Part V.B.2.
34. See infra Part V.B.4.
35. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 13.
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id. at 15.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 15.
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decision whether or not to disclose confidential information is not subject to
reexamination was also deleted." This deletion was objected to by Florida
Bar member Henry P. Trawick,42 but the Supreme Court adopted the deletion
as recommended by the Florida Bar.43
D. Changes to the Terminology Section
There were several additional terms added to this section that were con-
sistent with changes made throughout the rules." Specifically, definitions
for "confirmed in writing," "informed consent," "screened," "tribunal," and
"writing" were added.45 Moreover, the terms "law firm" and "partner" saw
some modifications to their definitions. 6
V. CHANGES TO THE RULES
A. Client-Lawyer Relationship
1. RPC 4-1.1 Competence
No substantive changes are made to this rule, but commentary is added
that a lawyer shall "keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice...
and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the
lawyer is subject., 47
2. RPC 4-1.2 Objectives and Scope of Representation
The changes to this rule were made so that they would conform to the
Model Rules.48 One change deals with the power given to a lawyer to take
action on behalf of a client if the lawyer has impliedly been given authoriza-
tion to do so. 9 The new rule seems to give an attorney the power to accept
or reject a settlement without consulting the client, as long as the client has
given the attorney authorization at the outset to do so.5 ° Differing from the
41. In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417, 423 (Fla. 2006).
42. Appendix D, supra note 8, at 252.
43. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d. at 418.
44. See id at 423-24.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 426-27.
48. Petition, supra note 14, at 12.
49. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 427.
50. See id.
2006]
9
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAWREVIEW
Model Rules, the Florida rules only require that a lawyer "reasonably" con-
sult with a client before pursuing an action.5  The commentary also gives
further instructions on the allocation of authority between the client and a
lawyer and advises a lawyer that he or she may withdraw if a disagreement
develops with his or her client."
The new RPC 4-1.2 completely eliminates subsection (e), which dealt
with a lawyer's duties when a client asks for assistance that is not allowed
under the RPC.53 Commentary to RPC 4-1.2 is added informing the reader
to refer to RPC 4-1.4(a)(5) when faced with this situation, as the substance of
subsection (e) has been moved to that rule. 54  The commentary also ex-
pounds on advice regarding how to avoid assisting a client in committing a
crime55 and agreements limiting the scope of representation.56
Additionally, RPC 4-1.2 is one of the rules dealing with informed con-
sent, and the language "consents in writing after consultation" is changed to
"gives informed consent in writing" in subsection (c).5 7
3. RPC 4-1.3 Diligence
There is no change to the substance of this rule whatsoever.5 8 However,
language in the comment section is clarified to explain that diligently repre-
senting a client does not mean a lawyer has to forego courtesy and respect. 9
For example, a duty to act with promptness does not mean a lawyer should
not agree to a postponement if it will not prejudice his or her client. 6  In
other words, do not object just for the sake of objecting.
The commentary also adds a discussion on the obligation of the lawyer
to prosecute an appeal for a client, stating that such an obligation is depend-
ent upon the scope of representation agreed to between the client and the
lawyer.6
51. Id.
52. Id. at 428.
53. Id. at 427.
54. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 430.
55. Id. at 429.
56. Id. at 428-429.
57. Id at 427. See also discussion supra Part V.A.
58. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 430.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 431.
[Vol. 31
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4. RPC 4-1.4 Communication
The changes to this rule place a stronger obligation on the attorney to
communicate with his or her client.62 The rule is now much more specific on
how an attorney is to accomplish this. 63 For example, in subsection (a)(1),
the rule now requires an attorney to "inform the client of any decision or
circumstance" that would require informed consent by the client.(, The
comments to this subsection point specifically to a settlement offer, and ex-
plain that an attorney must inform the client of such an offer unless, pursuant
to RPC 4-1.2(a), the attorney and client have come to a previous understand-
ing as to what would be an acceptable settlement.65 Subsection (a)(2) man-
dates that an attorney consult with his or her client about the means of ac-
complishing the goals of the representation. 66 The comments to this section
explain that this duty may require an attorney to contact a client prior to the
attorney taking actions on the case, but specifically point out that this com-
munication may not be necessary in situations such as a trial.67
Subsection (a)(3) requires an attorney keep the client informed about
the status of a matter, and the comments for this section do not expound on
this concept, except to exemplify matters "such as significant developments
affecting the timing or the substance of the representation. ' '61 Subsection
(a)(4) compels an attorney to promptly comply with requests for information
from the client, but the comments explain that in the event a prompt response
is not possible, the attorney or his or her staff should at least acknowledge
receipt of the request and tell the client when a detailed response should be
expected.69 Subsection (a)(5) places an obligation on the attorney to consult
with the client if the attorney believes the client wants him or her to engage
in unethical or illegal conduct.7°
5. RPC 4-1.5 Fees and Costs for Legal Services
Rule 4-1.5 has consistently varied to a great degree among the Model
Rule, the Florida Bar rule, and the Supreme Court rule, which each maintain
62. Petition, supra note 14, at 13.
63. See Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 431.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 431-32.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 431.
2006]
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differences.7 As such, no substantive changes were made to this rule.72 The
amended comments to the rule clarify that although an attorney is prohibited
from charging a contingency fee in a domestic relations case generally, con-
tingent fees are acceptable when the attorney is asked to recover post-
judgment balances, such as back child support, alimony, etc.73
6. RPC 4-1.6 Confidentiality of Information
The beginning of Rule 4-1.6 substitutes "informed consent" for the
older "consents after disclosure."74 With this exception, not many changes
were made to Rule 4-1.6 because, like RPC 4-1.5, this rule differs substan-
tially from the Model Rule. 75 As such, the changes made by the ABA were
not applicable to the Florida rule. 76 The commentary adds a paragraph refer-
encing the different rules governing confidentiality of information from pro-
spective clients, former clients, and other conflicts. 77 Additionally, the com-
ments explain that a lawyer may disclose confidential information so he or
she can seek advice on ethical violations.78
Dissent to this rule was filed by the Sixth Circuit Public Defender, who
claimed the language requiring mandatory disclosure of confidential infor-
mation which prevents "death or substantial bodily harm," should be deleted
as redundant. 79 The Florida Bar disagreed with the dissent, stating the claim
was not redundant, and that the comment was not properly brought before
the Court because the requirement was already in the rule and was not a
change recommended by the Bar."°
7. RPC 4-1.7 Conflict of Interest; General Rule
Though it appears the changes to Rule 4-1.7 are momentous, in effect
the changes are merely made to conform to and better organize the existing
changes of the Model Rules.8' To begin, the title has been changed to Con-
71. Petition, supra note 14, at 13.
72. Id.
73. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 433.
74. Id. at 435.
75. Petition, supra note 14, at 14.
76. See Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 435.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 437.
79. Petition, supra note 14, at 14.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15.
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flict of Interest; Current Clients to reflect the specific purpose of the rule.8 2
As already noted, supra, the rule now requires a client to give informed con-
sent, which must be "confirmed in writing or clearly stated on the record."83
In its petition, the Florida Bar required consent to be in writing, but after
commentary, the Supreme Court of Florida eased the requirement so that
informed consent could also be stated merely on the record.84
8. RPC 4-1.8 Conflict of Interest; Prohibited and Other Transactions
Changes are instituted in this rule to strengthen the protection of clients
and also to conform to changes in the Model Rules.85 If a client and attorney
enter into a business transaction with each other, subdivision (a)(2) now re-
quires the attorney to inform the client, in writing, of the benefits of seeking
independent legal counsel. 86 Furthermore, subdivision (a)(3) mandates that
the written consent from the client must spell out the terms of the transaction
and the attorney's role in the transaction. 87 Subdivision (c) prevents the
attorney from soliciting a substantial gift from a client, which adds to the
current rule that an attorney is prohibited from preparing an instrument for a
client that would give the lawyer a substantial gift.88 Subsection (f) contin-
ues to put limits on a lawyer's ability to accept compensation from a third
party, 89 and subsection (1) now requires a client to give "informed con-
sent." 90 In addition, subdivision (g) requires consent to an aggregate settle-
ment to be in writing. 9' Finally, a new subdivision (k) has been created that
attributes all conflicts listed in the rule to all lawyers in the same firm.92 This
differs from the previous rule in which subdivision (c) was exempted from
this imputation.9'
Extensive commentary is added to this rule in an effort to provide more
guidance to lawyers. 94 It clarifies that subsection (a) "does not apply to ordi-
82. Id.
83. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 440; see also discussion
supra Section IV.A.
84. Id.; Petition, supra note 14, at 7.
85. Petition, supra note 14, at 16.
86. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 440.
87. Id. at 441; Petition, supra note 14, at 16.
88. Petition, supra note 14, at 16.
89. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 441.
90. Id.
91. Petition, supra note 14, at 16.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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nary fee agreements."95 Further, the commentary explains that subdivision
(a)(2) does not apply if a client has obtained independent counsel. 96 It also
explains that this rule does not prohibit a lawyer from being appointed as the
personal representative of a client's estate, or another comparable fiduciary
position, as long as the appointment meets the requirements of RPC 4-1.7.
97
Lawyers are further cautioned that they "may not subsidize lawsuits or ad-
ministrative proceedings ..., including making or guaranteeing loans to
their clients., 98 A great deal of guidance is also added regarding third-party
compensation and aggregate settlements.99 Finally, the commentary explains
that the new subdivision (k) applies to all lawyers in the same firm.'00
9. RPC 4-1.9 Conflict of Interest; Former Client
The ABA adopted substantial amendments to this rule, most of which
the Florida Bar failed to recommend.'0 ' Agreeing with the Florida Bar's
recommendations, the Supreme Court of Florida instituted minimal changes
to this rule.102 As noted supra, RPC 4-1.9 is one of the rules that changed the
terminology "consent after consultation" to "gives informed consent."'0 3
The ABA amendments require this consent to be in writing.° 4 The Florida
Bar did not recommend this change, because it believes conflicts involving
former clients are minimized by the mere fact that they are former clients.'10
The new rules delete the definition of "generally known"'' 0 6 from the
rule and add it to the commentary, 10 7 for consistency purposes. 0 8  The
amendment to the commentary clarifies that the term "generally known" is
subject to a "but for" test.0 9 Essentially, the information is not generally
known if the attorney would not have known the information "but for" the
95. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 442.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 443.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 444.
100. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 444-45.
101. Petition, supra note 14, at 18.
102. See Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 445-46.
103. Petition, supra note 14, at 18. See also discussion supra Part V.A.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 445. This terminology
refers to information being used to the disadvantage of a client unless it has become "gener-
ally known." Id.
107. Petition, supra note 14, at 18.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 446.
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attorney-client relationship. "° The new rules also decline to adopt the
ABA's attempt to clarify the term "substantially related,""' and instead give
their own definition in the commentary. 112
10. RPC 4-1.10 Imputed Disqualification; General Rule
The changes to this rule are some of the most substantial throughout the
RPC. "' To begin, the name has been changed to Imputation of Conflicts of
Interest; General Rule. "14 Under the new rule, the conflict of one attorney is
no longer imputed to the entire firm if that conflict is based on a "personal
interest" of that attorney and the representation of the client would not be
affected.' Added commentary to the rule exemplifies a situation where an
attorney's strong political beliefs are in conflict with the representation of the
client." 6 The rationale behind this change is that loyalty and the protection
of confidential information is not a concern when the conflict arises from the
personal conflict of one lawyer." 7 Therefore, as long as the other lawyers in
the firm are not affected by the personal conflict of the individual attorney,
they should be able to represent the client. "'
The new rule also adds subdivision (e), which directs that imputation of
conflicts for government lawyers is addressed by RPC 4-1.11.' ' Also added
to the commentary is language addressing the conflicts of nonlawyer em-
ployees.' 20 The commentary explains that the conflict of a nonlawyer em-
ployee is not imputed to the entire firm, though such employees should be
screened from participation in the matter.'2 ' Last, the definition of a law
firm is deleted from the commentary since that definition is now found in the
terminology section. 122
110. Petition, supra note 14, at 18; Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So.
2d at 446.
111. Petition, supra note 14, at 18.
112. Id. at 18-19; see Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 445.
113. See generally Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417 (Fla.
2006).
114. Id. at 446.
115. Id.; Petition, supra note 14, at 19.
116. Petition, supra note 14, at 19.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 446.
120. Id. at448.
121. Id.; Petition, supra note 14, at 19.
122. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 446-47.
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11. RPC 4-1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment
This rule is now titled, Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and
Current Government Officers and Employees. 123 The change of title was
intended to reflect the content of the rule more accurately. 124 Subdivision (a)
now hosts a new proviso that a former government employee, or public offi-
cer, is subject to RPC 4-1.9(b)-the rule dictating that an attorney cannot use
information learned from a former client to his or her disadvantage, unless
that information has become generally known. 125 "Consents after consulta-
tion" is changed to "gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the
representation."' 126  Also, the language in subdivision (b) is clarified with
regard to the screening of disqualified lawyers. 1
27
The definition of "confidential government information" has been
moved to new subdivision (c) from former subdivision (e).12' The old subdi-
vision (c) has been renumbered as subdivision (d), and now includes a man-
date that government employees are subject to RPC 4-1.7-Conflict of Inter-
est; Current Clients-and RPC 4-1.9-Conflict of Interest; Former Client. 129
Subdivision (d) also changes the exception to conflicts regarding government
employees. 3 ' The prior rules allowed a current government employee to
participate in a matter in which he or she was involved in private practice if
there was no one else authorized to act in his or her stead. 3' The new rules
require "informed consent" from the proper agency. 3 2 The comments to this
rule have changed, clarifying the changes made.133 Specifically, the com-
ments explain the relationship between RPC 4-1.9-Conflict of Interest;
Former Clients-and this rule. 134 They also explain why government law-
yers should be treated differently than private lawyers, explain what screen-
ing is, and define "'matter' as used in the rule."'135
123. Id. at 448.
124. Petition, supra note 14, at 20.
125. Id.; R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-1.9 (2006).
126. Petition, supra note 14, at 20.
127. Id.
128. See id.; Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 449.
129. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 449.
130. Petition, supra note 14, at 20.
131. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 449.
132. Id.
133. Petition, supra note 14, at 20.
134. Id.
135. Id.
[Vol. 31
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
12. RPC 4-1.12 Former Judge or Arbitrator
The title to this rule has been changed to encompass other third-party
neutrals, such as former mediators. 136 The title now reads, Former Judge or
Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral. 137 Because more law-
yers are serving in the capacity of third-party neutrals, the Florida Bar and
the Supreme Court of Florida found it necessary to make it clear that this rule
applies to all lawyers who have served in this capacity.' 38 The rule also adds
the caveat that all parties must give informed consent, which is confirmed in
writing, to waive the conflict of interest. 139 The Florida rule also adds com-
mentary that a Bar member who happens to also be a certified mediator must
adhere to other rules relating to certified mediators. 40
13. RPC 4-1.13 Organization as Client
The only change to this rule requires that a lawyer explain the identity
of the client if "the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organi-
zation's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the law-
yer is dealing."'' This is compared to the prior language, which only re-
quired an explanation if it was "apparent" to the attorney.'42 The commen-
tary regarding the identity of a government client is amended for clarity pur-
poses, specifically addressing a government entity as a client. '43
14. RPC 4-1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
Most of the changes to this rule were made to conform to the Model
Rules.'" One change which is not consistent with the Model Rules, how-
ever, is the new requirement for the mandatory withdrawal of an attorney
from a case if the client has used the attorney's services to commit a
crime. 14 Prior to this change, an attorney was permitted to withdraw under
such circumstances, but the rules did not require it. 146 An attorney is also
136. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 452.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at453.
141. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 453.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 454; see also Petition, supra note 14, at 23.
144. Petition, supra note 14, at 24.
145. Id.
146. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 455.
2006]
17
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA W REVIEW
permitted, but not required, to withdraw if a client insists on taking action
"with which [a] lawyer has a fundamental disagreement," pursuant to subdi-
vision (b)(2)."'7 Subdivision (c) now requires a lawyer to obtain court per-
mission for withdrawal when applicable.' 48 The comments exemplify situa-
tions, such as pending litigation, where counsel may be required to obtain
leave of court before withdrawal.'49 Subdivision (d) now adds mention of
refunding unused cost advances, similar to unused fees. 1
50
15. RPC 4-1.17 Sale of Law Practice
Based on changes to the Model Rules, Florida has modified this rule to
allow the sale of part of a law practice, rather than the former requirement
that the entire practice be sold. 5' The Florida Rule differs still from the
Model Rule, however, in that the ABA requires an attorney to discontinue
practicing law in the area of the practice that is sold, while Florida does
not. 152
16. RPC 4-1.18 Duties to Prospective Client
This is an entirely new rule, based on the new Model Rule 1.18, which
essentially addresses an attorney's duty to maintain the confidences of a pro-
spective client.' 53 Subdivision (a) defines a prospective client, while subdi-
vision (b) explains that the confidences of a prospective client must be kept,
regardless of whether the client retains the attorney. '54 Subdivision (c) pre-
vents an attorney from representing a client whose interests may be adverse
to another prospective client, if information gained from the prospective cli-
ent "could be used to the disadvantage of' the prospective client.'55 The
Model Rule boasts the language "could be significantly harmful to," rather
than "could be used to the disadvantage of.' 56 The Florida Bar recom-
mended the change in language because it thought the suggested verbiage
147. Id.
148. Id. at 456.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 457.
152. Petition, supra note 14, at 25.
153. Id.
154. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 459.
155. Id. at 459-60.
156. Petition, supra note 14, at 26.
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more closely conformed to the existing concepts in Florida,157 and the Su-
preme Court of Florida agreed. 1
58
The Florida Bar and the Supreme Court of Florida did not agree, how-
ever, on one aspect of the new ABA Rule. 59 The ABA adopted two excep-
tions to the ban on representation based on subdivision (c). 6 ° First, if both
the affected client and prospective client give informed consent, which is
confirmed in writing, the representation will be allowed."'6 Likewise, if the
lawyer who received the information was screened from the process, the firm
may continue to represent the client.'62 The Florida Bar found this unaccept-
able, as the Florida rules do not generally use screening to resolve conflicts,
with the exception of government lawyers and judges. 163 The Supreme Court
of Florida disagreed and adopted the rule as written by the ABA. '6
B. Counselor
1. RPC 4-2.1 Adviser
No substantive changes were made to this rule, but the commentary was
amended to add a discussion about informing clients of reasonable alterna-
tive dispute resolution. 65
2. RPC 4-2.2 Intermediary
The ABA deleted this rule in its entirety from the Model Rules. 166 Flor-
ida chose to follow suit and also deleted the rule. 167 The ABA originally
adopted RPC 4-2.2 because the ABA considered the representation of multi-
ple clients to be prohibited.6 8 Today, however, it is much more acceptable
to represent multiple clients, and the Florida Bar reasoned that RPC 4-1.7
handles issues regarding this type of representation. 69 In an effort to main-
157. See id.
158. See Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 459-60.
159. Id. at419.
160. Petition, supra note 14, at 26.
161. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 460.
162. Id.
163. Petition, supra note 14, at 26.
164. See Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 418-419.
165. Id. at 461; Petition, supra note 14, at 27.
166. Petition, supra note 14, at 27.
167. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 462-63.
168. Petition, supra note 14, at 27.
169. Id.
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tain continuity, the Florida Bar and the Supreme Court of Florida decided to
designate the number as "open," rather than renumber the entire section. 7 0
3. RPC 4-2.3 Evaluation for Use by Third Persons
In subdivision (a), the term has been changed to "provide" evaluation,
rather than "undertake" evaluation.17' Further, "informed consent" is substi-
tuted for the prior "consents after consultation," as discussed in Section
IV.A., above. 172 The additions to the commentary emphasize that a lawyer
shall not make a knowingly false statement in performing an evaluation.
173
The commentary refers the reader to RPC 4-4.1, which deals with "Truthful-
ness in Statements to Others."' 174
4. RPC 4-2.4 Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral
The ABA adopted an entirely new rule discussing lawyers serving as
third-party neutrals, and the Florida Bar recommended the adoption of this
rule in its entirety to the Supreme Court of Florida. 17' The Court agreed, and
new RPC 4-2.4 was born. 176 The new rule defines a lawyer as a third-party
neutral "when the lawyer assists [two] or more persons who are not clients of
the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen
between them."' 177 The rule itself gives such examples as an arbitrator or
mediator.78 The rule requires a lawyer serving in this capacity to inform the
parties that he or she does not represent them. 17' Furthermore, the lawyer
has a duty to correct any misunderstanding regarding the lawyer's role.18 0
Extensive commentary is added to explain these new requirements. ' 8'
170. Id. at 27-28.
171. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 463.
172. Id. at 464; see also supra Section IV.A. (discussing the general changes involving
consent).
173. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 464-65.
174. Id.
175. Petition, supra note 14, at 28.
176. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 418.
177. Id. at 465.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 465.
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C. Advocate
1. RPC 4-3.1 Meritorious Claims and Contentions
This rule has always required an attorney to have a valid basis to bring
an action, and the changes to this rule insert the terms "in law and fact" after
the word "basis."18 2 The commentary explains a lawyer's obligation to in-
vestigate a client's case before arguing the client's case. 8 3 The rule also
points out that constitutional law may require an attorney defending a crimi-
nal client to present a claim that would otherwise be prohibited under this
section, but such constitutional matters take precedence over the Model
Rules. '"
2. RPC 4-3.2 Expediting Litigation
No substantive changes were made to this rule, but language was added
that a lawyer shall not routinely delay a matter for his or her own conven-
ience. '85
3. RPC 4-3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
The Florida Bar proposed several changes to this rule, which were re-
jected by the Supreme Court of Florida. 186 *The Court cited concerns with
possible contradictions within the proposed rule, and directed the Florida Bar
to study the rule further.'
87
4. RPC 4-3.6 Trial Publicity
The ABA Model Rule regarding trial publicity varies greatly from the
Florida rule.188 The Florida Bar recommended changes to the Florida rule to
conform to ABA Model Rule 3.6, but the Supreme Court of Florida rejected
these changes. 189
182. Id. at 466.
183. See id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 466-67.
186. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 419.
187. Id.
188. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT R. 3.6 (2002), with R. REGULATING THE
FLA. BAR R. 4-3.6 (2006).
189. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 419.
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5. RPC 4-3.7 Lawyer as Witness
There were no substantive changes to this rule.'90 Some terminology is
changed, in an effort to conform to the Model Rules, and commentary is
added explaining the rationale for the rule. 19 1
6. RPC 4-3.8 Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The Florida Bar proposed some extensive changes to this rule, including
the implementation of an obligation on the part of the prosecutor to ensure a
person accused of a crime has been advised of the right to counsel.192 The
Supreme Court of Florida chose not to adopt any of the changes recom-
mended by the Florida Bar. 93 The Court explained its reasoning for not
adopting these changes in detail, and essentially found that the obligations
being placed on prosecutors under this section would be more proper under
the criminal procedure rules, rather than the RPC. 1
94
7. RPC 4-3.9 Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings
This rule deals with the representation of a client before a body such as
the legislature or an administrative agency.' 95 The rule is expanded here to
require an attorney to deal honestly with the tribunal.' 96 Diverging from the
Model Rules, the Florida rule now allows ex parte contacts with the decision
maker.197 The Florida Bar found such a prohibition was "inconsistent with
the legislative and administrative process in government" and "unduly bur-
densome to practicing attorneys."' 9t
190. See id. at 467.
191. Id.
192. Petition, supra note 14, at 31.
193. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 419.
194. Id.
195. Id. at468.
196. Id. The prior rule stated that an attorney "should" deal honestly, and the new rule
dictates that an attorney "must" be honest. Id.
197. Petition, supra note 14, at 32.
198. Id.
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D. Transactions with Persons Other than Clients
1. RPC 4-4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
There are no substantive changes to this rule, but commentary is added
providing guidance on the meaning of misrepresentation.'99 The changes
proposed by the Florida Bar conformed generally to the Model Rules, but
deviated slightly.200 Finding no explanation for the deviation, the Supreme
Court of Florida chose to adopt the commentary as found in the Model Rule,
as opposed to the proposal by the Florida Bar.20'
2. RPC 4-4.2 Communication with Person Represented by Counsel
The Florida Bar proposed adding a comma to subdivision (a), but the
Supreme Court of Florida neither adopted that change nor commented on the
matter.22 The Court did, however, adopt the proposed additions to the com-
mentary.20 3 Several additions explain the rationale of the rule and its appli-
cation,2° Special considerations for a client that is an organization are also
discussed. 20' Additionally, the comments make clear that a violation occurs
only if the lawyer has actual knowledge that the person is represented by
counsel, and also reference RPC 4-4.3-Dealing with Unrepresented Per-
sons. 
206
199. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 468-69.
200. The Florida Bar's proposal reads:
Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of with-
drawal. In extreme cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose infor-
mation relating to the representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the cli-
ent's crime or fraud, to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.
Appendix D, supra note 8, at 181-82. Compare ABA Model Rule 4.1 with the rule as
amended by the Supreme Court of Florida which reads:
Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of with-
drawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. In extreme
cases, substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information relating to the
representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud.
Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 469-70.
201. Id. at 469.
202. Compare Petition, supra note 14, at 33, with Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla.
Bar, 933 So. 2d at 470.
203. Compare Petition, supra note 14, at 33, with Amends. to the Rules Regulating the
Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 470-71.
204. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 470.
205. Id. at 470-71.
206. Id. at 471.
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3. RPC 4-4.3 Dealing with Unrepresented Persons
In conformity with Model Rule 4.3, the Florida rule moves the "provi-
sion that a lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person...
from the commentary to the body of the rule."2 7 The Model Rule also adds
a provision allowing a lawyer to give legal advice to an unrepresented per-
son, as long as that person's "interests are not in conflict with the [interests
of the lawyer's] client. 202 The Florida Bar did not recommend adopting that
addition, however, "because of the danger that an attorney-client relationship
may be created with the unrepresented person pursuant to case law in Flor-
ida. 2 9 The commentary is modified to conform to substantive changes in
the rule and to add a reference to RPC 4-1.13-Organization as Client.
210
4. RPC 4-4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons
Because of the proliferation of e-mail and other electronic forms of
communication, the issue of misdelivered documents arises quite fre-
quently. 21' The new Model Rule 4.4 added a provision obligating the recipi-
ent of such an inadvertent document to notify the sender promptly, and the
new Florida rule reflects this requirement.2 12 The commentary to the Florida
rule also provides guidance on how to handle this situation. 213 The commen-
tary does not, however, reach the issue of whether such a document is privi-
leged, or whether the recipient must return the document.
214
E. Law Firms and Associations
1. RPC 4-5.1 Responsibilities of a Partner or Supervisory Lawyer
The title of this rule has been changed to, Responsibilities of Partners,
Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers.2 5 The changes to this rule extend the
responsibilities of a partner to all lawyers in the firm who have managerial
207. Petition, supra note 14, at 34.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at34-35.
212. Petition, supra note 14, at 34-35.
213. See In re Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d 417, 472 (Fla.
2006).
214. Petition, supra note 14, at 35.
215. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 472.
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authority.216 Language listing the types of partners affected by this rule is
deleted as redundant in subdivision (a) and (c)(2), as this list can be found in
the commentary." 7 The commentary also clarifies the difference between a
lawyer with managerial authority, such as a partner, and a lawyer with direct
supervisory authority over another lawyer. 218 Finally, the commentary clari-
fies that although a partner may be held liable for a lawyer's conduct, the
lawyer's personal duty to abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct is not
altered.2t 9
2. RPC 4-5.3 Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants
The term "authorized business entity" is changed to "law firm," in sub-
division (a) of this rule because law firm is defined elsewhere in the rules.220
The rule also expands the responsibility of assuring the compliance of
nonlawyers with the Rules of Professional Conduct to all attorneys with
managerial authority comparable to that of a partner." The comments now
read that a lawyer "must" give assistants appropriate instruction on ethical
considerations, as opposed to the prior rule which only stated a lawyer
"should" do so. 222
3. RPC 4-5.4 Professional Independence of a Lawyer
Following the Model Rules, this rule now allows lawyers to share court-
awarded fees with nonprofit, pro bono legal service organizations that either
employ or recommend a lawyer in the matter.23  The ABA Ethics 2000
Commission believed that such a division of fees provided "less of a 'threat
to independent professional judgment"' than the other fee-sharing arrange-
ments still prohibited by the rule. 224 Further, subdivision (e) broadens the
prohibition against nonlawyer officers to include nonlawyers who hold posi-
216. Id.
217. See id. at 472-73.
218. Id. at 473.
219. Id.
220. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 474; Petition, supra note
14, at 35.
221. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 474-75.
222. Id. at 475.
223. Petition, supra note 14, at 36.
224. Id.
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tions similar to corporate officers.225 Commentary was also added to reflect
these changes.226
4. RPC 4-5.6 Restrictions on Right to Practice
This rule is expanded to prohibit a lawyer from not only making a part-
nership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of lawyers to prac-
tice after termination of the relationship, but also a shareholder, operating, or
other similar type of agreement that would do the same.227 The commentary
also replaces the term "partners or associates" with "lawyers" to reflect the
fact that lawyers do not always work together in such a traditional way.228
F. Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession
1. RPC 4-8.1 Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters
No changes are made to the body of this rule, but the commentary re-
flects new language requiring the "correction of any prior misstatement" in a
bar application or disciplinary proceeding. 229
2. RPC 4-8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
A change in the language of this rule now dictates that a lawyer "who
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct"'23° must report that lawyer to the Florida Bar, rather
than the prior requirement that a lawyer "have knowledge" of the viola-
tion. 31 This change was made to conform to the Model Rules.232 The rule
also now creates an exception to this reporting requirement, which also con-
forms to the Model Rules, wherein disclosure is not required if the knowl-
edge of the lawyer's conduct is gained through a lawyer assistance pro-
gram. 233 This exception is an effort to encourage lawyers to participate in
such programs.234
225. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 476.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Petition, supra note 14, at 37.
229. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 477.
230. Id. (emphasis added).
231. Id.
232. Petition, supra note 14, at 37.
233. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d at 478.
234. Petition, supra note 14, at 37.
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3. 4-8.4 Misconduct
This rule adds a provision prohibiting a lawyer from achieving results
by violating the Rules of Professional Conduct.235 Commentary added to the
rule provides guidance when one lawyer is responsible for the misconduct of
another lawyer. 236
G. 5-1.1 Rules Regulating Trust Accounts
This rule clarifies the lawyer's obligation when more than one person
has an interest in a trust fund that the lawyer is holding.237 A provision is
also added that provides a "lawyer shall promptly distribute all" undisputed
funds.238 Commentary was further changed to make clear that some duties,
such as keeping disputed funds in a trust account, are mandatory.239
VI. CONCLUSION
Though many of these amendments were cosmetic in nature, there are
some that may have a significant effect on practitioners. It is suggested that
all attorneys practicing in Florida review the new rules as amended, and that
all Florida practitioners take particular notice of RPC 4-1.4240_
Communication; RPC 4-1.8 241 -Conflict of Interest; Prohibited and Other
Transactions; RPC 4-1.10 242-Imputation of Conflicts of Interest; General
Rule; RPC 4-1.11 243-Special Conflicts of Interest for Former and Current
Government Officers and Employees; RPC 4-1.1 8244-Duties to Prospective
Client; RPC 4-4.3245-Dealing with Unrepresented Persons; RPC 4-4.4246_
Respect for Rights of Third Persons; RPC 4-5.1 247-Responsibilities of Part-
ners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers; and RPC 4-5.3248_
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants. As the practice of law
235. Amends. to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 933 So. 2d. at 478-79.
236. Id. at 479.
237. Id. at 480.
238. Id.
239. Seeid. at481.
240. R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-1.4 (2006).
241. Id. R. 4-1.8.
242. Id. R. 4-1.10.
243. Id. R. 4-1.11.
244. Id. R. 4-1.18.
245. R. REGULATING THE FLA. BARR. 4-4.3.
246. Id. R. 4-4.4.
247. Id. R. 4-5.1.
248. Id. R. 4-5.3.
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changes, so does the regulation of its practitioners. Only time will tell how
these changes to the ethics rules will affect the practice of law in the State of
Florida.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A nonprofit corporation can be characterized as either a "public benefit"
organization or a "mutual benefit" organization.' Public benefit organiza-
tions, also referred to as charitable corporations or charities, exist to provide
a benefit to society.2 Mutual benefit organizations, often referred to as mem-
bership organizations, exist to provide a benefit to their members.' Florida,
like many states, uses a "one size fits all" approach to determine who has
standing to bring suit against directors of nonprofit corporations for breach of
fiduciary duties.4 That is, for both mutual benefit and public benefit non-
profit corporations, states restrict the parties who have standing to challenge
the actions of the directors on behalf of the corporation.' Standing is granted
1. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 74 (3d ed. 2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 74-75.
4. See Fox v. Prof 1 Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001).
5. For example, the Georgia Nonprofit Corporations Code provides in relevant part:
A corporation's power to act may be challenged: (1) [i]n a proceeding by a member against the
corporation to enjoin the act; (2) [i]n a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or
through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, against an incumbent or former direc-
tor, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or (3) [i]n a proceeding by the Attorney
General under Code Section 14-2-1430.
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-3-304(b)(l)-(3) (Supp. 2006). Similarly, the Connecticut Revised Non-
stock Corporation Act states in relevant part:
(b) A corporation's power to act may be challenged: (1) [i]n a proceeding by a member or di-
rector against the corporation to enjoin the act; (2) in a proceeding by the corporation, directly,
derivatively or through a receiver, trustee or other legal representative, against an incumbent or
former director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation; or (3) in a proceeding by the At-
torney General to dissolve the corporation or to enjoin the corporation from the conduct of un-
authorized affairs.
(c) In a member's or director's proceeding under subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of this section
to enjoin an unauthorized corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the act, if equitable
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only to members, directors, and legal representatives of the nonprofit corpo-
ration, as well as to the state's attorney general.6
In light of the distinctions between the two types of nonprofit corpora-
tions, this article proposes that the Florida Legislature include a standing
provision in the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act7 that ensures that
directors, of both mutual benefit and public benefit nonprofit corporations,
are held accountable to all of the constituencies they serve. This article ar-
gues that Florida's current approach, while adequately protecting the inter-
ests of mutual benefit nonprofit corporations, does not achieve for many pub-
lic benefit nonprofit corporations its desired goal of protecting nonprofit cor-
porations from the harmful acts of directors. Florida's approach to standing
leaves the actions of directors of public benefit nonprofit corporations virtu-
ally untouchable and unchallengeable.8
This issue is especially timely given the recent approval of the Uniform
Trust Code,9 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and Florida's subsequent adoption of it.' 0 The stated purpose of
the Uniform Trust Code is to "provide [s]tates with precise, comprehensive,
and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions."'" Because of a
settlor's special interest in a charitable trust, the drafters created section
405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code, which grants standing to a settlor of a
charitable trust to sue the trustees for breach of fiduciary duty. 2 Charitable
trusts and charitable corporations are both used to accomplish charitable pur-
and if all affected persons are parties to the proceeding, and may award damages for loss, other
than anticipated profits, suffered by the corporation or another party because of the enjoining of
the unauthorized act.
(d) the Attomey General may, upon his own information or upon complaint of an interested
party, bring an action in the name of the state to restrain any person from purporting to have, or
exercising, corporate powers not granted.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-1038(b)-(d) (West 2005).
6. See id.
7. See FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
8. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
9. UNIF. TRUST CODE (amended 2005).
10. See UTCproject.org, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, http://utcproject.org (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
The [United Trust Code] was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws (NCCUSL) in 2000. Minor amendments to the Code were made in 2001,
2003, 2004, and 2005. The [United Trust Code] has been enacted in 19 jurisdictions-Kansas,
Nebraska, Wyoming, New Mexico, District of Columbia, Utah, Maine, Tennessee, New
Hampshire, Missouri, Arkansas, Virginia, South Carolina, Oregon, North Carolina, and, re-
cently, Alabama, Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. It is under study in numerous other states.
Id.
11. UNIF. TRUST CODE Prefatory Note (amended 2005).
12. Id. § 405 & cmt. "The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a
proceeding to enforce the trust." Id. § 405(c).
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poses. 13 Thus, given the similarities between the two, it is time for donors,
and others with a special interest in a charitable nonprofit corporation, to be
treated the same as their counterparts in the charitable trust arena and be
given a comparable right to enforce the fiduciary duties of the directors of
the corporation.
Part II of this article explains what it means for a corporation to be rec-
ognized as a Florida charitable, public benefit, nonprofit corporation. Part III
of the article explores the role of directors in Florida nonprofit corporations.
Part IV of the article discusses the current state of Florida law regarding who
has standing to bring suit for enforcement of the duties directors owe to non-
profit corporations. Part V of the article explains why Florida law must be
changed if mutual benefit and public benefit corporations are to be treated
similarly with respect to standing. Part VI of the article proposes that the
Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act include a private attorney general
provision which would allow those with a legitimate stake in the public
benefit nonprofit corporation to enforce the duties of the directors. The pro-
posal is based, in part, on the rationale used to grant standing to settlors in
the charitable trust area. Finally, Part VII of the article concludes by calling
for an amendment to the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act which rec-
ognizes the special interests certain constituencies have in charitable corpora-
tions.
II. WHAT IS A CHARITABLE CORPORATION?
A corporation is a charitable corporation if it has been organized as a
nonprofit corporation under state law 4 and has complied with the require-
ments established by the Internal Revenue Code for charitable organiza-
tions.'5 Thus, the nonprofit corporate status of a charitable corporation is
determined by state law, while the charitable nature of the charitable corpo-
ration is established by federal law.
Complicating matters, the terms nonprofit and charitable are sometimes
used as if they are interchangeable. Charitable corporations are, however, a
subset of nonprofit corporations. 6 All charitable corporations are nonprofit
13. See MARILYN E. PHELAN & ROBERT J. DESIDERIO, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS LAW
AND POLICY 31 (2003).
14. Seeid.at30-31.
15. See id. at 169-71; Internal Revenue Serv., U. S. Dep't of the Treasury, Exemption
Requirements, http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/o,,id=96099,00.html (last visited
Jan. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Exemption Requirements].
16. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 1.
[Vol. 31
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corporations, but not all nonprofit corporations are charitable. 7 While a
corporation may be a nonprofit corporation, its purpose need not be charita-
ble. " Nonprofit corporations are simply corporations that can be distin-
guished from for-profit corporations, primarily, on the basis of one fact: no
part of a nonprofit corporation's profits may be distributed to owners of the
corporation.' 9 Unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofit corporations must
reinvest any profits in the corporation.2"
The Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act is found in chapter 617 of
the Florida Statutes.2 Nonprofit corporations can be formed in Florida for
many different purposes. In fact, section 617.0301 of the Florida Statutes
includes a non-exclusive list of twenty-two permissible purposes for non-
profit corporations. 2' According to the statute, nonprofit corporations may
be organized for "charitable, benevolent, eleemosynary, 23 educational, his-
torical, civic, patriotic, political, religious, social, fraternal, literary, cultural,
athletic, scientific, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and profes-
sional, commercial, industrial, or trade association purposes. ' 24 The defining
characteristic of a Florida nonprofit corporation, like all nonprofit corpora-
tions, is that it does not distribute any part of its income or profit to members,
directors, or officers. 25 This characteristic distinguishes a nonprofit corpora-
tion from a for-profit or business corporation that may distribute its profits to
its owners in the form of dividends paid to shareholders.26
Charitable corporations are nonprofit corporations that have applied for
and received recognition from the Internal Revenue Service as having com-
plied with the requirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code.27 In order for an organization to qualify for charitable status under
section 501(c)(3), five things must be true: 1) it must take the form of a cor-
poration, community chest, fund, or foundation; 2) it must be organized and
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2. "Nonprofit organizations are not prohibited from making a profit. The pro-
hibition is against the distribution of any profits to members, officers, or directors of the or-
ganization, or to other private individuals or entities." Id.
20. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 2.
21. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
22. Id. §617.0301.
23. Eleemosynary means "[rielating or devoted to charity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
467 (5th ed. 1979).
24. FLA. STAT. § 617.0301.
25. Id. § 617.01401(5).
26. Compare id. § 607.06401(1), with § 617.01401(5).
27. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
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operated primarily for a charitable" purpose; 3) the net earnings of the or-
ganization may not inure to the benefit of a private person; 4) the organiza-
tion may not engage in a substantial amount of lobbying activities; and 5) the
organization must not be involved in any political campaigns. 29
A. Charitable Corporations Are Public Benefit Organizations
Corporations that satisfy both the requirements of chapter 617 of the
Florida Statutes and section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are also
referred to as "public benefit" organizations. 30 The corporations are public
benefit organizations because they exist to provide a benefit to the public, or
to some segment of the public, and not to provide a benefit to their owners,
shareholders, members, or benefactors. 31  Historically, the goal of public
benefit organizations was to alleviate poverty by feeding the poor, housing
the homeless, caring for the elderly, tending to the sick, and engaging in
other activities that involved the provision of essential goods and services to
those who could not care for themselves.32 Over time however, the concept
of public benefit has expanded to also include other activities that provide a
benefit to society.33 The provision of education, both formal and informal,
support of religion, advancement of science, and the elimination of prejudice
and discrimination are all ways organizations can provide a benefit to soci-
ety.34 Additionally, organizations that promote the arts are considered public
benefit organizations.35 While the activities of these organizations may not
be charitable, as the term is traditionally understood, they enrich society in
ways that provide a benefit to the public.36 Thus, museums, symphonies, and
theater groups can be operated as charities. 3
28. Organizations that are recognized as having satisfied the requirements of section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are commonly referred to as charitable organizations.
See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 74. In order to be considered a 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion, the purpose of the organization must be "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for pub-
lic safety, literary, . . . education[] .... foster[ing] national or international amateur sports
competition.... or the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
29. See id. Throughout this paper, corporations that have been recognized as section
501 (c)(3) organizations will be referred to as charities or charitable organizations.
30. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 74.
31. Id. at 75.
32. See generally id. at 87-89 (discussing charitable purposes).
33. See id. at 89.
34. Exemption Requirements, supra note 15.
35. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE TO STARTING AND MANAGING A NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION 40 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE].
36. See id.
37. See id.
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B. Charitable Corporations Are a Subset of Tax Exempt Organizations
Charitable corporations are often referred to as tax exempt organiza-
tions because the income of these organizations is exempt from federal in-
come tax.38 The Internal Revenue Code provides that corporations are sub-
ject to an annual income tax.39 Charitable corporations, however, are exempt
from this tax pursuant to section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.4 ° In
addition to the exemption of the charity's income from federal income taxa-
tion, donors to certain charities are generally entitled to deduct the amount of
their charitable donations from the income on which they will have to pay
federal income tax.4' This deduction is available to donors to nonprofit or-
ganizations that are also recognized as section 501(c)(3) organizations, as
well as certain other tax exempt organizations. 42  However, donations to
most other types of tax exempt organizations are not deductible from the
donor's taxable income.4
3
Furthermore, Florida law provides preferential tax treatment to charita-
ble corporations in the areas of property, sales, use, and income taxes.'
Property owned by an exempt entity and exclusively used for "educational,
literary, scientific, religious, charitable, or governmental purposes" 41 is ex-
empt from Florida's property tax.46 Florida charities are also exempt from
paying state sales and use tax.47 Finally, the only taxable income earned by a
Florida charity is income that is derived from any commercial activity under-
taken by the charity that is unrelated to its charitable purpose. 48 Therefore,
38. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000).
39. Id. § 11 (a). "A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of
every corporation." Id.
40. Id. § 501(a). "An organization described in [§ 501(c)(3)] shall be exempt from taxa-
tion...." Id.
41. I.R.C. § 170(a)(1). "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribu-
tion .... " Id. The Internal Revenue Code limits the amount of the deduction to 50% or less
of the donor's taxable income. Id. § 170(b)(1)(A).
42. See id. § 170(c). The code also allows a donor donating to governmental bodies,
veterans' organizations, fraternal organizations, and cemetery companies to deduct the contri-
butions from the donor's adjusted gross income. Id.
43. See I.R.C. § 170(a) and (c).
44. See FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012, .192, 212.098(7)(k)-(q), 220.13(2)(h) (2006).
45. Id. § 196.012(1).
46. Id. § 196.192.
47. See id. § 212.08(7)(p). "Also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter are sales
or leases to organizations determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be currently exempt
from federal income tax pursuant to s. 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code .... Id.
48. See FLA. STAT. § 220.13(2)(h). "'Taxable income,' in the case of an organization
which is exempt from the federal income tax by reason of s. 501(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code, means its unrelated business taxable income .. " Id.
2006]
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any income generated by the charitable activities of the organization-for
example, tuition charged for education-is not subject to Florida income
tax.49
The primary reason that charities and their donors are entitled to prefer-
ential tax treatment is that they provide a benefit to society. Charitable
corporations are thought to alleviate the burdens of government by providing
goods and services to the public that the government and for-profit organiza-
tions-two other types of societal institutions that provide goods and ser-
vices to the public--cannot, or will not, provide in sufficient quantities."
Governments may not be able to provide the goods or services because it
would not be efficient for government to do so. In addition, it may not be
appropriate for government to provide the goods and services if it would
involve entanglement with religion. For-profit organizations may not be
interested in providing many of the goods and services provided by charita-
ble corporations because there is no significant profit to be made by doing
so. 2 In exchange for the contributions they make to society-both by less-
ening the burdens of government and by increasing the quality of life of its
citizens-charities and their donors are treated favorably by state law and the
Internal Revenue Code. 
53
C. Charitable Corporations Distinguished from Mutual Benefit Corpora-
tions
Charitable corporations must be distinguished from mutual benefit non-
profit corporations. Rather than benefiting the public, mutual benefit corpo-
rations exist to provide a benefit to members of the organization. 4 Like
charitable nonprofit corporations, mutual benefit nonprofit corporations are
governed by chapter 617 of the Florida Statutes.55
Mutual benefit nonprofit corporations may be recognized as tax exempt
organizations for tax purposes as well. Section 501(c) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code delineates organizations, other than charities, whose income is
exempt from the federal income tax. 6 Business leagues, social clubs, labor
49. See id.
50. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 327-28 (discussing the rationale for chari-
table tax exemptions).
51. See id. at 43-44 (explaining the rationale for the nonprofit sector).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 327-28.
54. Id. at 74.
55. FLA. STAT. § 617 (2006).
56. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2000).
[Vol. 31
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organizations, and horticultural organizations are just a few of the different
types of organizations listed in section 501(c).57 Homeowners associations 8
and political organizations59 are also tax exempt organizations pursuant to
other sections of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations to mutual benefit tax
exempt organizations are not deductible from the donor's taxable income.6°
III. ROLE OF DIRECTORS IN NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS
A nonprofit corporation is governed by a board of directors.6' It is the
members of the board of directors who collectively guide the nonprofit cor-
62poration's operations. Perhaps most importantly, directors are charged
with knowing the purpose of the nonprofit corporation they serve and with
working within the law to achieve and maximize this purpose.63
A. Fiduciary Relationship
It is generally recognized that the relationship between the director of a
nonprofit corporation and the corporation is a fiduciary one. 64 As a result,
directors owe three major fiduciary duties to the charity. 65 The first duty is
the duty of obedience.66 According to this duty, directors of nonprofit corpo-
57. See id. Mutual benefit organizations listed in this section include: labor, agricultural
or horticultural organizations, business leagues, chambers of commerce, recreational clubs,
and fraternal beneficiary societies. Id.
58. See id. § 528.
59. See id. § 527.
60. See HOPKINS, A LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 35, at 30.
61. FLA. STAT. § 617.0801 (2006). "All corporate powers must be exercised by or under
the authority of, and the affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors...." Id.
62. Id.
63. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 6 (George W. Overton &
Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002).
64. Fox v. Prof I Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2001). See also 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 844.10 (2002).
65. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 2 (2003) [here-
inafter HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES].
The duties of the board of directors of a nonprofit organization can be encapsulated in the three Ds:
[D]uty of care, duty of loyalty, and duty of obedience. Defined by case law, these are the legal stan-
dards against which all actions taken by directors are held. They are collective duties adhering to the
entire board and require the active participation of all board members. Accountability can be demon-
strated by showing the effective discharge of these duties.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
66. Id. at 4.
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rations must obey the articles of incorporation and the bylaws of the corpora-
tion, and remain faithful to the mission and goals of the corporation.67
The second duty, the duty of loyalty, requires the directors to act in the
best interest of the charitable corporation.68 This duty requires directors to
resolve any conflicts of interests with the corporation in favor of the corpora-
tion. 69 This duty also requires directors to avoid usurping opportunities that
the corporation may wish to obtain.7"
The duty of care is the third duty owed to the corporation by its direc-
tors.71 The duty of care requires directors to devote to the corporation the
time needed to actually manage its affairs. 72 It also requires directors to edu-
cate themselves about the issues facing the corporation and the consequences
of decisions they make on behalf of the corporation.73 In addition, the duty
of care imposes upon directors a responsibility to discover and expose any
acts that may inflict harm upon the corporation.74
B. Florida Statute Concerning Directors' Fiduciary Duties
Florida, like many other states, has codified the duty of care for direc-
tors of nonprofit corporations.75 Section 617.0830 of the Florida Statutes
provides:
(1) A director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, in-
cluding his or her duties as a member of a committee:
(a) In good faith;
(b) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) In a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation.76
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 4-7.
69. See NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 191-197 (Victor Futter ed., 2002).
70. 1 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 4:06 (2000).
71. HOPKINS, LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 65, at 3.
72. See id.; GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 63, at
19.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. FLA. STAr. § 617.0830(1)(a)-(c) (2006); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-830
(2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1986 (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 IB, § 8.30 (1997).
[Vol. 31
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This section, however, has only been cited a few times by Florida courts
ruling on disputes.77 Therefore, there is very little guidance available to de-
termine how it will be applied in particular situations.
C. Florida Case Law Concerning Directors'Fiduciary Duties
The vast majority of Florida cases involving the duties of directors of
nonprofit corporations involve non-charitable nonprofit corporations, spe-
cifically condominium and homeowners' associations." Careful analysis of
the relevant cases reveals that Florida courts treat the duties more broadly, as
fiduciary duties that involve obedience, loyalty, and care without identifying
or labeling them as such. 79  For example, in Penthouse North Ass'n v.
Lombardi, 80 the Supreme Court of Florida found that a condominium asso-
ciation could bring an action against its directors when the directors, who
also leased property to the nonprofit corporation, included a rent escalation
clause in the lease without informing the members of the association.8 The
Court recognized that directors who "us[e] their position[s] to enrich them-
selves at the expense of the [nonprofit corporation]" are in breach of their
fiduciary duties. 82 Likewise, in Taylor v. Wellington Station Condominium
Ass'n,83 the Court denied a director's motion for summary judgment when
members of the nonprofit condominium association alleged that the director
"acted solely at the urging of the developer in order to achieve financial
gain." 84 In Taylor, the director of the nonprofit corporation was also an offi-
cer of the for-profit developer of the condominium.85 In addition to alleg-
edly acting in the best interest of the developer, rather than in the best inter-
est of the condominium association, it was argued that the director never
attended the condominium association's board meetings.86 By denying the
76. FLA. STAT. § 617.0830(1)(a)-(c).
77. See, e.g., Fox v. Profl Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180-81 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (concerning a civil case involving a breach of a fiduciary duty); State
v. Justice, 624 So. 2d 402, 404 n.8 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (concerning a criminal case
involving an alleged theft by a director of a nonprofit corporation).
78. See, e.g., Penthouse N. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 461 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 1984);
Taylor v. Wellington Station Condo. Ass'n Inc., 633 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
79. See generally Penthouse N. Ass'n, 461 So. 2d at 1350; Taylor, 633 So. 2d at 43.
80. 461 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1984).
81. Id. at 1352.
82. Id. at 1351.
83. 633 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
84. Id. at 44.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 44 n.l.
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director's motion for summary judgment, the Court found that the director's
actions and inactions could constitute a breach of fiduciary duties. 7
Two cases involving charitable nonprofit corporations also discuss gen-
erally directors' fiduciary obligations to their charities. 88 In State ex rel. But-
terworth v. Anclote Manor Hospital, Inc., 9 the court found that directors of a
nonprofit corporation had breached their fiduciary duties by selling the non-
profit corporation's assets-a hospital and two undeveloped parcels of
land-for less than fair market value to a for-profit corporation they
owned.9" While not describing these fiduciary breaches as breaches of the
duties of obedience, loyalty, and care, the court recognized that the directors
were acting in ways that were inconsistent with the nonprofit corporation's
articles of incorporation.91 Similarly, in Word of Life Ministry, Inc. v.
Miller,92 the court found that directors of a church were not entitled to sum-
mary judgment on a suit brought by the church and members of the congre-
gation for attempting to amend the bylaws of the church, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, in such a way that would allow them to dissolve the nonprofit corpora-
tion and take control of the church's assets. 93 The court found that a cause of
action had been stated for a breach of fiduciary duty by the directors and
stated that "[a] corporation must act in accordance with its articles of incor-
poration and duly adopted by-laws." 94 In addition, the court in Word of Life
Ministry, Inc. found that summary judgment was inappropriate when the
complaint alleged that the directors had "acted in furtherance of their own
personal interests rather than in the Church's best interests."95
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES
When directors of a nonprofit corporation have breached their fiduciary
duties to the corporation, it is the corporation that is injured.96 The injury
87. Id. at 44-45.
88. See State ex rel. Butterworth v. Anclote Manor Hosp., Inc., 566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Word of Life Ministry, Inc. v. Miller, 778 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
89. 566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
90. Anclote Manor Hosp., Inc., 566 So. 2d at 297.
91. Id. at 299. "The attorney general presented sufficient competent evidence to sustain
the trial court's finding that the appellee's improperly used the corporation's articles of incor-
poration when they sold the corporation's assets .... " Id. at 298-99.
92. 778 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
93. Word of Life Ministry, Inc., 778 So. 2d at 363-65.
94. Id. at 363.
95. Id. at 366.
96. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 176.
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results from assets or opportunities that belong to the corporation being mis-
used in a way that interferes with the corporation's ability to fulfill its mis-
sion.97 The harm may reduce the funds available to the corporation for use
in its operations because the directors have spent the money in ways that are
not
aligned with the corporation's purpose.9" The harm may also cause the cor-
poration to miss out on opportunities that are aligned with the corporation's
purpose because the directors have taken the opportunities for themselves.99
In addition to hurting the corporation financially, the injury may also harm
the corporation's reputation, making it more difficult for the corporation to
operate in the community.'° The corporation can only be protected if there
are individuals who are entitled to bring suit against the directors, on behalf
of the corporation, for the unlawful acts committed by the directors in the
name of the corporation.'
A. Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act Provisions Concerning Standing
Florida law grants standing only to a few specific individuals who chal-
lenge actions of directors that may constitute breaches of the nonprofit cor-
poration directors' fiduciary duties.0 2 Section 617.0304 of the Florida Stat-
utes provides in relevant part:
(2) A corporation's power to act may be challenged:
(a) In a proceeding by a member against the corporation to enjoin
the act;
97. See id at 176-79.
98. Id. at 176.
99. Id. at 205-06.
100. See, e.g., David Kidwell, Charity Director Used Funds for Personal Benefit, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 18, 2004, at Al. Camillus House, a Miami, Florida charity providing housing,
meals, medical, and rehabilitation services to the homeless, is an example of how a charity's
reputation can be damaged by the action or inaction of a board of directors. Id. In March
2004, Dale A. Simpson, the former executive director of Camillus House, was forced to resign
after he used the assets of the charity to renovate his own homes. Id. According to the Miami
Herald, "[b]lind trust and lax oversight" on the part of the board of directors allowed Mr.
Simpson to misuse the charity's funds. Camillus House Scandal Is a Wake-Up Call, MIAMI
HERALD, Apr. 20, 2004, at 24A. "The board must be deeply engaged in Camillus' inner work-
ings if it is to shore up public trust." Id.
101. See generally Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAw. L. REV. 593 (1999) (analyzing the supervision of
charities and enforcement of fiduciary duties of charitable directors and trustees).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304 (2006).
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(b) In a proceeding by the corporation, directly, derivatively, or
through a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through
members in a representative suit, against an incumbent or former
officer, employee, or agent of the corporation; or
(c) In a proceeding by the Attorney General, as provided in this
act, to dissolve the corporation or in a proceeding by the Attorney
General to enjoin the corporation from the transaction of unauthor-
ized business.
(3) In a member's proceeding under paragraph (2)(a) to enjoin an
unauthorized corporate act, the court may enjoin or set aside the
act, if equitable and if all affected persons are parties to the pro-
ceeding, and may award damages for loss (other than anticipated
profits) suffered by the corporation or another party because of en-
joining the unauthorized act. 103
In Florida, only members, directors, or legal representatives of a non-
profit corporation in a derivative suit, and the attorney general, have standing
to challenge a nonprofit corporation's power to act on behalf of the corpora-
tion.'04 In determining how the attorney general will be apprised of possible
fiduciary breaches by directors of nonprofit corporations, Florida Statutes
section 617.2003-Proceedings to Revoke Articles of Incorporation or Char-
ter or Prevent Its Use-states:
If any member or citizen complains to the Department of Legal
Affairs that any corporation organized under this act was organ-
ized or is being used as a cover to evade any of the laws against
crime, or for purposes inconsistent with those stated in its articles
of incorporation or charter, or that an officer or director of a corpo-
ration has participated in a sale or transaction that is affected by a
conflict of interest or from which he or she derived an improper
personal benefit, either directly or indirectly, and shall submit
prima facie evidence to sustain such charge, together with suffi-
cient money to cover court costs and expenses, the department
shall institute and in due course prosecute to final judgment such
legal or equitable proceedings as may be considered advisable ei-
ther to revoke the articles of incorporation or charter, to prevent its
improper use, or to recover on behalf of the corporation or its un-
103. Id. § 617.0304(2)-(3).
104. See id. § 617.2003.
[Vol. 31
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL THEORY
known beneficiaries any profits improperly received by the corpo-
ration or its officers or directors. 105
This provision codifies the practice which allows citizens of the state to
contact the Office of the Attorney General of Florida, also known as the De-
partment of Legal Affairs, 10 6 with concerns and questions about nonprofit
corporations. 10
B. Statutory Provisions Do Not Adequately Protect All Nonprofit Corpora-
tions
Section 617.2003 of the Florida Statutes appears to provide an avenue
for private citizens to ensure that directors of nonprofit corporations honor
their fiduciary duties.' However, the provision allows the Department of
Legal Affairs to exercise its discretion in determining which of the concerns
voiced by citizens will be pursued.'09 As a result, breaches of fiduciary du-
ties by directors may not be challenged if the Department of Legal Affairs
declines to exercise its discretionary authority."0 This may happen for a
number of reasons, including "[s]taffing problems and a relative lack of in-
terest in monitoring nonprofits.""' As a result, it has been said that "attor-
ney general oversight [is] more theoretical than deterrent.""' 2 Moreover,
Florida's Attorney General's office, unlike those in several other states," 3
has not created a separate charities section or unit to handle and coordinate
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. Office of the Attorney General; Department of Legal Affairs,
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/profiles/1026 (last visited Jan. 28, 2007).
107. See Florida Attorney General-Role and Function of the Attorney General,
http://myfloridalegal.com/overview (follow "Role and Function of the Attorney General"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 28, 2007). "Many Floridians look to the Office of the Attorney
General for guidance with disputes and legal issues. This agency receives hundreds of letters,
e-mails, phone calls, and visits each week about crime victims' compensation, divorce pro-
ceedings, abuse, possible consumer fraud, and other topics." Id.
108. See FLA. STAT. § 617.2003. The first sentence allows for any citizen to lodge a com-
plaint. Id.
109. See id. "[T]he [D]epartment shall institute and ... prosecute ... proceedings as may
be considered .. ." Id.
110. Id.
111. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 248.
112. Id.
113. See COUNCIL ON FOUNDS. & FORUM OF REG'L Ass'NS OF GRANTMAKERS,
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CHARITIEs-AN OVERVIEW 9 (2006),
http://www.givingforum.org/cgi-bin/doc_rep/public/file.pU/3666/regpuboverview.pdf (discuss-
ing how states like Pennsylvania, California, and Ohio have established charity sections in
their attorney general offices).
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charity oversight work, thereby increasing the likelihood that concerns about
fiduciary breaches will not be handled in a timely fashion, if ever." 4
C. Shortcomings of Florida's Approach
Florida's approach to standing to bring suit against directors of non-
profit corporations for breach of statutory duties does not achieve its desired
goals." 5 While adequately protecting the interests of a mutual benefit non-
profit corporation, this approach leaves the actions of directors of public
benefit nonprofit corporations virtually untouchable and unchallengeable. 6
When directors of a mutual benefit corporation, such as a country club,
homeowners' association, or labor union, breach their fiduciary duties, those
who are most affected by the breach-the members of the corporation-are
empowered by the Florida Statutes to bring suit against the directors on the
corporation's behalf.' This right, which has been granted to the members,
has been analogized to the right of shareholders of a for-profit corporation to
bring suit against its directors for breach of fiduciary duties in a derivative
action.18 In Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd.,1"' members of the Fisher
Island Club, a nonprofit corporation that operated and maintained the resi-
dential condominium community facilities, brought a derivative action
against the corporation. O Reversing the trial court's dismissal of the mem-
bers' complaint, the court stated that the right of members to bring a deriva-
tive action on behalf of a nonprofit corporation comes from the common
law. "' According to the court, it is an equitable remedy that provides "relief
from 'faithless directors and managers. '' ' 122 Thus, even though the not-for-
profit corporation statute, in effect at that time, did not provide for derivative
actions against directors of nonprofit corporations, the common law did. 123
114. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L.
REv. 37, 47-49 (1993).
115. See, e.g., Fox v. Prof 1 Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Though Florida recognizes standing for members of nonprofit corpora-
tions for breach of fiduciary duties, the directors of the nonprofit corporation are essentially
immune from civil liability. Id.
116. See id. at 180-82.
117. Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
118. Fox, 801 So. 2dat 180.
119. 769 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
120. Id. at 1071-72.
121. Id. at 1072.
122. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949)).
123. Larsen, 769 So. 2d at 1072.
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Likewise, in Fox v. Professional Wrecker Operators of Florida, Inc., 124 the
court found that members of nonprofit corporations should be treated simi-
larly to members of for-profit corporations with respect to derivative actions
"[b]ecause there is nothing about the remedy, which seeks redress for breach
of fiduciary duty, that warrants distinctive treatment based upon corporate
purpose." 1
25
However, the same is not true when the directors of a public benefit
nonprofit corporation breach their fiduciary duties. 126 In this instance, it is
not the members of the corporation that are directly affected by a fiduciary
breach by directors; rather, it is the donors to the corporation, whose money
is being misused, or the employees and volunteers whose workplace has
been impacted, who are most directly affected. 127 Unlike the mutual benefit
corporation scenario, those who are most affected by the nonprofit corpora-
tion's failure to act as intended are not granted the right to challenge the ac-
tions of the directors on the corporation's behalf. 128
Florida's "one size fits all" approach to standing-lumping together
both mutual benefit and public benefit organizations 129-fails to recognize
that many public benefit nonprofit corporations do not have members who
are empowered to act on behalf of the corporation when directors abuse their
position. 3 ° Charities are unlike country clubs, homeowners associations, or
business leagues that are comprised of members who benefit from the non-
profit corporation's activities. 31 Public benefit organizations, by definition,
benefit the public or some undefined segment of the public. '32
In addition, while section 617.0304 of the Florida Statutes grants stand-
ing to directors to bring suit on behalf of the corporation when the directors
breach their fiduciary duties, '3 it is unlikely that directors will authorize
124. 801 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
125. Id. at 180.
126. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304(2)(a). Because the statute only grants standing to a "member"
of the corporation, this effectively leaves public benefit nonprofit corporations without mem-
bers as immune. Id.
127. See Victor B. Flatt, Notice and Comment for Nonprofit Organizations, 55 RUTGERS L.
REv. 65, 67-69 (2002).
128. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304(2)(a).
129. See id. § 617.0301; Fox, 801 So. 2d at 180.
130. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
131. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 249 (8th ed. 2004). Charitable organizations are
"operated exclusively for... community-service purposes [and do] not distribute earnings for
private individuals." Id.
132. FISHMAN & SCHWARtZ, supra note 1, at 76.
133. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
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potentially embarrassing litigation to be brought against them.'34 Thus,
unless the Florida statute is changed, those who wish to challenge the acts of
charitable corporations in Florida are at the mercy of the Florida Attorney
General when seeking recovery, when directors misuse their positions.
V. WHY FLORIDA SHOULD CHANGE THE STANDING PROVISION IN THE
FLORIDA NOT FOR PROFIT CORPORATION ACT
A. Florida Should Provide Equal Access to Derivative Actions to Public
Benefit and Mutual Benefit Nonprofit Corporations
Florida courts have stated-in cases involving mutual benefit corpora-
tions-that there is no reason to treat nonprofit corporations differently than
for-profit corporations, when it comes to derivative actions.135 Since the
purpose of derivative actions is to permit redress for "rights of action that
belong to corporations that have been injured by the acts of the corporations'
officers and directors,"' 3 6 the not-for-profit corporation statute must ensure
that it is possible for this to happen when both mutual benefit and public
benefit nonprofit corporations have been injured. The statute accomplishes
this goal for mutual benefit nonprofit corporations by allowing members of
the corporation to bring suit when the directors have breached their fiduciary
duties. '37 The members have a vested interest in the purpose of the nonprofit
corporation, and it is appropriate that they can act on behalf of the corpora-
tion when the directors act contrary to that purpose.
The statute does not, however, provide the same redress when the cor-
poration is a public benefit nonprofit corporation.' 38 Even though there are
individuals with a vested interest in the public benefit corporation's purpose,
because there are often no members of the corporation,' 39 there is no one
with standing to enforce the rights of the corporation.' 40 The goal of deriva-
tive actions, however, is to give those with a legitimate stake in the corpora-
134. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS
AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 8.12 (1996). Professor Hamilton makes the same argu-
ment about shareholders and actions against for-profit corporations. Id
135. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78; see, e.g., Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators
of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Larsen v. Island Developers,
Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
136. Timko v. Triarsi, 898 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Provence v.
Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304 (2006).
138. Id. § 617.0304 (2)(a).
139. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
140. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
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tion standing to act on the corporation's behalf.' Courts have held that
members have a legitimate stake in mutual benefit corporations. 14 2 Who has
a legitimate stake when the corporation is a public benefit corporation?
B. Florida Should Protect Charitable Corporations and Charitable Trusts
Similarly
Charitable organizations are generally organized as either charitable
corporations or charitable trusts. "' Even though charitable corporations are
as similar to charitable trusts as they are to for-profit corporations,'" the
organizational structure determines the law that governs the charity. '45 Flor-
ida has chosen to apply the principles of corporate law to charitable corpora-
tions. 46 Therefore, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act, 17 resembles
the Florida Business Corporation Act, 48 and not the Florida Trust Code,'49
when determining who has standing to bring suit, when directors of charita-
ble corporations breach their fiduciary duties. "'
The law concerning standing may have been drafted differently if Flor-
ida had chosen to borrow from trust law, instead of corporate law. In Dela-
ware ex rel. Gebelein v. Florida First National Bank of Jacksonville, 5' the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida explained standing for enforcement
of charitable trusts as follows:
As a general rule, only the Attorney General may enforce a chari-
table trust. Unlike a private trust, where there are identifiable
beneficiaries who are the equitable owners of the trust property,
the beneficiaries of a charitable trust are the public at large.
Whereas beneficiaries of a private trust have the power to maintain
141. Timko, 898 So. 2d at 90-91.
142. See, e.g., Fox v. Prof'I Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So. 2d 175, 180 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Larsen v. Island Developers, Ltd., 769 So. 2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000).
143. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 27-28, 30.
144. See id. at 27-32 (discussing organizational structures of nonprofit organizations).
145. See id. at 1-8.
146. Samuel W. Braver et al., No Trespassing: Donors Lack Legal Standing to Challenge
Corporate Acts of Florida Not-for-Profit Corporations, 75 FLA. B.J. 50, 50 (Dec. 2001).
147. FLA. STAT. §§ 617.01011-.2103 (2006).
148. Id. §§ 607.0101-.193.
149. Florida Trust Code of 2006, ch. 2006-217, § 736.0405(3) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 736).
150. See FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
151. 381 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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a suit to enforce the trust, the public must act through some public
official to maintain such a suit. 
152
The court continued:
However, it has been recognized that an entity other than the At-
torney General can be a proper party to bring suit to enforce a
charitable trust. Trustees have been permitted to bring suit against
co-trustees, and persons or organizations having a special interest
in a trust or a special status under a trust instrument are considered
to have standing to enforce the trust.
153
Under Florida corporate law, the attorney general and trustees are em-
powered to bring suit against trustees for breach of fiduciary duties.'54
Moreover, those with a "special interest" in a trust or a "special status" under
a trust instrument can bring suit to enforce a charitable trust.'55 In Gebelein,
the court found that the Attorney General of Delaware, as the lawful repre-
sentative of the citizens of Delaware, had standing to challenge the actions of
the trustees of the DuPont Trust. 5 6 According to the trust instrument, "the
net income of the trust was to be paid... to the Nemours Foundation 'for the
purpose of maintaining "Nemours" as a charitable institution for the care and
treatment of crippled children, . . first consideration, in each instance, being
given to beneficiaries who are residents of Delaware."",157 The Florida court
found that the citizens of Delaware had a special interest in enforcement of
the trust because they had a special status not shared with the public at
large. 158
Additionally, Florida is one of the nineteen states that has enacted the
Uniform Trust Code.'59 Section 736.0405 of the Florida Statutes recognizes
the special interest of settlors in ensuring that the assets of the charitable
trusts they create are used to fulfill a charitable purpose. 1"0 Because there are
those with a special interest or a special status, with respect to a charitable
corporation, just as there are those with such an interest or status, with re-
152. Id. at 1077.
153. Id. (citing RONALD CHESTER ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 412-14
(2005); EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS §§ 713, 718-19
(1974); 4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 391 (3d ed. 1967)).
154. FLA. STAT. § 617.0304.
155. Gebelein, 381 So. 2d at 1077.
156. Id. at 1078.
157. Id. at 1076.
158. Id. at 1078.
159. UTCproject.org, supra note 10.
160. FLA. STAT. § 736.0405 (2006).
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spect to a charitable trust, those corporate individuals should also have stand-
ing to enforce the directors' duties. 161
VI. THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL DOCTRINE
In order to fully protect the interests of charitable nonprofit corpora-
tions, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act should be amended to in-
clude a private attorney general provision for public benefit corporations.
A. What Is the Private Attorney General Doctrine?
The private attorney general concept dates back to at least 1943, when
the court, in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 62 used
the term private attorney general to refer "to plaintiffs empowered by Con-
gress to 'su[e] to prevent action by an officer in violation of his statutory
powers ... even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest."",1
63
The term has come to encompass much more than the right to sue a public
officer.164 For example, Florida recognizes that the private attorney general
theory is used when private attorneys bring suit for violation of civil
rights. 65 In Wesley Group Home Ministries, Inc. v. City of Hallandale,66 a
case involving the Fair Housing Act, the Florida court stated that "[i]n civil
rights laws, Congress uses the private attorney general concept as a vehicle
for vindicating social policies of the highest priority." '167 The common thread
that runs through private attorney general actions is that the lawsuit involves
more than just redress for a private injury. 68 Rather, the private attorney
general theory applies when the injury is to the public, or when the acts of
the potential defendant run contrary to some important public policy.
169
Such actions also allow for a remedy that protects the public and the public
161. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 37 (analyzing standing to sue charitable trusts
and corporations for mismanagement, fraud, and corruption).
162. 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
163. Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103
MICH. L. REv. 589, 590 n.1 (2005) (quoting Ickes, 134 F.2d at 704).
164. See Wesley Group Home Ministries, Inc. v. City of Hallandale, 670 So. 2d 1046,
1050 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
165. See id.
166. Id. at 1046.
167. Id. at 1050 (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
168. Morrison, supra note 163, at 590. "At its core, however, the term denotes a plaintiff
who sues to vindicate public interests not directly connected to any special stake of her own."
Id.
169. See id. at 598.
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policy, rather than just compensating a private individual for injury. 70 The
private attorney general theory is not appropriate when there is only an injury
to a single person because in that instance, it would be appropriate for the
injured party to retain an attorney to seek redress for the injury. 171
B. Potential Plaintiffs Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine
When directors of public benefit corporations breach their fiduciary du-
ties, it is the corporation that is injured.'72 In addition, the public is injured
because public benefit corporations exist to provide a benefit to the public. 
73
Because public benefit corporations generally do not have members, there
are no private individuals who are entitled to bring suit for enforcement of
those duties. 174 A private attorney general provision in the Florida Not for
Profit Corporation Act would grant standing to certain private individuals
that would enable them to act on behalf of the corporation."' The provision
would not grant standing generally to members of the public.176 Rather, the
provision would recognize that there are those with a legitimate stake or spe-
cial interest in the corporation who are entitled to act on behalf of the corpo-
ration. '77
In order to have a legitimate stake or special interest in a public benefit
nonprofit corporation that would confer standing, an individual must have an
interest or stake in the charity that exceeds any general interest possessed by
the public at large. '78 The individual must have a more intimate relationship
with the charity, such that it would be appropriate for that individual to serve
as a watchdog over the charity. 179  Three categories of individuals-
substantial donors, key employees and volunteers, and potential beneficiar-
ies-shall be considered in turn.
170. See id.
171. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" Is-And Why It
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2129, 2171 (2004). "[Plrivate attorneys general are persons who
mix public and private functions in the adjudicative arena .. ." Id.
172. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
173. See PHELAN & DESIDERIO, supra note 13, at 2.
174. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
175. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 590.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 622-27.
179. See id.
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1. Substantial Donors
Section 736.0405 of the new Florida Trust Code explicitly grants, for
the first time, standing to enforce a charitable trust to the trust's settlor. 8 0
The statute continues the common law rule that charitable trusts are enforce-
able by the state attorney general, as well as others with a special interest in a
trust, including co-trustees. 8 ' The Florida Trust Code defines a settlor as "a
person, including a testator, who creates or contributes property to a trust."'
' 82
Thus, in order to protect charitable corporations and charitable trusts simi-
larly, the Florida Not for Profit Corporation Act should also allow those who
create or contribute property to a charitable corporation to sue the directors
for breach of fiduciary duty. However, in order to ensure that not everyone
who makes a contribution to a charity will have standing to sue the charity, a
private attorney general provision would only grant standing to "substantial"
donors. The provision could define a substantial donor as one who has con-
tributed at least twenty percent of the charity's revenue in the year or years
of the action or actions to be challenged. This requirement would protect
directors from having to defend themselves in lawsuits brought by those with
virtually no interest in the corporation, while recognizing the significant con-
tribution the substantial donor has made to the charitable corporation '
83
Allowing a substantial donor to have standing to sue directors for
breach of fiduciary duties serves several beneficial purposes.'1 4  First, it
serves to alleviate the burden on the attorney general's office of policing the
fiduciary duties of all Florida charitable organizations. 181 Substantial donors
would likely keep a watchful eye on the continuing operations of their cho-
sen charitable organizations. Granting standing to such concerned individu-
als or entities would perhaps enable the donors to catch a breach early
enough to avert a catastrophic result to the charity.
Second, charitable organizations attempting to seek substantial contri-
butions from prospective donors would benefit from a law granting such
180. Florida Trust Code of 2006, ch. 2006-217, § 736.0405(3) (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 736). The effective date of the new Florida Trust Code is July 1, 2007. Id. § 49.
181. Delaware ex rel. Gebelein v. Fla. First Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 381 So. 2d 1075,
1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
182. Ch. 2006-217, § 736.0103(16); see also FLA. STAT. § 731.201(17) (2006).
183. See John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law
Setting, 62 N.C. L. REV. 905, 914-15 (1984); see also Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to
Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code and Related
Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
611, 629-35 (2003).
184. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 608 & n.82.
185. Id.
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donors standing. The charitable organizations could point to this right in
discussions with prospective donors who otherwise might insist on difficult
and confining contractual limitations on the use of their donated funds. 
186
2. Employees and Volunteers
This portion of the attorney general provision of the statute would also
provide a status akin to employees' whistle-blower status and regular volun-
teers of the charity.' 87 Often, employees and volunteers, those who are in-
volved in the day-to-day operations of the charity, have a front row seat to
abuses by directors. The statute could grant a special status to these indi-
viduals, so long as they were employees or volunteers at the time of the al-
leged breaches and witnessed, or otherwise had first-hand knowledge of the
directors' breaches of fiduciary duties, giving them standing to sue the direc-
tors on behalf of the corporation.'88
3. Beneficiaries and Potential Beneficiaries
While it is tempting to advocate that beneficiaries and potential benefi-
ciaries be recognized as having standing to bring suit on behalf of the chari-
ties from which they benefit against the directors who are misusing the chari-
ties, these individuals may constitute a group that is too amorphous and un-
defined to be manageable. The beneficiaries of a charitable corporation are
by definition unidentifiable, and while it may be possible to identify current
beneficiaries of a particular charity, current beneficiaries eventually become
former beneficiaries. '89 Students graduate from school, homeless people find
homes, hospitals discharge patients, and symphony patrons move to new
186. See Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1143 (2005).
187. See 10-259 Lab. & Emp. Law (MB) § 259.04 (2006), http://Ilexis.com (follow "Mat-
thew Bender" hyperlink; then follow "By Area of Law" hyperlink; then follow "Labor &
Employment Law" hyperlink; search "259.04"; then follow "Part IX General Employment
Law" hyperlink). Whistle blower status protects "employees who report, or threaten to report,
[or object to employer] wrongdoing" from retaliatory job actions. Id.
188. FLA. STAT. § 112.3187(2) (2006). Florida's Whistle-blower's Act is intended:
to prevent agencies or independent contractors from taking retaliatory action against an em-
ployee who reports to an appropriate agency violations of law on the part of a public employer
or independent contractor that create a substantial and specific danger to the public's health,
safety, or welfare. It is further the intent of the Legislature to prevent agencies or independent
contractors from taking retaliatory action against any person who discloses information to an
appropriate agency alleging improper use of governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any
other abuse or gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public officer, or employee.
Id.
189. Gary, supra note 101, at 616; Braver et al., supra note 146, at 50.
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cities. However, it is possible that certain beneficiaries have stakes in the
corporation that are legitimate enough that they should be granted standing to
sue for breach of fiduciary duties by the directors.'90 Therefore, the statute
should provide that: 1) Current beneficiaries of a charitable corporation at
the time of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty have standing to sue on be-
half of the corporation; and 2) when the class of potential beneficiaries is
sharply defined, any of those potential beneficiaries has standing to sue on
behalf of the corporation. For example, students who are members of a class
from which a charitable corporation is to select scholarship recipients would
have standing to sue if the directors breach their fiduciary duties.
C. Fundamental Principle Underlying Private Attorney General Doctrine
Determining who should have standing to enforce the fiduciary duties
of charitable corporation directors is difficult and bright line rules are always
subject to scrutiny. However, the fundamental, conceptual principle is clear:
The plaintiff must be distinguishable from members of the general public so
that it is appropriate for the individual to act on behalf of the corporation. 191
There must be a nexus between the potential plaintiffs interest in the charity
and the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.' 92 The potential plaintiff must have
an interest in the charity that is related to the alleged breach of duty.' 93 Do-
nors, employees, volunteers, and certain beneficiaries all have interests in the
charity that require the directors to act in ways that do not harm the char-
ity.'94 When directors misuse the charity's assets or opportunities, donors,
employees, volunteers, and beneficiaries are affected in ways that are differ-
ent than any effect that may be felt by general members of the public.' 95
190. See Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 756 (N.Y. 1985). In this
case, the Knapp Foundation, a charitable corporation, established to provide assistance to the
employees of specified companies and their families, amended its certificate of incorporation
to allow it to distribute principal and income of the Foundation to other charitable organiza-
tions. Id. at 754. The court, in holding that the employees had standing to challenge the
amendment, stated:
The general rule is that one who is merely a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, or a
member of a class of possible beneficiaries, is not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust..
. There is an exception to the general rule, however, when a particular group of people has a
special interest in funds held for a charitable purpose, as when they are entitled to a preference
in the distribution of such funds and the class of potential beneficiaries is sharply defined and
limited in number.
Id. at 755.
191. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 55, 70.
192. Id. at 74
193. Id.
194. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 75-76.
195. See Blasko et al., supra note 114, at 70-71.
2006]
53
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LAW REVIEW
Donors, whose money has been misspent, employees and volunteers, who
can no longer perform their jobs effectively, and beneficiaries, who cannot
receive the goods or services they need, suffer and are affected by the breach
in a way that is related to, but separate from the injury suffered by the char-
ity. Similarly, the potential plaintiff must have an interest in ensuring that
the charity fulfills its charitable mission in a way that can be distinguished
from the interest of the general public. '96 While public benefit organizations
benefit the public generally by lessening the burdens on government, and
improving the quality of life for society as a whole, there are those who are
more intimately connected with a charity's charitable purpose.' 97 Donors,
who have contributed money to further the charitable purpose, employees
and volunteers, who give their time to further the charitable purpose, and
beneficiaries, who receive the fruits of the charity's labor, have a greater
interest in the charity's fulfillment of its charitable purpose than members of
the public generally.
D. Remedy Available Under Private Attorney General Doctrine
The purpose of the private attorney general theory is to protect the char-
ity-not to compensate any individual for harms they may have received as a
result of a breach of fiduciary duty. 198 Thus, the remedies available under
the statute will be those designed to restore the charity to the state it was in
before the breach. '99 Directors who have acted in ways inconsistent with the
fiduciary duties that they owe to the corporation will be required to return to
the charity any assets or opportunities taken from the charity.2 °0 In addition,
the charity may be entitled to equitable relief intended to enjoin the directors
from acting in ways that will harm the charity.20' Further, in appropriate
instances, the court may even remove directors from the board or in the most
egregious situations, dissolve the corporation.2 2 There is the risk that a pri-
vate attorney general provision in the Florida Not for Profit Corporation stat-
ute will make it more difficult for charitable corporations to find individuals
196. Id. at 70-72.
197. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 1, at 76.
198. See Morrison, supra note 163, at 590. "The remedies sought in such actions tend to
be correspondingly broad: rather than seeking redress for discrete injuries, private attorneys
general typically request injunctive or other equitable relief aimed at altering the practices of
large institutions." Id.
199. See Rubenstein, supra note 171, at 2141.
200. Id.
201. Morrison, supra note 163, at 590.
202. See FLA. STAT. § 617.1430 (2006).
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willing to serve as directors.2"3 However, the private attorney general provi-
sion will not alter any protections for directors already built into the Not For
Profit Corporation Act.20 4
E. Attorney's Fees Under the Private Attorney General Doctrine
Private attorney general statutes often provide for attorney's fees for
successful litigation." 5 The doctrine has been described as one that allows
for the award of attorney's fees "to a party who vindicates a right that: (1)
benefits a large number of people; (2) requires private enforcement; and (3)
is of societal importance. 2 0 6 The private attorney general statute this article
proposes would not generally allow for attorney's fees.20 7 Unlike, for exam-
ple, the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, which allows the
prevailing party to recover attorney's fees,20 8 the private attorney general
provision in the Not for Profit Corporation Act would only do so in very
limited circumstances.0 9
The purpose of allowing private individuals to bring suit for directors'
breaches of fiduciary duty is to protect the charity. 0 That is, directors
should be required to disgorge any benefit they received at the expense of the
charity and return it to the charity.2"' If the prevailing party were entitled to
attorney's fees from the corporation, as is the case with the attorney's fees
when shareholders prevail in derivative actions,22 it is possible the charity
would end up paying more in attorney's fees than the charity would recover
203. See id.
204. See id. § 617.0834(1)(b)(1)-(3). The Florida Statute provides for immunity from civil
liability for directors who have not acted criminally, derived an improper personal benefit, or
who have not acted recklessly, in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or in a manner demon-
strating wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Id.
205. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Private Attorney General Doctrine-State Cases,
106 A.L.R.5TH 523 (2003).
206. Id.
207. Contra FLA. STAT. § 501.2105(1) (2006).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 501.2105(5).
210. See Gary, supra note 101, at 596.
211. See id.
212. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.07401(6).
The court may award reasonable expenses for maintaining the proceeding, including reason-
able attorney's fees, to a successful plaintiff or to the person commencing the proceeding who
receives any relief, whether by judgment, compromise, or settlement, and require that the per-
son account for the remainder of any proceeds to the corporation; however, this subsection
does not apply to any relief rendered for the benefit of injured shareholders only and limited to
a recovery of the loss or damage of the injured shareholders.
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from the breaching directors. Instead, the American Rule" 3 regarding attor-
ney's fees would apply and private attorneys and legal clinics would be en-
couraged to take up these cases on a pro bono basis. If, however, a director
is found to have breached his or her fiduciary duties, and also either: 1) vio-
lated the criminal law; 2) received an improper personal benefit; or 3) acted
recklessly, in bad faith, with a malicious purpose, or in a manner demonstrat-
ing wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property, that
director will be responsible for the prevailing party's attorney's fees.21 4 In
addition, a nonprofit corporation will not be permitted to indemnify a direc-
tor in such a case.21 s
The private attorney general provision in the Florida Not for Profit Cor-
poration Act is intended for use in only the most serious cases-when none
of the directors of the charity is willing to bring suit on behalf of the charity
and when the attorney general's office is unwilling to pursue the claim.216
By providing for attorney's fees only when the directors have acted particu-
larly egregiously, 217 the provision will discourage frivolous and vexatious
litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
A private attorney general provision in nonprofit corporation acts that
treats public benefit and mutual benefit corporations similarly with regards to
standing will ensure that charitable nonprofit corporations provide the public
benefits they were created to provide. By providing a mechanism that allows
those who are most invested in the corporation to enforce the fiduciary duties
the directors owe to the corporation, the private attorney general provision
will allow private individuals to assist the attorney general in maintaining a
watchful eye over corporations that were granted the privilege of operating in
the State of Florida based on the benefits they promised to provide to the
public. In addition, the provision will prevent charitable corporations from
misusing their corporate charters by encouraging directors to live up to their
fiduciary responsibilities. A private attorney general provision that is not a
213. Black's Law Dictionary explains the American Rule as providing "that attorney fees
are not awardable to the winning party unless statutorily or contractually authorized."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979).
214. This language is borrowed from the provision of Florida's Not for Profit Corporation
Act regarding personal liability of directors of nonprofit corporations. FLA. STAT. §
617.0834(l)(b)(l)-(3).
215. This does not change the indemnification provision in the Florida Not for Profit Cor-
poration Act. See id. §§ 617.0831, 607.0850.
216. See supra Part VI.D.
217. See supra Part VI.E.
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"one size fits all" provision will further the state's interest in protecting its
citizens by holding directors of charitable corporations accountable to the
corporations they serve.
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In 2000, a Florida jury awarded a history-making $145 billion in puni-
tive damages against the tobacco industry in a class action suit brought on
behalf of Florida smokers.' The judgment, however, was reversed in its en-
tirety, including the class certification, three years later by Florida's Third
District Court of Appeal in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV). 2 This
year, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the Third District's reversal of the
$145 billion punitive damages award although it rejected much of the Third
District's decision in that case.3
While Engle IV presented a number of intriguing issues, one is espe-
cially noteworthy because of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell (State Farm I)' that was
made the month before the Third District rendered its decision. In State
Farm I, which ironically involved a $145 million punitive award, the Court
reiterated its previous position that excessive punitive damage awards can
run afoul of the United States Constitution and provided further guidance for
courts to determine when this occurs.5 In State Farm I, the Court did the
latter by elaborating more on the appropriate ratio between any award of
punitive damages and that of the compensatory damages.6
After the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in State
Farm I, it was unclear how that case would affect Engle IV since there had
been no total award of compensatory damages to the class to which the $145
billion punitive award could be compared. However, for both the Third Dis-
trict and the Supreme Court of Florida, that fact alone rendered the punitive
1. See Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145 Billion, WASH. POST, July 15, 2000,
at A1; David Noonan, Lighting into Big Tobacco, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 2000, at 30.
2. 853 So. 2d 434, 440 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part,
rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
3. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2 (Fla. July 6,
2006). Please note that at the time this article was going to print that this opinion by the Su-
preme Court of Florida was not final due to a rehearing motion which had been filed but not
determined.
4. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
5. Id. at 417-19.
6 ld at 424-28.
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award violative of State Farm 1.7 The two courts further held that the puni-
tive award was unconstitutionally excessive as a matter of law.
8
Whether the punitive award in Engle IV was violative of State Farm I
and/or unconstitutionally excessive under either federal or Florida law war-
rants examination.
I. STATE FARM AND ITS AFTERMATH
The State Farm I case arose out of an automobile accident that occurred
in Utah.9 A state jury in Utah found Curtis Campbell liable for causing a
multi-car accident in which one driver died and another was left permanently
disabled, awarding damages against him of more than $185,000.10 Thereaf-
ter, Campbell and his wife sued their insurance company-which allegedly
had refused to settle and insisted on going to trial-for "bad faith, fraud, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress."" Another Utah jury then
"awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145
million in punitive damages." 2
After the verdict against the insurance company, the trial court reduced
the compensatory award to $1 million and the punitive award to $25 mil-
lion.'3 The Supreme Court of Utah, however, reinstated the full $145 million
punitive award after both parties appealed. " The insurance company then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Utah and remanded the case back to that court "for
further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] opinion."' 5
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in State Farm I would be-
gin by announcing that the issue in that case concerned "the measure[ment]
of punishment, by means of punitive damages [that] a State may impose
upon a defendant in a civil case."' 6  The Court noted that while
7. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451; Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3.
8. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458; Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3.
9. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 412-13.
10. Id. at413.
11. Id. at414.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Id.
14. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 415.
15. Id. at 429.
16. Id. at 412. Punitive or exemplary damages are damages which may be awarded to the
plaintiff over and above compensatory damages,
where the wrong done to [plaintiff] was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression,
malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to
solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other
60
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"[c]ompensatory damages 'are [only] intended to redress the concrete loss
that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct,' . . . punitive damages serve a broader function [than compensatory
damages as] they are aimed at deterrence and retribution."' 17  Further,
"[w]hile States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages,"
the Court acknowledged, "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary pun-
ishments on a tortfeasor."' 8 The Court explained that "[t]o the extent [a pu-
nitive] award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and con-
stitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property." 9
In evaluating whether a punitive award was excessive, the Court in
State Farm I noted that it had previously
instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to consider three
guideposts: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases.
20
The Court stated that the first guide post was "[t]he most important in-
dicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award."'2' According to
the Court:
[Courts should] determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by
considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to
economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the
conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant for his evil behavior or to
make an example of him.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. 1979). In this article, "punitives" and "compensato-
ries" are used interchangeably with "punitive damages" and "compensatory damages."
17. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 416 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
18. Id. (citing Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 433).
19. Id. at 417 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting)).
20. Id. at 418 (citing BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
21. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
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actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
22
With respect to the second guide post, the Court noted that it had "been
reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm,
or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. ' 23 While
the Court would "decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive
damages award [could not] exceed," 24 the Court would make the following
observations:
[F]ew awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,25 in up-
holding a punitive damages award, we concluded that an award of
more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might
be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. We cited that 4
to 1 ratio again in BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore.26 The
Court further referenced a long legislative history, dating back
over 700 years and going forward to today, providing for sanctions
of double, treble, or quadruple damages to deter and punish.
While these ratios are not binding, they are instructive. They
demonstrate what should be obvious: Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios
in range of 500 to 1, or, in this case, of 145 to 1.27
The Court stated that "ratios greater than those [it had] previously upheld
may comport with due process where 'a particularly egregious act has re-
sulted in only a small amount of economic damages."' 28 The Court, how-
ever, stated that "[t]he converse [was] also true ... [meaning that] [w]hen
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal
to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
22. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77). The Court further
stated that "[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not
be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all of them renders any
award suspect." Id.
23. Id. at 424 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
24. Id. at 425.
25. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
26. 517 U.S. at 559.
27. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted).
28. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
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guarantee."29 The Court further emphasized that "[t]he wealth of a defendant
cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award. 31
In reference to the third guide post, "the disparity between the punitive
damages award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases,"' 31 the Court noted that it had "also looked to criminal penalties that
[might] be imposed [on the defendant]. 32 The Court interjected, however,
that "the remote possibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically
sustain a punitive damages award.
33
Applying the State Farm I guide posts, the Court found that the case
was "neither close nor difficult,, 34 and that "[i]t was error [for the Supreme
Court of Utah] to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages
award. ' 35 While the Court did not disagree that the insurance company had
engaged in reprehensible conduct-and that an award of punitive damages
was proper-the Court clearly disagreed with the degree of reprehensibility
and declared that "a more modest punishment" was warranted. 36 The prob-
lem as described by the Court was that the case "was used as a platform to
expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of [the insurance company's]
operations throughout the country,"37 and this resulted in punitive damages
being awarded "to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the
Campbells' harm., 3' The Court also stated that there was "no doubt that
there is a presumption [of unconstitutionality] against an award that has a
145 to 1 ratio."39 The Court noted that the $1 million compensatory award in
the case "for a year and a half of emotional distress" was "substantial," and
appeared to "already contain [a] punitive element [in it]."40 The Court fur-
ther noted that "[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law for the
wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an act of fraud,
29. Id.
30. Id. at 427 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 585).
31. Id. at 428 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
32. State Farm , 538 U.S. at 428 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 583; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991)). The Court explained that "[t]he existence of a criminal pen-
alty [has a] bearing on the seriousness with which a State views the wrongful action." Id.
33. Id. The Court emphasized that "[p]unitive damages are not a substitute for the crimi-
nal process," and "[g]reat care must be taken to avoid the use of the civil process to assess
criminal penalties that can be imposed only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial
have been observed." Id.
34. Id. at 418.
35. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 418.
36. Id. at 419.
37. Id. at 420.
38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 426.
40. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 426.
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... an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages award.",4, The
Court termed the Supreme Court of Utah's discussion "about the loss of [the
insurance company's] business license, the disgorgement of profits, and pos-
sible imprisonment" as "speculat[ion]," and stated that this was an "insuffi-
cient [basis] to justify the award., 42
After the Court struck down the $145 million punitive damages award,
the Supreme Court of Utah-in a second review-lowered the punitive dam-
ages to $9 million.4 3 The Court then declined the opportunity to further re-
view the case despite the defendant's claim that the 9 to 1 ratio was still too
high. 44
Immediately after State Farm I was rendered, there was some doubt as
to its applicability since it was a case involving economic injury, and not
personal injury or products liability. 45 That doubt would not last long; within
a month of the decision, the Court vacated a number of other punitive dam-
age awards in state cases and remanded the cases back to the state courts for
reconsideration in light of the principles set forth in State Farm.4
6
One such case involved a plaintiff in an Oregon state court, who was se-
riously injured by a drug and sued the drug manufacturer as well as the doc-
tor who prescribed it.47  The doctor made a cross-claim against the drug
manufacturer for negligence and fraud, alleging that the manufacturer "failed
to provide adequate information concerning [the drug]., 48 The jury returned
verdicts in favor of both the plaintiff and the doctor against the drug manu-
facturer, awarding the plaintiff more than $5 million in compensatory dam-
ages plus $35 million in punitive damages and the doctor $500,000 in com-
41. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
42. Id. The Court again reiterated that the Supreme Court of Utah's "references were to
the broad fraudulent scheme drawn from evidence of out-of-state and dissimilar conduct." Id.
43. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm I), 98 P.3d 409, 410 (Utah
2004).
44. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm III), 543 U.S. 874
(2004); State Farm I, 98 P.3d at 418; Robert S. Greenberger, High Court Won't Revisit Dam-
ages: In a Letdown for Business, Justices Pass on Clarifying Punitive-Award Guidelines,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2004, at A6.
45. See Paul J. Martinek, $145 Million Punitive Award Unconstitutional, LAW. WKLY.
U.S.A., Apr. 14, 2003, at 1. "Because State Farm [I] did not involve a personal injury, [one
defense lawyer] suspect[ed] that some courts might argue that the rationale doesn't apply to
product liability cases and other suits involving physical harm." Id. at 27 (quoting Andrew
Frey).
46. See Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci IV), 76 P.3d 669, 672 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); see
generally Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 2002); Sand
Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Sand Hill 1), 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 2002).
47. See Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 671.
48. Id.
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pensatory damages plus $22.5 million in punitive damages.49 After the drug
manufacturer appealed, the company settled with the plaintiff, but continued
to challenge the punitive damages awarded to the doctor.5" On appeal, the
manufacturer claimed that "an award of $22.5 million in punitive damages
[was] excessive in relation to the $500,000 that the jury awarded [the doctor]
for compensatory damages."'', After two reviews by an Oregon intermediate
appellate court, the $22.5 million punitive damages award was upheld in its
entirety. 52 The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated and re-
manded the case based on State Farm and the state appellate court was re-
quired to review the issue for a third time.53 On the third review, the state
appellate court required the doctor to accept a punitive damages award of
$3.5 million, a 7 to 1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or face a
new trial.54
Two other state cases where the United States Supreme Court vacated
the punitive damages award and ordered that they be reconsidered in light of
State Farm involved the automaker Ford Motor Company.55 In one case, a
California jury awarded $290 million in punitive damages against the auto-
maker in a sport-utility vehicle rollover accident that killed three individu-
49. Id.
50. Id. at 672.
51. Id.
52. See Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci I1), 22 P.3d 758 (Or. 2001); Bocci v. Key
Pharms., Inc. (Bocci 1), 974 P.2d 758 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). In the first appeal, an equally di-
vided appeals court affirmed the judgment in favor of the doctor. See Bocci I, 974 P.2d at 774
(en banc). The Supreme Court of Oregon, however, vacated the decision and remanded the
case for reconsideration in light of its findings in Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473,
483-84 (Or. 2001), where it had stated that a punitive award is "grossly excessive" in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion where it is not within the range that a rational juror could award. Bocci II, 22 P.3d at 759.
After remand, the appeals court considered Parrott as well as BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), in its second review and again affirmed the punitive award. See
Bocci v. Key Pharms., Inc. (Bocci II1), 35 P.3d 1106, 1108, 1111 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the drug manufacturer had only "argued that the total punitive
damage award of $57 million in favor of [the plaintiff] and [the doctor] was excessive .... "
Id. at 1108. While the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages would be 45 to 1 if the
damages were viewed separately and apart from the damages to the plaintiff, when they are
considered collectively, the ratio of the punitive damages award to the compensatory damages
award would only be approximately 10 to 1. See id. at 1111 n.3; Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 675.
The appellate court "concluded that, evaluated in their entirety, the punitive damages were not
excessive" and the Supreme Court of Oregon would later decline further review. See Bocci
IV, 76 P.3d at 672 (citing Bocci Ii, 35 P.3d at 1111).
53. See Key Pharms., Inc. v. Edwards, 538 U.S. 974 (2003).
54. Bocci IV, 76 P.3d at 676.
55. Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (Romo 11), 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (mem.); Ford Motor Co. v.
Estate of Smith (Sand Hill I1), 538 U.S. 1028 (2003) (mem.).
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als.16 In the other, the Supreme Court of Kentucky found that the automaker
should pay $15 million in punitive damages to the family of a miner killed
when a Ford pickup truck slipped into reverse and crushed him, although the
jury had actually awarded $20 million in such damages. 7 While the punitive
damages award in the California case exceeded the single-digit ratio of puni-
tive to compensatory damages,5 8 the United States Supreme Court discarded
the already reduced punitive award in the Kentucky case 59 even though there
was only a 5 to 1 ratio in that case. 60  After the California case was re-
manded, the state appellate court "conditionally affirm[ed] the punitive dam-
ages portion of the judgment ... conditioned upon plaintiffs' acceptance of
reduction of the punitive damages portion of the judgment [from $290 mil-
lion] to $23,723,287,' ' 6' resulting in a reduction of almost 92%. After its
case was returned, the Supreme Court of Kentucky vacated the punitive
damages award and remanded the case back to the trial court "for a new de-
termination of the amount of punitive damages. 62
The United States Supreme Court's actions shortly after State Farm
quickly made clear that its guidelines on punitive damages were applicable to
both personal injury and product liability cases.63 They also demonstrated
that the Supreme Court had placed itself in a position to monitor punitive
56. Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2002).
57. Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (Sand Hill 1), 83 S.W.3d 483, 496 (Ky.
2002).
58. Romo 1, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. While the jury in the California case found that the
plaintiffs' total compensatory damages were $6,226,793.00, it also found that one of the plain-
tiffs had been 10% at fault. Id. Consequently, the trial court reduced the compensatory award
to $4,935,709.10. Id. Depending upon which of these figures ($6,226,793.00 or
$4,935,709.10) is used to calculate the ratio, it is either 47 to 1 or 59 to 1. Id.
59. SandHill 11, 538 U.S. at 1028.
60. Sand Hill I, 83 S.W.3d at 497. There was a $3 million compensatory award in that
case. Id.
61. Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo II1), 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 797 (Ct. App. 2003). If the
plaintiffs declined such acceptance, the punitive damages judgment would be reversed and a
new trial would be had on the issue. Id. at 813.
62. Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith (Sand Hill I11), 142 S.W.3d 153, 168 (Ky. 2004).
Although the Supreme Court of Kentucky had rejected the automaker's challenge to the jury
instructions as they related to punitive damages in its earlier opinion, it now found that those
instructions had been insufficient "in light of State Farm." Id. at 155-56 (quoting Ford Motor
Co. v. Estate of Smith (Sand Hill I1), 538 U.S. at 1028). According to the court, State Farm
necessitated instructions that "set[] forth the purpose of punitive damages and provide[d] a
safeguard from extraterritorial punishment" and that the trial court's jury instructions had
failed to do the latter. Id. at 166.
63. See Sand Hill II, 538 U.S. at 1028; Key Pharms., Inc. v. Edwards, 538 U.S. 974, 974
(2003); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Romo (Romo I), 538 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2003).
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damages whether they are awarded in federal or state court. 64 Further, as the
Kentucky case demonstrates, the Court appears willing to exercise this juris-
diction even where the punitive award does not exceed a single-digit ratio of
65punitives to compensatories.
Shortly after State Farm, some predicted that the tobacco industry
would become a big beneficiary of the Court's punitive damages ruling.66
Engle is not the only example in which this is true.67
In Henley v. Philip Morris Inc (Henley ), 68 a California jury awarded
"$1.5 million in compensatory damages and $50 million in punitive dam-
ages" to a smoker who developed lung cancer. 69 The trial judge, however,
ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, unless the smoker con-
sented to a reduction of such damages to $25 million.7 ° The "[smoker] con-
sented to the reduction.' The cigarette manufacturer, against whom the
award had been rendered, appealed claiming that the $25 million punitive
award was still unconstitutionally excessive.72 Initially, the California Court
of Appeals for the First District upheld the damage award7 3 but the Supreme
Court of California ordered its reconsideration in light of State Farm.74 On
remand, the court of appeals found that while the cigarette manufacturer's
conduct in that case "supports a substantial award ... and warrants some-
64. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co. (Romo 1), 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146 (Ct. App. 2002);
see also Sand Hill 1, 83 S.W.3d at 496.
65. See Sand Hill I, 83 S.W.3d at 483; see also Sand Hill 111, 142 S.W.3dat 153.
66. See, e.g., Lorraine Woellert & Mike France, Tort Reform Has Friends in High
Places, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 2003, at 78 ("The [tobacco] industry gets hit with the most puni-
tive damages awards, so it could be a big winner.").
67. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 146 (Or. Ct. App. 2004);
see Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I/), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 75 (Ct. App. 2004).
68. 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (Ct. App. 2001).
69. Id. at 496.
70. Id.
71. Id. This made the total award to plaintiff $26.5 million. See id.
.72. See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38.
73. See Henley I, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 509.
74. See Henley 11, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38. This actually was the second time that the Su-
preme Court of California remanded the case back to the intermediate appellate court. See id.
The first remand occurred when the California appeals court was ordered to reconsider the
case in light of two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of California: Myers v. Philip
Morris Inc., 50 P.3d 751 (Cal. 2002), and Naegele v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 50 P.3d 769
(Cal. 2002). See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38. The issue in Myers and Naegele concerned
state "immunity." See Myers, 50 P.3d at 753; see also Naegele, 50 P.3d at 771. Apparently,
this California statute granted tobacco manufacturers "immunity" from most claims for per-
sonal injury but was repealed. See Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 41. These two cases dealt
with the effect of the repeal (to what extent it continues to shield tobacco companies) and the
scope of the protection it afforded. See id.
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thing approaching the maximum punishment consistent with constitutional
principles, ' , 71 the $25 million in punitives could not be sustained in light of
the relatively small $1.5 million compensatory.76 Consequently, the court of
appeals reduced the punitive award to $9 million, a sum it found "permissi-
ble and appropriate on [the] record ' 77 explaining as follows:
In light of [State Farm] we do not believe the 17 to 1 ratio re-
flected in the present judgment can withstand scrutiny. As we read
that case, a double-digit ratio will be justified rarely, and perhaps
never in a case where the plaintiff has recovered an ample award
of compensatory damages. Indeed, where a plaintiff has been fully
compensated with a substantial compensatory award, any ratio
over 4 to I is "close to the line." Nonetheless we believe a higher
ratio (6 to 1) is justified here by the extraordinarily reprehensible
conduct of which plaintiff was a direct victim .... [This smoker's]
injuries were not merely economic, but physical, and nothing done
by [the cigarette manufacturer] mitigated or ameliorated them in
any respect. 78
Despite the fact that the jury's original $50 million punitive award had
been reduced by more than four-fifths to $9 million, the cigarette manufac-
turer later sought further review from the Supreme Court of California, as
well as the United States Supreme Court; both declined to disturb the
award. 
In another tobacco case, Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams III), 8°
an Oregon state court jury awarded the family of a smoker, who died of lung
cancer, $821,485.80 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive
damages. 8' The trial judge thereafter reduced the compensatory damages to
75. Id. at 70. The California Court of Appeals explained its rationale as follows:
The record reflects that defendant touted to children what it knew to be a cumulatively toxic
substance, while doing everything it could to prevent them and other addicts and prospective
addicts from appreciating the true nature and effects of that product. The result of this conduct
was that millions of youngsters, including [this smoker], were persuaded to participate in a
habit that was likely to, and did, bring many of them to early illness and death.
Id.
76. See id. at 72.
77. See Henley I1, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 69.
78. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
79. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Henley (Henley IV), 544 U.S. 920 (2005); Henley v. Philip
Morris USA (Henley I11), 97 P.3d 814 (Cal. 2004); Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I1), 9
Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38 (Ct. App. 2004).
80. 92 P.3d 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
81. Id. at 130.
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
NOVA LA WREVIEW
$521,485.80 and the punitive damages award to $32 million.82 The state
appeals court, however, reinstated the full $79.5 punitive damages award.83
The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the state appellate
court and returned the case back to the appeals court to reconsider in light of
the State Farm ruling.8 4 Despite the United States Supreme Court's admoni-
tion and its subsequent consideration of State Farm,85 the appeals court rein-
stated the total $79.5 million punitive award, specifically finding that the
second guide post was met despite an acknowledgement that the punitive
award amounted to "a 96 to 1 ratio between the compensatory and punitive
damages."86  In making this determination, the court relied on two United
States Supreme Court decisions decided prior to State Farm, which had indi-
cated that it is appropriate to consider the potential harm, as well as the ac-
tual harm caused by the defendant's conduct. 87 The appeals court concluded
that while the jury found actual harm to the smoker of $821,485.80 in dam-
ages, "[the cigarette manufacturer] inflicted potential harm on the members
of the public in Oregon."8 8 The Supreme Court of Oregon, which had earlier
declined to accept jurisdiction in this case, allowed review this time.89 While
it disagreed with the intermediate appellate court regarding the second guide
post and specifically stated that it was not met, Oregon's highest court, nev-
ertheless, affirmed the appellate court's decision upholding the award in its
entirety because it was supported by the other two guide posts.9° The United
States Supreme Court granted the Williams cigarette manufacturer's petition
for certiorari, and whether that punitive award will survive the nation's high
court's third intervention remains to be seen.9'
82. Id.
83. Id. The family of the smoker apparently only appealed the reduction of the punitive
damage award. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 1), 48 P.3d 824, 829 (Or. Ct. App.
2002). The decision by the Oregon appeals court was said to "mark[] the first time a jury's
award of punitive damages against a tobacco company [had] been upheld in its entirety."
Milo Geyelin, Court Reinstates Tobacco Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at A3.
84. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams (Williams 11), 540 U.S. 801, 801 (2003).
85. Id. The Oregon appellate court would perform a complete analysis based on the Gore
guide posts as refined by State Farm. See Williams 111, 92 P.3d at 142-46.
86. Williams 111, 92 P.3d at 144.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); see also TXO Prod.
Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993). The court further stated that even if
the punitive award was deemed to exceed a single digit ratio, the "unique facts in [that] case"
would justify it. Williams I1, 92 P.3d at 145.
89. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams IV), 104 P.3d 601, 601 (Or. 2004).
90. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams V), 127 P.3d 1165, 1181-82 (Or. 2006).
91. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256
(Or. Mar. 30, 2006).
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II. ENGLE IV AND THE THIRD DISTRICT
Engle was a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of a "class of smok-
ers and their survivors" seeking damages for alleged smoking related inju-
ries. 9' The defendants included the "major domestic cigarette companies and
two industry organizations" (hereinafter "tobacco defendants").9 3 The six
named plaintiffs were individuals who were smokers. 94  "All six [named
plaintiffs] alleged [that] they were unable to stop smoking because they were
addicted to nicotine and, as a result, developed medical problems ranging
from cancer and heart disease to colds and sore throats. 95
The six named plaintiffs brought the class action for personal injuries
against the tobacco defendants seeking damages for injuries caused by smok-
ing.96 In their complaint, they asserted claims of "strict liability, negligence,
breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, fraud, conspiracy to
commit fraud, and intentional infliction of emotion distress."9' "They sought
over $100 billion in compensatory damages" as well as over "$100 billion in
punitive damages" on behalf of themselves and their class. 98 The trial court
initially certified a class of smokers and their survivors "as a nationwide
class action." 99 On appeal, however, the Third District Court of Appeal "re-
duced the class to include Florida smokers only."' 00 After the case was re-
manded, the trial court issued its trial plan with respect to the case. ' 01
92. Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
93. Id. The companies were: Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard Tobacco Co. and Lorillard Inc. (collectively, "Loril-
lard"), and Liggett Group Inc. and Brooke Group Holding Inc. (collectively, "Liggett"). Id. at
441 n.l. The two industry organizations were the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A., Inc.
and the Tobacco Institute, Inc. Id.
94. Id. at 440.
95. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 440.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 441.
98. Id.
99. Id. The class was defined by the trial court as follows: "All United States citizens
and residents, and their survivors, who have suffered, presently suffer or have died from dis-
eases and medical conditions caused by their addiction to cigarettes that contain nicotine."
Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
100. Id. (citing R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 1), 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
101. Id. The trial court issued the trial plan and "refused the [tobacco] defendants' request
to decertify the class," after which the tobacco "defendants sought review of both orders be-
fore the Third District," but their appeal was dismissed. Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of
Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 873 (2001) (discussing R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 11), 711 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
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The trial plan provided for the trial proceedings to be divided into
three phases: o
Phase 1 consisted of a year-long trial on liability and entitlement to
punitive damages [with] [t]he jury consider[ing] common issues
relating exclusively to defendants' conduct and the general health
effects of smoking. At the conclusion of Phase 1, the jury ren-
dered a verdict for the class on all counts. In Phase 2, the jury de-
termined that the three [named plaintiffs] were entitled to compen-
satory damages ... total[ing]... $12.7 million.' 03
The jury also determined in Phase 2 that the entire class was entitled to puni-
tive damages totaling $145 billion.' °4 In Phase 3, a new jury was supposed
to decide the "individual liability and compensatory damages claims for each
class member" after which, "[t]he trial court [was to] then divide the $145
billion punitive award equally among the successful class members."' 5
However, Phase 3 was interrupted because the tobacco defendants appealed
after the verdicts in Phase 2.106
In the appeal after the Phase 2 verdicts, the Third District reversed the
entire judgment as well as the trial court order certifying the class.'0 7 Al-
though the appellate court had previously approved the class certification, 0 8
102. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441-42.
103. Id. at 441.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 442. After the punitive damages verdict was rendered, but before entry of
judgment, the tobacco defendants temporarily removed the case to federal court. Engle v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Engle III), 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The removal
occurred after a health care plan-Southeastern Iron Workers Health Care Plan-filed a "Mo-
tion to Intervene seeking permission to assert subrogation claims under Florida law on behalf
of itself and similarly situated funds and insurers for reimbursement from damages recovered
by any beneficiary or insured who is a member of the Engle class." Id. The tobacco defen-
dants thereafter removed the case on the basis that these subrogation claims implicated the
Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act, otherwise known as ERISA. Id. The
district court would remand the case finding "that a nonparty's mere motion to intervene can-
not furmish a basis for removal." Id. at 1363.
106. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d. at 442. After the verdicts in Phase 2, the tobacco defendants
filed several post-verdict motions; however, the trial court, in an Omnibus Order, denied the
motions, except in minor respects, and upheld the verdicts. Id. at 441-42. Further, in the
Omnibus Order the trial court would order "immediate payment to the individual plaintiffs,"
as well as direct the tobacco "defendants to immediately pay the $145 billion in punitive dam-
ages into the court registry for the benefit of the entire class." Id. at 442. The defendants then
appealed the Omnibus Order. Id.
107. Id. at 470.
108. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441. As noted, the Third District had modified the class from
a nationwide class to include Florida smokers only. Id.
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the court found that the class was improperly certified stating "that the plain-
tiff's smokers' claims are uniquely individualized and cannot satisfy the
'predominance' and 'superiority' requirements imposed by Florida's class
action rules."' 9 The Third District made a number of other rulings against
the plaintiffs in reference to the damage award, as well as with respect to
other aspects of the case:
e The court held that the punitive damage award was barred by the to-
bacco settlement between the cigarette makers and the states under the doc-
trine of res judicata. " 0
* Additionally, the court held that the trial court erred "by instructing
the jury not to consider the "tobacco settlement between the cigarette manu-
facturers and the states, as well as the specific agreement between the State
of Florida and the cigarette makers "with regard to the issue of punishment
and deterrence."'
109. Id. at 444 (citing Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)).
The court emphasized that Rule 1.220(d)(1) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits
class certification orders to be "altered or amended at any time before entry of a judgment."
Id. at 442. The court noted that since "[c]lass-certification orders necessarily precede substan-
tial development of the issues and facts ... a court is required to reassess its class rulings as
the case develops." Id. Additionally, the Third District would note that "since [its] affir-
mance of certification in 1996, virtually all courts that have addressed the issue have con-
cluded that certification of smokers' cases is unworkable and improper." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d
at 443-44 (citations omitted). According to the court, "Phase 2 of the trial conclusively estab-
lished that individualized issues of liability, affirmative defenses, and damages, outweighed
any 'common issues' in this case, and that class representation [was] not superior." Id. at 445.
Specifically, the court stated that Phase 2 showed that "each claimant will have to prove that
his or her illness not only was caused by smoking, but was also proximately caused by defen-
dants' alleged misconduct." Id. at 446. The court also stated that this is "evidenced by the
fact that affirmative defenses and damages must be litigated individually." Id. at 447. The
court further pointed to individualized choice-of-law problems. Id. at 447-49.
110. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 467-68. The court would explain its rationale as follows:
The claims for punitive damages in the Florida v. American Tobacco Co. case and
in this action are based on the same ... alleged misconduct and the same public in-
terest. The plaintiffs, as private parties, do not have a "right" to punitive damages;
punitive damages are awarded solely as a matter of public rights or interests, in or-
der to serve the public policy of punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, as a mat-
ter of law, Florida's settlement and release, and the resjudicata effect of the result-
ing final judgment, preclude the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims here.
Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
111. Id. The Third District stated that the tobacco settlement "clearly qualiftied] as evi-
dence relevant to punishment and deterrence" and that "[tihe defendants were entitled to have
the jury consider the [tobacco settlements] as potential mitigating factors in determining the
need for further punishment and deterrence, especially with regard to claims for the same
alleged misconduct." Id. at 469. The court found that "[tihe trial court erred in providing the
jury with an instruction that removed a disputed issue from the jury's consideration." Id. at
470. According to the court, "[tihis error effectively precluded the defendants from presenting
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* Also, the court found that neither the punitive award nor the com-
pensatory damage award, as it related to one of the tobacco defendants, was
supported by the evidence and, according to the court, was "[p]roof of a 'run-
away jury.'"l11
e The court found that "[p]laintiffs' counsel [made] improper race-
based appeals [to the jury] for nullification [that] caused irreparable preju-
dice and require[d] reversal" because such conduct "incited" the "predomi-
nantly African-American jury" "to disregard the law because the defendants
[were] tobacco companies.""l 3
* Moreover, the court referenced other purported misconduct by plain-
tiffs' counsel, saying that "plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly made legally im-
proper arguments to the jury regarding the payment of any [punitive]
award,""' 4 "referred to matters outside the evidence," 5 made derogatory per-
sonal remarks about opposing counsel," 6 and expressed his personal opinion
to the jury" about the case, 117 as well as to some of the defense witnesses. "8
crucial mitigation evidence in the form of the [tobacco settlements] to support the argument
that they had already received heavy financial obligations and binding deterrent measures for
precisely the same conduct." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470. For the court, "[t]he resulting
prejudice [was] clearly evidenced by the astronomically excessive punitive damages award."
Id.
112. Id. at 466. The court would explain that while "[t]he Phase 1 verdict found all defen-
dants liable . . . in the first part of Phase 2, the jury allocated zero fault to [this one tobacco
defendant] with respect to the non-punitive counts." Id. The tobacco defendant, however,
would be "held jointly and severally liable for 100% of the compensatory damages award to
each of the three named plaintiffs." Id. Additionally, the tobacco defendant had to pay $790
million dollars in punitive damages. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 467 n.47. Apparently, none of
the three named plaintiffs in Phase 2 had ever used this tobacco defendant's cigarettes, which
explains the allocation of zero fault to it in Phase 2. Id. at 467. For the appellate court, this
meant that the jury found the tobacco defendant liable because of "[miere participation in the
tobacco industry." Id.
113. Id. at458-59,461.
114. Id. at 463. The court indicated that "plaintiffs [sic] counsel repeatedly... urg[ed] the
jury to assume [that] any award would be payable in installments over decades into the fu-
ture," thereby, "ensur[ing] there would be no realistic check on the jury entering a bankrupting
award." Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 463-64.
115. Id. at 464. Apparently, one example is plaintiffs' counsel telling "the jury the defen-
dants' CEO witnesses lied to him under oath during their depositions." Id. at 465.
116. Id. at 464. The court claimed that "[p]laintiffs' counsel maligned a defense attorney
by name, calling the attorney's argument to the jury 'a fraud."' Id.
117. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 464. The court complained that plaintiffs' counsel "ex-
pressed his personal opinions about the merits of the case stating the defendants' position
made him grit his teeth and say to himself: 'Can anyone buy this?"' Id. Plaintiffs' counsel
also purportedly stated that the "defendants had engaged in the 'longest running con in the
history of the world,' and [that] 'our kids and grandchildren' will ask 'how did you let them
get away with it?' Id. at 465.
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* The court would indicate, in a footnote, that "none of the three plain-
tiffs presented a proper claim within the class action [during Phase 2].""9
In addition to the above, the Third District would further hold that the
$145 billion punitive damage award was unconstitutionally "excessive as a
matter of law"'2 and that, in fact, the award had been improper because it
"preclud[ed] the constitutionally required comparison of punitive damages
and compensatory damages." '21
The Third District would specifically state that the $145 billion punitive
award was excessive under both Florida and federal law. 2 2 The court would
cite to Florida law for the proposition "that punitive damages may not be
assessed in an amount which will financially destroy or bankrupt a defen-
dant."' 123 The court emphasized that "[t]he [cigarette makers] established that
their combined net worth was no more than $8.3 billion" and that "[t]he $145
billion verdict [was] roughly 18 times ... [that] net worth."' 1 4 The court also
118. Id. at 464-65. According to the court:
Plaintiffs' counsel ... repeatedly expressed his personal opinions about the defen-
dants' witnesses, making such comments as: "I wanted to punch" one witness; that
another witness "wouldn't know science if he fell on science;" that he was sure an-
other witness "was ashamed to give this answer, but he gave it... under oath;" and
that as to another witness, "I figured, well, this guy hasn't been prepped on the sub-
ject [by counsel], so maybe I'll get an honest answer."
Id.
119. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 453-54 n.23. The appellate court would state that all of the
claims of one of the plaintiffs were barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 454 n.23.
The trial court had found that while the statute barred most of this plaintiff's claims, his fraud
claim and its derivative conspiracy claim were not so barred as there was "an exception to the
statute of limitations bar in the case of continuing fraud." Id. The Third District rejected the
trial court's position finding that the case relied on by it did not support such an outcome. Id.
With respect to the other two plaintiffs in Phase 2, the appellate court would state that "judg-
ment should have been entered in favor of the defendants as to [them] ... because their claims
did not accrue until years after the cut-off date for class membership." Id. The appellate court
would explain as follows: "By its terms, the class definition includes only those smokers who
developed a disease by October 31, 1994. Since [one] was diagnosed in April 1996, and [the
other] was diagnosed in February 1997, they [were] clearly excluded from the class ......
Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 454 n.23.
120. Id. at458.
121. Id.at450.
122. Id. at 456.
123. Id. (citing Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039,
1043 (Fla. 1982); Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000);
Brooks v. Rios, 707 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Hockensmith v. Waxler,
524 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)). According to the court, it was "acknowl-
edged by even the plaintiffs' purported experts [in Engle] [that] the $145 billion punitive
award will extract all value from the defendants and put them out of business." Engle IV, 853
So. 2d at 456.
124. Id. at 456-57.
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emphasized that "[t]here [was] no precedential authority for such an award"
and that "[n]o Florida decision endorses even a remotely comparable award,"
as "[t]he largest reported [Florida] awards involved only a fraction of a de-
fendant's net worth."' 25 The court would cite to federal law for the proposi-
tion that "[f]ederal due process also prohibits 'excessive' punitive
awards."' 26 Specifically citing State Farm, the Third District would exclaim
that "[t]his unprecedented punitive damages award is excessive as a matter of
law and, thus, does not promote a valid societal interest."' 27 The court would
even suggest that since "[p]unitive damages are imposed to benefit society's
interests," the $145 billion award would "frustrate the societal interest in
protecting all injured claimants' rights to at least recover compensatory dam-
ages for their smoking related injuries" since "[s]mokers with viable com-
pensable claims will have no remedy if the bankrupting punitive award...
[were] upheld."2 8
The Third District would also state that the punitive damages award in
Engle IV put the '"[c]art [b]efore [the] [h]orse"' where it was made "without
the necessary [prerequisite] finding[] of liability and compensatory dam-
ages."' 2 9 While the appellate court would acknowledge that determinations
of liability were made in Phase 2, it would apparently find them insufficient
to justify the class-wide punitive award, since they related to only three indi-
viduals. 130 According to the court, "[t]he defendants [were] entitled to a jury
determination, on an individualized basis, as to whether and to what extent
each particular class member is entitled to receive punitive damages."'
' 3
'
125. Id. at 457.
126. Id. at 456 n.27 (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 434 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993)).
127. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State
Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 416-17 (2003)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 450. The court found that "compensatory damages must be ... [determined
before] punitive damages." Id. at 451 (citing Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 457 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring)). Otherwise, it would be impossible to compare the two to deter-
mine if the "punitive damages bear a 'reasonable' relationship to the actual harm inflicted on
the plaintiff, as required by Florida and federal law." Id.
130. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 450 n.16. The court explained that "[t]he jury did not
determine [that the tobacco] defendants were liable to anyone [in Phase 1]," but only "an-
swered certain general questions about the defendants' products and conduct." Id. at 450.
The court noted that while these questions related to some of the legal elements, of each legal
theory alleged, they did not relate to all of the elements, of each such theory, and that
"[e]ssential elements of liability, such as reliance and proximate cause, were never tried in
Phase 1." Id.
131. Id. at453.
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Evidently, any class-wide punitive award rendered-where there was no
prior determination of liability and compensatory damages, with respect to
the entire class-would be improper for the appeals court. 1
3 2
III. FLORIDA'S HIGHEST COURT IN ENGLE
After the Third District would deny a motion to certify the case to the
Supreme Court of Florida, as an issue of great public interest, an attorney, in
the law firm that had represented the tobacco defendants in the appeal, would
be quoted as saying that "[w]e are confident that there is no basis for a claim
of conflict,"' 33 which reportedly was the only other route for the plaintiffs in
Engle to obtain review by the Supreme Court of Florida.' 34  The Supreme
Court of Florida, however, would grant the plaintiffs' petition for review,'3 5
and two years later issue its opinion. 1
36
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida would indicate
that it granted jurisdiction in Engle VI, because the Third District "misap-
plie[d]" its decision in Young v. Miami Beach Improvement Co. "' The
Court would thereafter reject much of the decision by the Third District, but
"approve... [its] reversal of the $145 billion class action punitive damages
award." 1
38
The Supreme Court of Florida held "that the Third District erred in nul-
lifying its previous affirmance of the trial court's certification order,"'3 9 al-
132. See id. at 456 ("The trial plan in the instant case required the defendants to pay puni-
tive damages for supposed injuries to thousands of class members without the necessary pre-
requisite findings of liability and compensatory damages.").
133. Laurie Cunningham, Appeals Court Refuses to Rehear 'Engle' Tobacco Suit, DAILY
Bus. REv., Sept. 24, 2003.
134. For a very comprehensive discussion of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Florida, see generally Harry Lee Anstead, et al., The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court of Florida, 29 NOVA L. Rev. 431 (2005).
135. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle P), 873 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 2004).
136. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
137. 46 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1950) (en banc). See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 1 (ref-
erencing Young, 46 So. 2d 26). The Third District had relied on Young for its ruling that the
punitive damages claim was barred by the Florida Tobacco Settlement. See Engle IV, 853 So.
2d at 468. The Third District would explain the holding in Young as follows:
[T]he [Supreme Court of Florida] held that a judgment in a suit involving a municipal corpora-
tion which resolved "a matter of general interest to all its citizens" was binding even though
they were not parties to the suit. The court reasoned that each citizen "is a real, although not a
nominal, party to such judgment, and [could not] relitigate any of the questions which were
litigated in the original action." Thus, once a governmental agency resolves a matter of public
rights or interests, the same matter cannot thereafter be relitigated by private parties.
Id. (citation omitted).
138. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2.
139. Id. at 28.
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though it "agree[d] with the Third District that problems with the three-phase
trial plan negate the continued viability of th[e] class action." 140  The Su-
preme Court of Florida found that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.220(d)(1) did not authorize the Third District to simply change its position
and reverse its previous ruling, which upheld the trial certification order; 4'
and determined that "under the doctrine of law of the case, the Third District
would have been justified in reversing its previous ruling ... only if it con-
cluded that the prior ruling would have resulted in a clear manifest injus-
tice."' 42 For the Supreme Court of Florida, "no circumstances existed that
justified the subsequent ... reconsideration of the prior Third District deci-
sion approving class certification."' 143 The Court, however, found "that con-
tinued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan [was] not feasible
because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and
damages predominate."' 44  Although the Court noted that there were "no
Florida cases address[ing] whether it [was] appropriate under [Florida Rule
of Civil Procedure] 1.220(d)(4)(A) to certify class treatment for only limited
liability issues,"' 145 it relied on "several decisions by federal appellate courts
applying a similar provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"'146 as
"persuasive authority" for it to do so in Engle V. 147 The end result was that
the Court "decertiffied] the class, [but] retain[ed] the jury's Phase I findings,
other than those on the fraud and intentional infliction of emotion[al] distress
claims, which [it stated] involved highly individualized determinations, and
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 28. According to the Court, the rule only "provide[d] an avenue for reexaming
[sic] certification if subsequent discovery shows that circumstances have changed." Id.
142. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 29 (citing Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Juliano, 801
So. 2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001)).
143. Id. at 30. In fact, the Court found that the Third District's opinion on this issue "was
flawed" in two respects. Id. One, the Court found that the Third District "ignored the trial
court's pretrial ruling that only Florida law would apply when [the Third District] stated that
the 'choice-of-law analysis in [Engle VI would] require examination of numerous significantly
different state laws governing the different plaintiffs' claims."' Id. (quoting Liggett Group
Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part,
quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006)). Two, the Supreme Court of
Florida stated that "none of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the Third District... to
justify decertification was in the procedural posture of [Engle V]." Id.
144. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 32.
145. Id. at 33. The Court noted this rule provides that "[w]hen appropriate ... a claim or
defense may be brought or maintained on behalf of a class concerning particular issues." Id.
at 32-33 (quoting FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(d)(4)(A)).
146. Id. at 33. This was Rule 23(c)(4)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
states "[w]hen appropriate ... an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
147. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 33.
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the finding on entitlement to punitive damages question, which [it found to
have been] premature."' 48
The Supreme Court of Florida also held that "reversal [was] not war-
ranted based on the remarks made by the Engle Class's Counsel," finding
that "under the totality of the circumstances" such comments did not rise to
the level of reversible error. '49 Moreover, the Court found that:
a review of the verdicts reveals that each verdict reflected a careful
and differentiated analysis as to comparative fault and individual
damages and in no way justifie[d] the Third District's overall con-
clusion that this was a runaway jury inflamed by race because of
the arguments directed to the four of the six members of the jury
who were African-American.' 
50
148. Id. at 36. The jury findings were as follows:
(1) that cigarettes cause some of the diseases at issue; (2) that nicotine is addictive; (3) that the
defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous;
(4) that the defendants made a false or misleading statement of material fact with the intention
of misleading smokers; (4)(a) that the defendants concealed or omitted material information
not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to
disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes
or both; (5) that all of the defendants agreed to misrepresent information relating to the health
effects of cigarettes or the addictive nature of cigarettes with the intention that smokers and the
public would rely on this information to their detriment; (5)(a) that the defendants agreed to
conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature
with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detri-
ment; (6) that all of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective; (7) that all
of the defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that at the time of the sale or supply did not con-
form to representations of fact made by the defendants; (8) that all of the defendants were neg-
ligent; (9) that all of the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct or with reck-
less disregard relating to cigarettes sold or supplied to Florida smokers with the intent to inflict
severe emotional distress; and (10) that all of the defendants' conduct rose to a level that would
permit an award of punitive damages,
Id. at 8 n.4. The court would specifically state that findings 1, 2, 3, 4a, 5, 5a, 6 and 8 could
stand and that findings 4 and 9 could not. Id. at 4.
149. Id. at 39. The Court noted that Engle's "counsel ventured very close to the line of
reversible error on a number of occasions in his attempt to counteract opposing counsel's
contentions that Tobacco acted lawfully and to communicate his message to the jury that
'legal doesn't make it right."' Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 39. The Court, however,
found that the context in which the statements were made was "crucial" in evaluating them
and emphasized that they had been spread out over a two-year period. Id. at 41. Further, the
Court found that some of the comments that supposedly were improper pleas for jury nullifi-
cation "were not an attempt to tell the jury to ignore the law" but simply "made in response to
Tobacco's preemption defense: that the warnings on the cigarettes were as provided by law"
and Tobacco's position during the trial that cigarettes were a legal product. Id. at 45.
150. Id. at 46. The Court did state that:
[t]here [was] absolutely no justification for [a] series of remarks [by Engle's counsel], which
appear[ed] to compare the tobacco industry with slavery and, [finding that his references to]
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Although the Supreme Court of Florida "agree[d] that the [Third Dis-
trict] properly held that all judgments in favor of [one of the three class rep-
resentatives] were barred by the applicable statute of limitations," it dis-
agreed with the Third District on the issue of whether the other two class
representatives were properly included within the class as certified by the
trial court.' 5' Consequently, it "quash[ed] the [Third District's] reversal of
judgment entered in favor of [those two] class representatives . . . [and] or-
der[ed] that the judgments be reinstated."1 52
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the Third District that the
judgments against the one tobacco defendant had to be reversed because this
defendant "'did not manufacture or sell any of the products that allegedly
caused injury to the individual plaintiff representatives."" 53  In contrast to
the Third District, however, the Supreme Court appeared not to view this as
"proof of a 'runaway jury .'.15 but simply an "inconsistency in the ver-
dict." 55
The Supreme Court of Florida held "that the Third District erred in ap-
plying the doctrine of res judicata to bar the Engle Class's punitive damages
claim."' 5 6 Specifically, the court explained that
[s]ince the State [of Florida] had no right to pursue [the] type[] of private
interests [involved in Engle] on behalf of its citizens, the punitive damages
claims settled by the State in the [Florida Settlement Agreement between
Florida and the tobacco companies], if any, were distinct from the punitive
damages sought by the Engle Class. 1
57
civil rights leaders Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King, appealed to the jury's sense of outrage
for the injustices visited upon African-Americans in this country.
Id. at 44.
151. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 50-51. The Third District found that the cutoff
date for membership to the class was October 31, 1994 when the trial court originally certified
the class. However, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that the proper date was No-
vember 21, 1996 when the trial court recertified the class to include only Florida smokers,
pursuant to the Third District's direction. Id. at 53.
152. Id. at 50.
153. Id. at 51 (quoting Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 466 n.46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), appd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006)).
154. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 466.
155. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 51.
156. Id. at 19.
157. Id. at 17. The Supreme Court of Florida would not address the issue of whether the
trial court had erred by instructing the jury not to consider either the Florida Settlement
Agreement or the Master Settlement Agreement (between the states and tobacco companies)
with regard to the punitive damages issue as the Third District had found. Id. at 3.
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Despite its ruling that the Florida Tobacco Settlement did not preclude
such award, the Supreme Court of Florida would find three other reasons to
discard the $145 billion punitive damages award. '58
First, the court would hold "that the trial court erred in allowing the jury
to consider entitlement to punitive damages during the Phase I trial."' 5 9 The
court acknowledged that "an award of compensatory damages [was] not a
prerequisite to a finding of entitlement to punitive damages"161 since the two
types of damages serve different purposes. 16' However, the court empha-
sized that "a finding of liability [was] required before entitlement to punitive
damages [could] be determined, and that liability [was] more than a breach
of duty."' 162 The court noted that "[a]lthough [it] appeared to use 'breach of
duty' and 'liability' interchangeably in Ault v. Lohr,"'163 this really was not
the case and that an actual "finding of liability" was necessary before any
finding of entitlement to punitive damages."6 The Supreme Court of Florida
found that "the Phase I verdict did not constitute a 'finding of liability"' and
therefore that it had been "error for the Phase I jury to consider whether To-
bacco was liable for punitive damages."'
165
Second, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "[e]ven if it were not
error to determine entitlement to punitive damages in Phase I, it was clear
error to allow the jury to go beyond mere entitlement and award class-wide
punitive damages when total compensatory damages had not been deter-
mined."' 166 In so ruling, the court acknowledged that it was deviating some-
what from Florida law, explaining as follows:
In the past, we have not discussed whether punitive dam-
ages awards must bear some reasonable relation to compensatory
damages. For example in Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida,
158. See id. at 2.
159. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 19-20.
160. Id. at 70.
161. Id. at 20. The Supreme Court of Florida would rely on the following language from
the United States Supreme Court in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., to
explain the differences:
The former are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of
the defendant's wrongful conduct. The latter, which have been described as "quasi-criminal,"
operate as "private fines" intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A
jury's assessment of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination,
whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation.
Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)).
162. Id. at21.
163. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
164. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 21.
165. Id. at23.
166. Id.
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Inc. v. Jenkins, 167 we stated that punitive damages "are to be meas-
ured by the enormity of the offense, entirely aside from the meas-
ure of compensation for the injured plaintiff." However, we now
hold, consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions after
Ault that recognize due process limits on punitive damages, that a
review of the punitive damages award includes an evaluation of
the punitive and compensatory amounts awarded to ensure a rea-
sonable relationship between the two. 1
68
Third, the court found "[t]he amount awarded [was] also clearly exces-
sive because it would bankrupt some of the defendants." 169 In this regard,
the court appears to rely on Florida law, not federal law in reaching this con-
clusion. 170 As the court would explain:
We [] conclude that the punitive damages award was clearly ex-
cessive under the limitation based on ability to pay established by
our precedent because it [was] "so inordinately large as obviously
to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which
the jury may properly operate." A comparison of the amounts
awarded and the financial worth assigned to each company by the
Engle Class's expert clearly demonstrate[d] that the award would
result in an unlawful crippling of the defendant companies. 17'
IV. STATE FARM S APPLICABILITY TO ENGLE
As described herein, State Farm has, in a short time frame, had quite an
impact on state court judgments awarding punitive damages, including the
record one in Engle. This is even more remarkable considering that the
United States Supreme Court's entry into this area has a relatively short his-
tory. Prior to 1996, the United States Supreme Court had never invalidated a
state court's punitive damages award as unreasonably large. 172 This was true
despite the Court having several opportunities. 1
73
167. 409 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982).
168. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 24 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 19.
170. See id.
171. Id. at 27 n.8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993); Pac.
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989).
173. See id.
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The Court held that a punitive award was unconstitutionally excessive
for the first time in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. 114 In Gore, the
Court refused to sustain a $2 million punitive damages award in an Alabama
state case where there was only $4,000 in compensatory damages. 
75
It was in Gore where the United States Supreme Court first articulated
the three guide posts to identify unconstitutionally excessive punitive dam-
age awards. 176 The Court also "illuminate[d] 'the character of the standard
[to] identify [such] unconstitutionally excessive awards' of punitive dam-
ages"'' 77 explaining as follows:
Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a
State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and de-
terring its repetition. In our federal system, States necessarily have
considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive dam-
ages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any
particular case .... Only when an award can fairly be categorized
as "grossly excessive" in relation to these interests does it enter the
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 
178
Although it was prior to State Farm, at least one federal circuit has
opined that "[the] guidepost [sic] should neither be treated as an analytical
straitjacket nor deployed in the expectation that they will 'draw a bright line
marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive damages award,'
[as o]ther pertinent factors may from time to time enter into the equation."1
79
174. 517 U.s. 559, 584-86 (1996). In Gore, the purchaser of an automobile brought an
action against the distributor based on its failure to disclose that the automobile had been
repainted after being damaged. Id. at 563-64.
175. Id. at 578, 582. The jury had actually assessed $4 million in punitive damages but the
Supreme Court of Alabama would reduce it to $2 million because it "found that the jury im-
properly computed the amount of punitive damages by multiplying [plaintiff's] compensatory
damages by the number of similar [acts] in other jurisdictions," not just Alabama. Id. at 567.
176. See id. at 574-85.
177. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420
(1994)).
178. Id. (citations omitted).
179. Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
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The fact that Engle was a class action 80 certainly should have been a
relevant consideration in determining whether the punitive award was
impermissibly excessive. However, not one of the cases cited by either the
Third District or the Supreme Court of Florida involved punitive damages in
the context of a class action, and those courts seem to largely ignore that
distinction.1 81 Moreover, since Engle was a mass tort action involving per-
sonal injuries, that fact, too, should have entered into any equation in review-
ing that punitive award relative to the Gore guide posts.'82 As one legal
scholar would observe around the time the Engle verdict was rendered,
"[v]irtually no mass tort case... ha[d] been tried to a jury." 183
The Third District would not engage in any analysis of the punitive
award utilizing the Supreme Court's guide posts, but simply cited to State
Farm for the proposition that the punitive award was excessive as a matter of
law. 18 4 The Supreme Court of Florida would also not engage in such analy-
sis, although it would rely on Gore's second guide post for its conclusion
that "compensatory damages must be determined" before any award of puni-
tive damages. 85  As noted, State Farm I mandates that a court evaluate a
punitive damages award in light of Gore's three guide posts.186 Applying
those guide posts to Engle, it is not at all clear that they would prohibit the
imposition of the historic punitive damages awarded in that case.
A. The First Guide Post
The United States Supreme Court in State Farm I repeated its statement
in Gore that, "'the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a puni-
180. According to the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc.:
[A] class action is a nontraditional litigation procedure permitting a representative with typical
claims to . . . stand in judgment for a class of similarly situated persons .... The purpose and
intent of class action[s] ... is to adjudicate and obtain resjudicata effect on all common issues
... not only to the representatives... but to all others who are "similarly situated."
703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997).
181. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 456-58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, rem"d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
182. A "mass tort" can be defined as "tortious conduct affecting a large number of persons
[that] give[s] rise to a latent injury." R. Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bell-
wether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 199, 201 (1999).
183. Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad. Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 20 (2001) [hereinafter Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad].
184. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456.
185. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 25-26 (Fla. July
6, 2006).
186. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)
(citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
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tive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
[mis]conduct."",17  Thereafter, the Court again described the five factors
relevant to this guide post. 88 One factor was whether "the harm caused was
physical as opposed to economic."'8 9 A second was whether "the target...
had [a] financial vulnerability."' 90 A third was whether "the tortious conduct
evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of
others."'' A fourth was whether "the conduct involved repeated actions or
was an isolated incident."' 9 2 A fifth was whether "the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident." 93 There should be
little debate about the reprehensibility guide post and the fact that it was met.
1. Most Reprehensibility Factors Appear Present
The Court in State Farm I indicated that "[t]he existence of any one of
these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain
a punitive damages award."' 94 However, arguably almost all of the relevant
factors are present in Engle. 195  The named plaintiffs, and their class in
Engle, clearly alleged physical, rather than merely economic injury.'96 The
conduct of the tobacco defendants in Engle could certainly be said to
"evince[] an indifference to or a reckless disregard [for] the health [and]
safety of others," ' 7 if they knowingly sold the named plaintiffs, and their
class, a dangerous product.' 8 The situation in Engle definitely was not
about an isolated incident.' 99 Instead, it dealt with a repeated pattern of con-
duct on the part of the defendants' companies-selling cigarettes-that oc-
curred over many years. 200 This is not a situation where the harm caused
187. Id. at 419 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
190. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
191. State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
192. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576-77).
193. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576).
194. Id. The Court also stated that "the absence of all of them renders any award suspect."
Id.
195. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 440-41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, remd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
196. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 576); Engle IV, 853 So.
2d at 440.
197. Id.
198. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 440-41.
199. Id.
200. See id.
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could simply be considered a mere accident, and the jury verdict in Engle
seems to strongly suggest that the tobacco defendants engaged in deceit."0 '
2. Other Courts Found Most Reprehensibility
Additionally, the courts that have reviewed the awarding of punitive
damages in individual tobacco cases have found the reprehensibility guide
post met in those cases. 202 There appears to be no reason why Engle should
be any different.
3. State Farm Deficiencies Not Present
Moreover, the punitive award in Engle does not appear to suffer from
the same alleged deficiencies, in reference to the first guide post, as the one
in State Farm.20 3 In State Farm, the plaintiffs purportedly "reli[ed] upon
dissimilar and out-of-state conduct evidence" 2°4 that provided "scant evi-
dence of repeated misconduct of the sort that injured them., 25  Conse-
quently, according to the United States Supreme Court, this resulted in a
punitive damages award "that bore no relation to the [plaintiffs'] harm. 2 6
"In [State Farm], because the [plaintiffs] . . . show[ed] no conduct by [the
defendant] similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them
201. See id. at 450. As noted, during Phase 1 of the trial proceedings, the jury would
answer questions related to each legal theory alleged, which included claims for fraud and
conspiracy to commit fraud. See id. at 441, 450.
202. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 677 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Utiliz-
ing the five factors listed in State Farm, all show a high degree of reprehensibility and weigh
in favor of the jury's conclusion that a substantial punitive award was appropriate in this
case."); Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 71 (Ct. App. 2004) ("It..
. appears that allfive of the subfactors in [State Farm], point to a high degree of reprehensibil-
ity.") (emphasis in original); Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams III), 92 P.3d 126, 145
(Or. Ct. App. 2004) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of more reprehensible misconduct for a
longer duration of time on the part of a supplier of consumer products to the Oregon public
than what occurred in this case."); see also Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F.
Supp. 2d 1253, 1262 (D. Kan. 2002) (federal district judge "find[ing] that all of [the] factors
[relating to reprehensibility] point to a conclusion that [the tobacco manufacturer's] conduct
was highly blameworthy and deserving of significant punishment," in imposing a punitive
damage award of $15 million for an injured individual smoker).
203. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 420.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 423.
206. Id. at 422.
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[was] the only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis. 20 7 While
the court in State Farm "[did] not suggest there was error in awarding puni-
tive damages [in that case] based upon [the defendant's] conduct toward the
[plaintiffs], a more modest punishment," based solely upon that conduct, was
warranted.0 8 In Engle, there is absolutely no indication in the opinion of
either the Third District Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Florida
that the plaintiffs in that case improperly used "dissimilar and out-of-state
conduct evidence" in securing their punitive damages award. 2 9  Further-
more, while the United States Supreme Court in State Farm found that the
punitive damage award in that case could not "be justified on the grounds
that [the defendant] was a recidivist, ' 210 the same is certainly not true in
Engle. 211
B. The Second Guide Post
Although the Third District Court of Appeal in Engle was not referring
to the second guide post-"the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award" 212-in particular, it
would stress that it was not possible to calculate the ratio between the puni-
tive and compensatory damages in that case at the time the punitive award
was rendered. 213 The Supreme Court of Florida would agree and specifically
state that the second guide post was "determinative" in regard to the exces-
24siveness issue. "4 The fact that it might not have been possible to calculate
the actual ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in Engle at the
207. Id. at 424.
208. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419-20.
209. Id. at 420; see Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 456-58 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
210. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 423.
211. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451-58, 468-69. As the United States Supreme Court
explained, "a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender [because] ...
repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of malfeasance."
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 577 (1996).
212. State FarmI, 538 U.S. at 418.
213. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451. As noted, the Supreme Court in State Farm had
stated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages... will satisfy due process," and, in fact, "an award of more than four times the...
compensatory damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety." State Farm
1, 538 U.S. at 425 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)).
214. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 25 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
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time the jury returned the $145 billion punitive award may be true.215 That
fact alone, however, hardly seems a sufficient basis to discard such award for
a number of reasons.
1. Engle Involved Mass Tort Class
As noted earlier, the fact that Engle was a class action was certainly a
relevant factor that needed to be taken into consideration.2"6 By definition,
"[t]he class action is a representative action in which certain named parties
sue or are sued as representatives of a larger group of persons."2"7 In most
instances, "non-party members of the class need not be brought personally
before the [c]ourt."2" 8 Also noted earlier was the fact that Engle was not just
a class action, it was one in the mass tort context.219 The Supreme Court of
Florida case, Ault v. Lohr,22 ° which the court in Engle would state requires "a
finding of liability . ..before entitlement to punitive damages [could] be
determined, and that liability [was] more than a breach of duty, 221 was not a
class action.2 22 How such liability is to be established in the class suit is un-
clear. State Farm also was not a class action, 223 and in that case, the United
States Supreme Court also did not attempt to suggest how the ratio guide
post was to be applied in the context of a class action.24 The teachings in
both Ault and State Farm clearly were designed to apply to the traditional
one-on-one mode of litigation and not specifically to class actions.225 While
a class action should not alter the fact that liability must still be found and
compensatory damages be determined,226 the reality that a class action is
involved, as well as the nature of the case, cannot be simply ignored either.
215. SeeEngleIV,853 So. 2dat 45l.
216. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
217. David A. Sonenshein, Commentary, in U.S.C.S. COURT RULES, FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 23, at 9 (LexisNexis, Cumulative Supp. 2006).
218. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 99 (D.D.C. 1976).
219. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469, 539 (1994) (federal district court judge maintaining that "in mass tort cases.., the tradi-
tional one-on-one adversarial model of litigation does not apply [and that while] Ulustice does
hold true scales... it is not blind, nor should it be.").
220. 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989).
221. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 21 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
222. See Ault, 538 So. 2d at 455.
223. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm I), 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
224. See id. at 424-25
225. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
226. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip. op. at 21.
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This, however, seems to be what occurred in Engle. If Ault requires all of
the nonparty members of the class to be brought before the court at one time
to establish liability, is this a class action and, further, is this even possible?
Similarly, if State Farm requires that the amount of compensatory damages
for all nonparty members be determined before punitive damages can be
awarded to the class as a whole, will this, in reality, foreclose the possibility
of punitive damages from ever being awarded in a class action? Obviously,
since the Supreme Court of Florida issued the ruling in Ault, it was in the
best position to explain how its holding in that case was to be applied to the
class context.227 The fact that it did not attempt to do so is most troubling.
While the Supreme Court of Florida may not have been in the same position
to reconcile State Farm as it was with Ault, it is important to understand that
its conclusion-that the ratio guide post precluded the punitive award 221-
was based not on the fact that it found that the ratio guide post was not met,
but simply because the ratio calculation could not be performed at the time
the award was rendered.229 Whether State Farm demands such an outcome
in any case (not just a class action) seems far from certain 23 but if it does,
then this ratio guide post is far and away the most important guide post, de-
spite the repeated pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court in
State Farm that the first guide post, reprehensibility, is the most important. 2
3
'
2. This Was Engle's Trial Plan
The trial plan in Engle specifically was designed to determine the puni-
tive damages before determining the compensatory damages owed to the
227. See Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1989).
228. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 426.
229. See supra note 212-13 and accompanying text.
230. As noted earlier, one federal circuit court has stated that the guide posts are not to "be
treated as an analytical straitjacket." See supra note 179 and accompanying text. If the ratios
are supposedly not "binding" and only "instructive," how can the inability to perform the ratio
be conclusive that a punitive award must be discarded? See State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 425-26.
The courts clearly have not totally discarded punitive damages simply because there were no
civil or criminal sanctions to which such awards could be compared in accordance with
Gore's third guide post. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 683 (Ct. App,
2005) (upholding punitive award despite finding no "convincing analogous civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct"); Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.
(Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (upholding punitive award despite find-
ing "that [the state of] Oregon [did] not provide civil sanctions for [the] defendant's conduct
and that the criminal statutes that plaintiff [had] mentioned were not truly comparable").
231. State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
575 (1996)).
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class as a whole.2 32 In the past, trial plans had been approved where punitive
damages were determined before compensatory damages.233  Further, sepa-
rating out common issues as to all class members for the jury to first deter-
mine, as was done during Phase 1 of the trial in Engle, is nothing new.234
While the Third District would acknowledge that it had approved the class
certification, it would emphasize that the trial court had made its trial plan
after such approval.235 Notwithstanding such a disclaimer by the Third Dis-
trict, the trial plan in Engle would seem to have been within the trial court's
inherent power under Florida law to control and manage the process of litiga-
tion before it. Florida courts have the "inherent power to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of
[their] jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and constitutional provi-
sions. 236 Moreover, there does not appear to be any Florida authority that
existed prior to Engle's $145 billion punitive award suggesting that punitive
232. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
233. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014, 1018, 1023 (5th Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that trial plan in mass-tort class action was not invalid on the ground that the plan called
for the jury to determine punitive damage liability and then to determine compensatory dam-
ages for the class members); Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone? 98 F.R.D. 323, 332-33 (1983) (federal district court judge recommending trial plan in
mass tort case very similar to the one adopted by the trial court in Engle).
234. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 464 (D. Wyo. 1995); see also
Cent. Wesleyan Coll. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6 F.3d 177, 184, 186 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming
conditional class certification in an asbestos-related property damage case of a nationwide
class to determine common issues relating to the characteristics of the asbestos products at
issue, the defendants' knowledge of asbestos health hazards, and whether the defendants'
conduct justified a punitive damages award).
235. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
236. Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978). See also Moossun v.
Orlando Reg'l Health Care, 826 So. 2d 945, 954 (Fla. 2002) (Lewis, J., dissenting). As the
Supreme Court of Florida has explained: "Inherent power has to do with the incidents of
litigation, control of the court's process and procedure, control of the conduct of its officers
and the preservation of order and decorum with reference to its proceedings." In re Petition of
Fla. Bar, 61 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1952). In addition, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly Rules 1.200, 1.220, 1.270, 1.280 and 1.380, contain numerous express grants of
authority that supplement a Florida court's inherent power to manage litigation. Further, the
Third District in Engle IV cited to the Manual for Complex Litigation, which serves as an
important judicial reference for complex litigation in state and federal court. Engle IV, 853
So. 2d at 455 n.24 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.27 (1995)). The
Manual encourages an active role by the judiciary in developing an effective trial plan as well
as recognizes "[t]he need for special judicial management of mass torts." MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § § 10.13, 22.1 (2004).
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damages in a multi-stage class action could only be made after all of the
compensatory damages were determined." 7
3. Florida's Lawsuit Against Big Tobacco
Although technically the State of Florida's lawsuit against the tobacco
companies seeking reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures may not have
been a class action, the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Agency for
Health Care Administration v. Associated Industries of Florida, Inc., 238 relat-
237. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 451. The Third District cited to a Florida attorney general
opinion stating that "[i]n the absence of any determination of the extent of compensatory
damages, the court lacks a standard by which it can judge whether an assessment of punitive
damages is reasonable or is 'grossly excessive."' Id. (quoting 00-21 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 76,
78 (2000)). This opinion, however, was not only issued after the Engle punitive award was
rendered, but in direct response to it. 00-21 Fla. Op. Att'y Gen. 76 (2000). The Florida attor-
ney general, of course, had brought Florida's lawsuit against the tobacco makers resulting in
the Florida Tobacco Settlement. Could that fact have played a role in the position he would
take? At least one critic of the States' settlement with the cigarette makers has opined that it
has resulted in the states becoming "full partners with the tobacco industry." Timothy E.
Brooks, Editorial, Tobacco Settlement: First Step or Misstep? Tobacco Industry Is the Win-
ner, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 11, 1998, at 17B; see also Editorial, Addicted to Tobacco,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2003, at A8. One could argue that this was later illustrated when thirty-
seven states and United States territories would sign an amicus brief asking the trial court in
an Illinois case to reduce the appeal bond for a cigarette manufacturer who had been found
liable for $10.1 billion in a class action. Christina Cheddar Berk, Altria Backed on Appeal
Bond, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2003, at B4. The cigarette manufacturer had apparently warned
that requiring it to post the bond might cause it to seek bankruptcy protection and suspend
payments to the state governments under the 1998 tobacco settlement. See Gordon Fairclough
& Vanessa O'Connell, Altria 's CEO Faces a Pack of Problems, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2003,
at B1. The states appear to have been clearly concerned that the manufacturer's payments to
them under the tobacco settlement were at risk. Could the Florida Attorney General have had
similar concerns about the Engle punitive award's impact on the Florida Tobacco Settlement?
238. 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996). Medicaid is "[a] form of public assistance sponsored
jointly by the federal and state governments providing medical aid [including nursing home
care] for people whose income falls below a certain level." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981
(6th ed. 1990). The intended role of Medicaid is to "be the payor of last resort." See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (2006) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that Medicaid be the payor
of last resort for medically necessary goods and services furnished to Medicaid recipients.");
Shweiri v. Commonwealth, 622 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Mass. 1993) ("[The] ultimate goal of Medi-
caid [is] that the program 'be the payer of last resort, that is, other available resources must be
used before Medicaid pays for the care of an individual enrolled in the Medicaid program."').
Consequently, Medicaid requires states to take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal
liability of third parties to pay for care or services available under Medicaid and, where legal
liability is found, to seek reimbursement for such assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)
(1994).
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ing to that lawsuit cannot be ignored. Shortly before Florida brought its suit,
the Florida Legislature amended Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act, making it easier for the State to file and prove any recoupment
claims.239 Prior to the amendment, Florida was limited to recovering Medi-
caid expenses using the traditional method of subrogation, meaning that
since it would be standing in the shoes of the injured party, it would be sub-
ject to any defenses that the defendant would have against the injured
party.240 The amended legislation created a new cause of action that was
independent of any right or claim of a Medicaid recipient.24' It was also un-
usual in that it appeared to allow the State to proceed under any theory of
recovery. 242 The amended legislation also provided the State with certain
additional advantages: 1) It allowed the State to bring a lawsuit that is very
similar to a class action; 243 2) it allowed the State to pursue such action
against a third party, or aggregate third parties without identifying each indi-
vidual member of the class; 24 3) it prevented such third parties from assert-
ing defenses such as assumption of risk and comparative fault;245 4) it al-
lowed the State to pursue its claim under both the market share liability the-
ory, 246 as well as the joint and several liability theory; 247 5) it allowed the
State to use statistical analysis in proving its case against third parties; 248 and
6) it allowed the State to sue on claims that had already been extinguished by
the passage of time, by abolishing the statute of repose defense in such
suits.249 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled on a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act in Agency for
Health Care Administration, and largely upheld the Act.250 The court ruled
that the State could properly bring an action under the Act's statutory author-
239. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(a) n.5 (1995).
240. See Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1244 (discussing the history of the
1994 amendment to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act). See also Philip C. Patterson &
Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity
Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 561 (2000).
241. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(6)(a) (1995); Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d
at 1248, 1250.
242. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(1) (1995). "Common-law theories of recovery shall be
liberally construed to accomplish this intent." Id.
243. See id. § 409.910(9).
244. Id. § 409.910(9)(a).
245. See id § 409.910(1).
246. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b).
247. Id. § 409.910(1) (1995).
248. Id. § 409.910(9).
249. Id. § 409.910(12)(h).
250. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1256-57 (Fla. 1996).
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ity, but that the Act only applied to causes of action that accrued after the
effective date of the amendments to the Act. 251 The court also held that the
elimination of affirmative defenses under the Act was not facially unconsti-
tutional as a violation of due process, 252 since new causes of action do not
have to offer defendants all of the usual defenses and there is no absolute
prohibition against the elimination of all affirmative defenses. 253 The court
further upheld the joinder of claims in order to promote judicial efficiency,254
as well as the use of statistical evidence to prove causation. 255 The court,
however, did find that the provision granting the State authority to pursue an
action without identifying individual Medicaid recipients must be stricken as
encroaching on due process rights.2 56 In addition, the court modified the
State's abolition of the statute of repose such that Florida could not resurrect
a claim that was already time barred when the Act was amended. 257 Fur-
thermore, the court held that the State must use either a theory of market
share liability or joint and several liability, but not both. 58 Clearly, the Su-
preme Court of Florida would allow the State of Florida a good deal of flexi-
bility in presenting its case against Big Tobacco.259
4. Third District's Prior Broin Case
The Third District's prior decision in Broin v. Philip Morris Co.,260 es-
tablished the background for what would occur in Engle, although it did not
involve an award of punitive damages. In Broin, a class action was
brought against tobacco companies, and the class was represented by the
same plaintiffs' counsel as in Engle IV. 262 The class in Broin, however, did
not consist of smokers, but of nonsmoking flight attendants that were alleg-
edly injured by secondhand smoke. 63 After the trial court granted the to-
251. See id. at 1250.
252. Id. at 1251.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 1255.
255. See Agencyfor Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d. at 1250.
256. Id. at 1254.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1255-56.
259. See id.
260. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
261. See id. at 889.
262. Compare id. at 889, with Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 440
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July
6, 2006).
263. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 889.
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bacco companies' motion to dismiss the class' allegations, the Third District
reversed and remanded the case with an order to reinstate them.26 In so do-
ing, the Third District found that the case raised common issues as to all
class members and listed the following as examples:
(1) How much exposure to secondhand smoke causes disease?
(2) Whether and when the tobacco industry knew that exposure to
secondhand smoke caused injury?
(3) Whether studies conducted by the tobacco industry provide in-
formation about the dangers of secondhand smoke?
(4) Whether the tobacco industry misrepresented data on second-
hand smoking hazards and conspired to distort such information?
(5) Whether the tobacco industry has a duty to warn nonsmokers
that exposure to passive cigarette smoke could cause serious health
problems?265
The Third District also made certain other key rulings in Broin: 1) that
"[P]laintiffs' legal claims need not be completely identical; ' 266 2) that
"[d]ifferences among the class members as to applicable statutes of limita-
tions [did] not require dismissal of [the] class action;, 267 3) that even though
different choice of law provisions might govern, that did not defeat class
certification; 268 and 4) that "[e]ntitlement to different amounts of damages
[was] not fatal to [the] class action., 269  Upon remand, the trial com-
menced 270 and the parties eventually reached a settlement. 27 ' The Supreme
264. Id. at 892.
265. Id. at 890. The Third District noted "that the common issues [were] potentially dis-
positive of the case. If defendants prevail[ed] on [those] issues, the individual claims [would]
be rendered moot." Id.
266. Id.
267. Broin, 641 So. 2d at 891.
268. Id. at 891 n.2.
269. Id. at 891. The court noted that subclasses could be utilized to address many of these
items if they presented a problem. See id. at 891 n.2.
270. One observer noted that Broin "was historic for being the first class action to reach
trial against the tobacco industry." Brian H. Barr, Note, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Im-
proper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 787, 805 (2001).
271. Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 743 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 3d. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
Under the settlement agreement the tobacco makers agreed, inter alia, to "support Federal
legislation that would impose a smoking ban on all international flights . . . and establish a
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Court of Florida's criticism of the Third District's change in position regard-
ing class certification seems even more justified in light of Broin.272
5. Possible Solution to "Overkill" Problem?
The Supreme Court of Florida has specifically rejected the argument
that punitive damages should be barred in mass tort cases to prevent "over-
kill," which presumably would result from "multiple punitive damage
awards against a single defendant for the same course of conduct., 273  It
seems that there is not any reason to take a different position with respect to
an award of punitive damages in a class action. In fact, many have endorsed
class actions as a solution to the problems resulting from multiple punitive
damages awards.274 Some have even gone further and suggested use of a
$300 million settlement fund to endow a foundation to sponsor scientific research for early
detection and cure of diseases of flight attendants caused by cigarette smoke." Id. The indi-
vidual class members would not be entitled to any monies under the terms of the settlement
agreement, but would "retain the right to bring individual claims for compensatory damages
[and not punitive damages which were waived] on any theory of liability other than fraud,
misrepresentation, or any other willful or intentional conduct." Id.
272. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 31 (Fla. July
6, 2006). "Invalidating the completed class action proceedings on manageability and superi-
ority grounds after a trial has occurred does not accord with common sense or logic." Id.
273. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 1994). The term "overkill"
was first used by the Second Circuit in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832,
839 (2d Cir. 1967). According to one California appellate court, "every appellate court in the
nation to consider the argument that punitive damages should be barred in mass tort cases to
prevent 'overkill' has rejected the idea." Stevens v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 57 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 525, 541-42 (Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, the Supreme Court of Kentucky observed
"the [United States] Supreme Court has been afforded numerous opportunities to address the
issue [of duplicative punitive damages in the context of a mass tort] and, to date, has declined
to do so." Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 413 (Ky. 1998). It
would be noted that in addition to "overkill", the term "windfall" describes another problem
with adjudicating punitive damage awards in individual suits. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 59 (1979) (Blackman, J., concurring). It refers to the arbitrariness of such
awards, since juries are usually accorded "broad discretion both as to the imposition and
amount of such damages." Id. at 50. It also refers to the situation in which giving punitive
awards to early plaintiffs will risk the possibility that later plaintiffs will not be able to obtain
compensatory damages from that same defendant. See Dunn v. HOVIC, I F.3d 1371, 1394-
95 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J., dissenting) (noting that the dispensing of punitive damages has
resulted in the "increased ... likelihood that future claimants will not be able to recover for
their injuries").
274. Both the American Bar Association and the American Law Institute have endorsed
class action lawsuits as the best solution to the multiple punitive damages problem. See 2
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
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"mandatory class action" on the issue of punitive damages in mass tort
cases. 275
INJURY: APPROACHES To LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 260-65, 412-39 (1991); AM-
ERICAN BAR ASS'N, REVISED FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMM'N ON MASS
TORTS 54-55 (1989). So too have others. See generally Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective
Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1114, 1140-41 (2004) (suggesting that "[tihe punitive damages class is the
only mechanism that can, within the constraints of constitutional process, protect the rights
and interests of both plaintiffs and defendants"); Howard A. Denemark, Seeking Greater
Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by a Defen-
dant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 967 (2002) ("The problem [of multiple awards] simply disappears
if all plaintiffs are joined into one class action."); Richard A. Nagareda, Punitive Damage
Class Actions and the Baseline of Tort, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 943, 944, 955-57 (2001)
(stating that class actions are the best solution to the multiple punitive damages problem);
Jonathan Hadley Koenig, Note, Punitive Damage "Overkill" After TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources: The Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 751,
782 (1995) (stating that "only comprehensive class action reform promises a significantly
more fair and more rational approach to the adjudication of punitive damage claims in mass
tort litigation"); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF
THE COMMITrEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 20-26 (1989)
(proposing class actions as the remedy to multiple punitive damages awards); J.K. Ivey, Puni-
tive Damages in Mass Product Liability Cases: Hope for Reform? 6 REv. LITIG. 69,91 (1987)
(stating that "a class determination of punitive awards" in federal courts is viable after Jen-
kins); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 102 (1985) (noting that "a class action [for puni-
tive damages] lessens the risk of overkill because a single resolution of the punitive damages
issue enables the judge and jury to carefully consider the matter and award the total amount
necessary to both punish the defendant and deter others"); Note, Class Actions for Punitive
Damages, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1788 (1983) (asserting that a class action is the best way to
resolve mass-tort punitive damage claims).
275. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez 1), 229 F. 3d 790, 795-96 (9th Cir. 2000).
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[m]andatory class actions avoid the unfairness that results
when a few plaintiffs-those who win the race to the courthouse-bankrupt a defendant early
in the litigation process. They also avoid the possible unfairness of punishing a defendant
over and over again for the same tortious conduct." Id.; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser &
Thomas M. Sobol, Equity for the Victims, Equity for the Transgressor: The Classwide Treat-
ment of Punitive Damages Claims, 74 TUL. L. REV. 2005, 2031 (2000) ("The certification of a
mandatory class with respect to punitive damages claims [will] insure[] defendants that the
ultimate award... will ... be proportional to the course of conduct at issue ... [and that it]
will be distributed equitably among the affected class."); Jerry J. Phillips, Multiple Punitive
Damage Awards, 39 VILL. L. REV. 433, 446 (1994) ("[O]nly ... the mandatory class action,
provides a vehicle with which to control multiple punitive damage awards."); Briggs L. Tobin,
Comment, The "Limited Generosity" Class Action and a Uniform Choice of Law Rule: An
Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal
Courts, 38 EMORY L.J. 457, 465 (1989).
A class action approach to the adjudication of mass-tort punitive damage claims both
preserves the benefits underlying the doctrine of punitive damages and solves the prob-
lems caused by individual adjudication of these claims .. .[but] the class must be a
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6. Jenkins Shows No Federal Infirmity
The trial court plan in Engle does not appear to suffer from any type of
constitutional infirmity under federal law as well.276 Although Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries, Inc. 277 was decided prior to State Farm, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the argument that under either federal or Texas law, punitive dam-
ages could not be determined separately from actual damages in a class ac-
tion.278 The case involved a class of plaintiffs with asbestos-related claims
who brought an action against thirteen different defendants.279 The Federal
Appeals Court refused to accept the defendants' argument that the culpability
of their conduct needed to be evaluated relative to each plaintiff, explaining
as follows:
The purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the victim but
to create a deterrence to the defendant, and to protect the public interest.
The focus is on the defendant's conduct, rather than on the plaintiffs.
While no plaintiff may receive an award of punitive damages without
proving that he suffered actual damages, the allocation need not be made
concurrently with an evaluation of the defendant's conduct. The relative
timing of these assessments is not critical. 8°
mandatory class binding upon all members of the class regardless of whether they have
joined in the proceeding.
Id; see also Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the
Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDiHAM L. REv. 37, 91-92 (1983) (rec-
ommending mandatory punitive damage class actions and discussing circumstances where
they are most appropriate); C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Peter M. Astiz, Punitive Damage Claims of
Class Members Who Opt-Out: Should They Survive? 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 40 (1981) (recom-
mending that plaintiffs who opt out of class action should not be able to assert subsequent
individual punitive damage claim).
276. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd inpart, quashed inpart, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
277. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
278. Id. at 474.
279. Id. at 469.
280. Id. at 474 (citations omitted). For the appellate court, the trial court's "plan [was]
clearly superior" to re-litigating the same issue over many times. Id. at 473.
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7. Class Reps Were Awarded Compensatories
Prior to State Farm, federal law also did not appear to prohibit an award
of punitive damages in a class action where representative class members
were awarded compensatory damages with such punitive damages. The
Sixth Circuit made its position clear in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.281
that, "[a trial] court need not defer its award of punitive damages prior to
determining compensatory damages for the entire class ... [s]o long as the
court determines the defendant's liability and awards representative class
members compensatory damages." '282 If so, was there a problem in Engle
where representative class members were awarded compensatory damages
along with the award of punitive damages?
8. State Farm's Impact Seems Questionable
To suggest that State Farm prohibits a class claim for punitive damages
seems most questionable. As noted, State Farm was not a class action nor
did the United States Supreme Court even attempt to address how its teach-
ings were to be applied in that context. Further, at least one court has already
rejected the argument that State Farm precludes a class claim for punitive
damages.283 In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,284 the federal district court
rejected such contention explaining as follows:
[Defendant] also argues that [p]laintiffs' class claim for punitive
damages is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123
S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed. 2d 585 (2003). Nothing in State Farm,
however, supports this supposition. In State Farm the Court held
that a punitive damage award in an individual action improperly
punished the defendant for conduct that "bore no relation to the
[plaintiff's] harm." Id. at 422, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Specifically, it
found that the jury improperly considered conduct by [the defen-
281. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
282. Id. at 1217.
283. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 172 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Dukes in-
volved the largest employment discrimination class action in American history, consisting of
at least 1.5 million women in the putative class. Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation: To
(b)(2) or not to (b)(2)?, NAT'L L.J., July 26, 2004, at 12.
284. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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dant] that occurred in other states and did not directly affect the
plaintiff. Id. at 422-23, 123 S.Ct. 1513. As such, it underscored
the basic proposition that a "defendant should be punished for the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory indi-
vidual or business." Id. at 423, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Such a principle is
not, as [defendant] suggests, incompatible with the recovery of pu-
nitive damages in a class action.
First, courts can ensure that any award of punitive dam-
ages to the class is based solely on evidence of conduct that was
directed toward the class. Second, as [p]laintiffs propose here,
courts can limit recovery of any punitive damages to those class
members who actually recover an award of [damages], and thus
can demonstrate that they were in fact personally harmed by the
defendant's conduct. Finally, courts also can ensure that any puni-
tive damage award is allocated among the ... class in reasonable
proportion to individual [damages] awards. Accordingly, this
Court is satisfied that procedures exist that permit [p]laintiffs' pu-
nitive damage claim to be managed in a manner fully consistent
with the principles of State Farm.
2 85
9. Individualized Entitlement to Punitive Damages?
In Engle IV, the Third District's pronouncement that "[t]he defendants
[were] entitled to a jury determination, on an individualized basis, as to
whether and to what extent each particular class member [was] entitled to
receive punitive damages" is most questionable.2 86 Although the Supreme
Court of Florida would not specifically state this, some undoubtedly will say
that its action in discarding the punitive award suggests as such. This might
285. Id. at 172. But cf In re Simon II Litig. (Simon I1), 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
Simon II suggests that State Farm demands:
In certifying a class that seeks an assessment of punitive damages prior to an actual determi-
nation and award of compensatory damages,... [a class] [c]ertification [o]rder... [must] ensure
that ajury will be able to assess an award that, in the first instance, will bear a sufficient nexus
to the actual and potential harm to the plaintiff class, and that will be reasonable and propor-
tionate to those harms.
Id. According to one litigant, State Farm may have "unintentionally strengthened the pros-
pects for class certification of issues relating to punitive damages" since the guide posts "fo-
cus primarily on defendants' conduct and self-consciously strive to systematize the determina-
tion of punitive damages in all courts and cases." Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action
Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1475, 1507 (2005).
286. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
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287be a legitimate argument if referring to compensatory damages. However,
does it apply to punitive damages? 288  As the Fifth Circuit in Jenkins had
stated, punitive damages are not meant to compensate the victim; they are
designed to vindicate the public interest.289 Awarding punitive damages to
private citizens is justified as a necessary incentive to accomplish the goals
of punishing a defendant who has engaged in outrageous conduct, and deter-
ring that defendant-as well as others-from engaging in such misconduct in
the future. 290 The fact that courts have recognized the legitimacy of certify-
ing a class solely for punitive-and not compensatory--damages 291 is
287. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319-21 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
district court's trial plan as inconsistent with state law because it did not entail an individual
inquiry into each member's actual damages).
288. Again, wouldn't this defeat one of the primary benefits of bringing a class action, if
the Third District is correct and individual determinations were required? See Maenner v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 127 F.R.D. 488, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1989) ("Defendants' proposal
... that all issues of liability and damages be tried together ... would effectively defeat the
class-action treatment of this case.").
289. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). This is true
under Florida law as well since the "[award of] punitive damages is for the public benefit or
collective good ... [and] will reflect not the wrong done to any single individual but the
wrongfulness of the conduct as a whole." Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 1295
(11 th Cir. 1999) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986)); Tapscott
v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 1996)); see also Arab Termite &
Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla. 1982). Punitive damages are
to be determined "entirely aside from the measure of compensation for the injured plaintiff."
Id.
290. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003). "Compensatory damages are 'intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff
has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct' while "punitive damages serve a
broader function ... aimed at deterrence and retribution." Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)). Punitive damages "are private fines
levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468 ("The
plaintiffs, as private parties, do not have a 'right' to punitive damages; punitive damages are
awarded solely as a matter of public rights or interests, in order to serve the public policy of
punishment and deterrence.").
291. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez I1), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1079-80, 1082 (D.
Alaska 2004) (The court certified a "single, punitive damages claims class" relating to an oil
spill that allegedly caused economic losses and emotional injuries, which eventually resulted
in a $5 billion jury verdict.); see also Williams, supra note 233, at 332-36 (judge defending
his decision to certify a nationwide punitive damage class action in In re Northern District of
California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation (Dalkon Shield I), 526 F. Supp.
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A. H. Robins
Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)); see generally In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725
F.2d 858-59, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1067 (1984) (denying mandamus
petition to vacate certification of two classes, one on issues of punitive damages, in case
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clearly reflective of the fact that such individual determinations are not con-
sidered to be required with respect to them.292
10. Individualized Proof of Punitive Damages?
Tenth, it is also clear that courts have approved various methods of de-
termining compensatory damages on the basis of class-wide, as opposed to
individualized, proof of damages. 293 In so doing, the courts rejected the de-
where plaintiffs claimed to have suffered damages as a result of exposure to herbicides manu-
factured by the defendant).
292. As one legal scholar would observe shortly after State Farm I:
Because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish defendants for egregious conduct and
deter similar behavior in the future, the typical punitive damages analysis focuses predomi-
nantly on characteristics of the defendant, such as the nature of the defendant's wrongful con-
duct, the nature and extent of harm the defendant has caused, and the defendant's financial
condition. Historically, the characteristics of the plaintiff have played a minor role at best. In-
deed, in the class action context, a claim for punitive damages might not vary at all-either in
the evidence that was presented or in the size of the award-based on the absence or presence
of any individual class member. From this vantage point, the claim appears to be collective
because the award yields relief to the group, based on the defendant's conduct to the group,
rather than to any particular individual.
Steven S. Gensler, Diversity Class Actions, Common Relief and the Rule of Individual Valu-
ation, 82 OR. L. REV. 295, 312-13 (2003) (citations omitted). Although the scholar noted that
State Farm I "may alter" the plaintiff's "minor role" in determining punitive damages, does
there really seem to be any justification for this? See id. at 313 n.88. As noted, many have
argued that punitive damages in mass tort cases should be subject to class action treatment
because of the inherent unfairness that often results in the normal case-by-case method of
adjudication when determining such damages. See supra notes 274-75. "A jury's assessment
of the extent of a plaintiff's injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposi-
tion of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation." Engle v. Liggett
Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 20 (Fla. July 6, 2006) (quoting Cooper
Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 432); see Christopher J. Willis, Aggregation of Punitive Damages in
Diversity Class Actions: Will the Real Amount in Controversy Please Stand Up? 30 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 775, 795-99 (1997) (arguing that punitive damages sought for a class of plain-
tiffs are common and undivided interests justifying aggregation of such damages for purposes
of determining the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction).
293. See Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260, 1267 (8th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1291 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury award of approximately
$766 million to a class where a random sample of compensatory damage claims were used to
determine such damages. 103 F.3d 767, 772, 787 (9th Cir. 1996). In a case similar to Engle,
In re Simon 11 Litig., the district court made various forms of sampled evidence, including
statistical proof of both causation and damages, an integral part of its trial plan in a nationwide
class action comprising all persons who smoked defendants' cigarettes and who were diag-
nosed with certain enumerated diseases within the class period. 211 F.R.D. 86, 99-100, 113
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated, 407 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005). As noted, Florida's lawsuit against
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fendants' argument that they have a right to an individual determination of
such damages.294 The Third District's holding in Engle IV, that the tobacco
defendants had a right to an individualized determination with respect to
punitive damages, is therefore questionable from this perspective as well. 295
Further, should a wrongdoer be able to avoid punitive damages simply be-
cause the harm it caused may have been difficult to prove or value? This is
clearly not the case with respect to compensatory damages.29 6 Under Florida
law, any "difficulty in proving [compensatory] damages or uncertainty as to
[their] amount will not prevent recovery" 297 "where it is clear that substantial
damages were suffered and there is a reasonable basis in evidence for the
amount awarded., 298  Other jurisdictions have come to similar conclu-
sions.29 9 One rationale is that a wrongdoer is not able to escape liability sim-
the tobacco companies was, in essence, a class action, and both the Florida Legislature and the
Supreme Court of Florida approved of the use of statistical evidence being used in that case.
See FLA. STAT. § 409.910(9)(b) (1995) (section omitted pursuant to Fla. HB 3077, § 1 (1997));
see Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1256 (Fla.
1996).
294. See Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. I11. 1991)
("[T]o the extent defendant argues in this case that ... it has an absolute right to individual-
ized determinations of damages, its contention must be rejected as contrary to the case law
and to the policies governing class actions."); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
278, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("[T]he court cannot conclude that the defendants are constitution-
ally entitled to compel a parade of individual plaintiffs to establish damages.").
295. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006) ("The
defendants are entitled to a jury determination, on an individualized basis."). Further, would it
be constitutionally impermissible to use some method to determine the ratio of compensato-
ries to punitives in a class action based on other than individual proof of such damages?
296. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Schimpf v.
Reger, 691 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Adams v. Dreyfus Interstate Dev.
Corp., 352 So. 2d 76, 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); BE&K Constr. Co. v. Will & Grundy
Counties Bldg. Trades Council, 156 F.3d 756, 770 (7th Cir. 1998); Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P
Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992); Broan Mfg. Co. v. Assoc. Distrib., Inc.,
923 F.2d 1232, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991); Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F.2d 589, 592 (10th
Cir. 1929); Long-Lewis, Inc. v. Webster, 551 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1989); Romer v. Dist.
of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097, 1100 (D.C. 1982); DeSombre v. Bickel, 118 N.W.2d 868, 873
(Wis. 1963); Weinglass v. Gibson, 155 A. 439, 440 (Pa. 1931); Uhrich Millwork, Ltd. v. J.B.
Brewster Co., 261 P. 561, 562 (Kan. 1927).
297. Schimpf 691 So. 2d at 580.
298. Adams, 352 So. 2d at 78.
299. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264; BE&K Constr. Co., 156 F.3d at 770; Sir Speedy, Inc.,
957 F.2d at 1038; Broan Mfg. Co., 923 F.2d at 1240; Hoffer Oil Corp., 34 F.2d at 592; Long-
Lewis, Inc., 551 So. 2d at 1027; Romer, 449 A.2d at 1100; DeSombre, 118 N.W.2d at 873;
Weinglass, 155 A. at 440; Uhrich Millwork, Ltd., 261 P. at 562.
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ply because the harm caused is difficult to prove or value. 300  Could that
logic have any application to a punitive damage award? Should a wrongdoer
be able to avoid a punitive damage award simply because the harm it may
have caused was so great that it either was impossible to determine or might
take years to ascertain?
11. What Is Really Proper Analysis?
As one federal district court observed, "the proper analysis is not always
simply a comparison of punitive damages to the amount of compensatory
damages actually awarded by the jury."3 0 ' In Gore, the United States Su-
preme Court reiterated that "the proper inquiry is 'whether there is a reason-
able relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to
result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has oc-
curred."' 30 2 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California, in Simon v. San
Paolo U.S. Holding Co.,303 suggested that the Gore inquiry still holds true,
even after State Farm L 304 California's highest court explained that in State
Farm I "the [United States Supreme] [C]ourt referred to the relationship be-
tween punitive damages and both 'the amount of harm' and 'the general
damages recovered,' impliedly recognizing that these two are not always
identical. 30 5 The Supreme Court of California also noted that in "discussing
300. See Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264-65; Thompson v. Haynes, 305 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); BE&K Constr. Co., 156 F.3d at 770; Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106,
1118 (2d Cir. 1986).
301. lannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc., 941 F. Supp. 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
302. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 (1996) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (emphasis omitted)). In TXO, the jury
awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in compensatory damages for slander of title, plus $10 million
in punitive damages, roughly 526 times the compensatory damages award. 509 U.S. at 446.
Nonetheless, and despite its suggestion just two years earlier in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip that a 4 to 1 ratio was close to the line, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the award, holding that the punitive damages were not so "'grossly excessive' as to be
beyond the power of the State to allow." Id. at 462; see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991). While the Court acknowledged the "dramatic disparity between the
actual [and punitive] damages," it concluded that "in light of the amount of money potentially
at stake, the bad faith of [the defendant], the fact that the scheme employed ... was part of a
larger pattern of fraud, trickery, and deceit, and [the defendant's] wealth," the punitive dam-
ages award did not violate due process. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 462.
303. 113 P.3d 63 (Cal. 2005).
304. Id. at 71 (discussing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538
U.S. 408 (2003)).
305. Id. (citing State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 426).
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the second [Gore] 'guide post,' the [nation's] high [C]ourt [in State Farm 1]
spoke repeatedly of a proportionality between punitive damages and the
harm or 'potential harm' suffered by the plaintiff. 30 6 According to the Su-
preme Court of California, "United States Supreme Court precedents [includ-
ing State Farm I] appear to contemplate, in some circumstances, the use of
measures of harm beyond the compensatory damages.' 7 As a result, "fed-
eral and state courts have, in a variety of factual contexts, considered un-
compensated or potential harm as part of the predicate for a punitive dam-
ages award. 30 8 The Supreme Court of California makes a convincing argu-
ment that, upon closer analysis, is actually supported by State Farm I, as well
as other Supreme Court precedents.3 °9 In evaluating the excessiveness of a
punitive award, the amount of the compensatory damages awarded may not
always be indicative of the harm caused; therefore, should courts consider
the potential harm as well?
310
12. Calculation Could Have Been Deferred
Finally, and probably most important, it is clear that a calculation of pu-
nitive damages could have been taken after all the compensatory damages
306. Id. (citing State Farm 1, 538 U.S. at 418, 424).
307. Id.
308. San Paolo US. Holding Co., 113 P.3d at 71; see Gensler, supra note 292, at 342-43.
Gensler contends that "State Farm, like the previous decisions, does not specifically identify
what figure is to be the denominator in the ratio calculation[s]," while theorizing that it was
still possible that the denominator could be "the total harm the defendant caused or intended to
cause, or the defendant's total gain from a course of misconduct." Id. (emphasis omitted)
(footnote omitted). Furthermore, Catherine M. Sharkey, in a relevant article on punitive dam-
ages, argued that even though State Farm I states that:
"[A] defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised,
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages" . . . [and] in discussing the relationship "be-
tween harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award," the [United
States Supreme] Court seems to contemplate explicitly the use of "harm to the people of
Utah," at least in cases where such an "adverse effect on the State's general population" could
be shown.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 362
(2003) (quoting State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 422-423, 424, 427) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
309. See San Paolo US. Holding Co., 113 P.3d at 71 (citing State Farm I, 538 U.S. at
418).
310. See In re Exxon Valdez (Exxon Valdez I1), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1076 (D. Alaska
2004). The court opined "that State Farm [I], while bringing the [Gore] guideposts into
sharper focus, does not change the analysis." Id.
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were determined.31' In fact, after the Phase 2 verdicts, a case involving a
sick smoker was allowed to proceed to trial in accordance with the Engle
trial plan, after which the jury awarded the smoker $37.5 million in compen-
satory damages.312 Although this case was thought to be a possible preview
of suits to come,3"3 it apparently was the only one. Such individual tobacco
cases, however, clearly have been allowed to proceed.31 4 Further, is not the
ruling by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle VI in reality allowing such
individual tobacco cases to proceed, but simply without the bonus of the pu-
nitive damages award already determined.3' 5
C. The Third Guide Post
The third guide post is "the disparity between the punitive damages
award and the 'civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
311. See, e.g., Gordon Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay $15 Million-Scale of Puni-
tive Award Heightens Threat Lawsuits Pose to Tobacco Industry, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2002,
at A6 [hereinafter Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay].
312. See Jay Weaver, Jury Awards Smoker $37.5 Million, MIAMI HERALD, June 12, 2002,
at lA.
313. Fairclough, Reynolds Ordered to Pay, supra note 311.
314. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle (Engle 1), 672 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1996). This clearly seems to be what the Third District contemplated in its original
opinion in Engle I, modifying the order certifying a nationwide class to "manageable propor-
tions" by restricting the class to Florida smokers. Id. In its opinion, the Third District recog-
nized that while "certain individual issues [would] have to be tried as to each class member,
principally the issue of damages, the basic issues of liability common to all members of the
class [would] clearly predominate over the individual issues." Id. at 41. Incidentally, Broin v.
Philip Morris Co. appears to support such an outcome, although it did not involve punitive
damages and was a settlement as opposed to a verdict. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994). As noted, while the individual class members in that case were not entitled to any
money under the terms of the settlement agreement, they did, however, have the right to bring
individual claims. See Philip Morris Inc. v. French, 897 So. 2d 480, 483-84 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2004). A number of class members appear to have instituted their own suits following
the settlement in Broin. Id. ("Following the [Broin] settlement, over 3,000 flight attendants
brought individual suits against the tobacco defendants for the claims retained by the agree-
ment.").
315. Moreover, if there was true concern that the $145 billion punitive award would "frus-
trate the societal interest in protecting all injured claimants' rights to at least recover compen-
satory damages," as claimed by the Third District in Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV),
payment of the punitive damage award could have been stayed until the compensatory dam-
ages were determined and satisfied. 853 So. 2d 434, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), app 'd
in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006); see Keene Corp. v. Levin,
623 A.2d 662, 663 (Md. 1993) (noting that trial courts in asbestos litigation had deferred
payments of punitive damages "until all Baltimore City plaintiffs' compensatory damages
[were] paid").
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cases."' 316 The real purpose of this guide post is to determine whether or not
the defendant has "fair notice" that the wrongful conduct entailed the result-
ing punitive award.31 Prior to the historical award in Engle it could be ar-
gued that the tobacco defendants in that case had "fair notice" from several
different avenues.
1. Punitive Awards in Individual Cases
In Gore, it was significant to the United States Supreme Court that at
the time the dispute arose between the plaintiff and the defendant, "there
[did] not appear to have been any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere
indicating that [the defendant's conduct] might give rise to such severe pun-
ishment."3 I The same is not true for Engle. While, prior to the Engle ver-
dict, there were no comparable punitive awards in a class action composed of
injured smokers as in that case, there were, however, punitive awards in
comparable individual civil suits.3 19
In 1998, a Florida jury awarded $450,000 in punitive damages to the
family of a deceased smoker who had died of a smoking-related injury.32 ° In
1999, a California jury awarded $50 million in punitive damages to an in-
jured smoker 321-although the award would eventually be reduced to $9 mil-
316. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 428 (quot-
ing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
317. See id. at 417; Gore, 517 U.S. at 587.
318. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584.
319. See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 812 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "it is appropriate
for [the court] to examine punitive damage awards in similar cases" in reference to Gore's
third guide post); see also St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d 1110, 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (stating that "[a]s the United States Supreme Court noted in Gore, this last factor is a
broad one, which takes into account many circumstances, including fair notice to the defen-
dant that he can expect to be hit with a punitive damage[s] award similar to the one actually
imposed"). Unlike civil penalties or criminal sanctions, other punitive awards would appear
more valuable because they should provide "'fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject [the defendant] to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose."' State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
320. Vivian Wakefield, Verdict Is Heard Worldwide: Tobacco Penalty Boosts Cigarette
Foes, FLA. TIMES-UNION, June 12, 1998, at B I. It would be noted that since the family had
been awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages, bringing the total verdict to $950,000, the
case clearly satisfied State Farm I in terms of the ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, since it was less than 1 to 1. See id.
321. Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I), 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 496 (Ct. App. 2001).
This was the Henley case discussed earlier.
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lion because of State Farm 1322 Later, in 1999, an Oregon jury would award
$79.5 million in punitive damages to the family of another smoker who had
died of a smoking-related injury.323 In 2000, prior to the Engle punitive
award, another California jury would award $20 million in punitive damages
to a sick smoker, 324 although the verdict would be reversed on other
grounds.3 5
Prior to the punitive award in Engle, punitive awards of $450,000,326
$50 million,3 27 $79.5 million,328 and $20 million 32 9 had been rendered against
322. See supra notes 68-78 and accomp~anying text.
323. This was the Williams case discussed earlier. See supra notes 80-91 and accompany-
ing text. Although the Supreme Court of Oregon has upheld the $79.5 million punitive award,
even in light of State Farm I, as noted, the United States Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction
to review this issue, see Philip Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256 (Or. Mar. 30, 2006), and
it remains to be seen if the entire punitive award will be allowed to stand. Since the compen-
satory damages in Williams III were only $521,485.80, which was stated to be a ratio of puni-
tive damages to compensatory damages of 96 to 1, see 92 P.3d at 130, 144, the United States
Supreme Court may still yet find that the $79.5 million punitive award is "unconstitutionally
excessive." Cf Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams P), 127 P.3d 1165, 1182 (Or. 2006).
Assuming, arguendo, that a minimum ratio of 1 to 1, and a maximum ratio of 10 to 1, and that
the $521,485.80 in compensatory damages that were ultimately awarded in that case had to be
used, a court could find that an appropriate punitive award would fall somewhere between
$500,000 and $5 million.
324. Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807, 820 (Ct. App. 2004); Harriet
Chiang, $20 Million Jury Award to Smoker, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2000, at Al.
325. Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 864; Smoker Cancer Award Returned for Retrial, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 8, 2004 at 1. In Whiteley, plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed suit against two ciga-
rette manufacturers after the wife was diagnosed with lung cancer, alleging claims based on
various theories of fraud. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 812, 819. After a jury would award the plaintiffs
about $1.7 million in compensatory damages, and $20 million in punitive damages, id. at 819-
20, the two cigarette manufacturers would appeal claiming, inter alia, that they could not "be
liable for fraud, negligent design, or other such product liability claims based on conduct
occurring from January 1, 1988 to January 1, 1998" because of a former state immunity stat-
ute California Civil Code § 1714.45. Id. at 812-13. The appellate court would agree with the
cigarette manufacturers that the immunity statute provided them complete immunity for the
ten-year period and find that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it could
not base liability upon any of their conduct occurring within such period. Id. at 812-13.
Consequently, the appellate court would reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and re-
mand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. Id. at
864. The court mentioned that while it found it unnecessary to address the manufacturers'
challenge to the punitive damages award, it noted that the trial court would "doubtless be
guided by" the United States Supreme Court's decision in State Farm L Whiteley, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 864. This seems to suggest that the appeals court believed that State Farm I would
have required the $20 million punitive damages award, which was approximately twelve times
the $1.7 million compensatory damages award, to be reduced. Again, assuming a minimum
ratio of 1 to 1 and a maximum ratio of 10 to 1, the punitive award would fall somewhere be-
tween $1.7 million to $10.7 million.
326. Wakefield, supra note 320.
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the cigarette makers. Could these awards have provided "fair notice" to the
tobacco defendants in Engle that their conduct could subject them to punitive
damages?33 And, if so, did such punitive awards provide them "fair notice"
as to the severity of such an award? The former would certainly seem the
case even though the $450,000 award was the only award rendered in Flor-
ida,331 the $50 million award was reduced to $9 million,332 the $79.5 million
award may still yet be reduced, and the $20 million award has been com-
327. Henley v. Philip Morris Inc. (Henley I/), 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29, 38 (Ct. App. 2004).
328. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 111), 92 P.3d 126, 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).
329. Whiteley, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 820.
330. See Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), appd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006) (listing
the defendants in the case).
331. There does not appear to be any reason why verdicts against cigarette manufacturers
in jurisdictions outside of Florida are not relevant for this purpose. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that at the time Engle was filed, Florida had a statutory presumption of excessiveness of
any punitive damage awards exceeding three times the amount of compensatory damages in
cases based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, and breach of warranty. See FLA.
STAT. § 768.73(1)(a)-(b) (1997) (amended 1999) (although the wording of the statute has
since changed, this version was applicable to Engle); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 434. The statu-
tory presumption, however, did not apply to class action suits, and therefore was not an issue
in Engle IV. § 768.73(l)(a) (1997) (amended 1999). Nevertheless, if Engle is to be compared
to individual suits where punitive damages were awarded, this statutory presumption must be
taken into account. The presumption, however, was hardly conclusive and could be overcome
if the claimant demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that the specific circum-
stances justify the award. § 768.73(l)(b) (1997) (amended 1999). A case illustrating the
statutory presumption of excessiveness being overcome by a claimant is Owens-Coming
Fiberglas Corp. v. Ballard, a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida one year
before the Engle verdict. 749 So. 2d 483, 483-84 (Fla. 1999). In Ballard, Florida's highest
court upheld a $31 million punitive damages award to a claimant in an asbestos case even
though it was almost eighteen times the $1.8 million compensatory damages award. Id. at
484-85, 488-89. The court found that the presumption of excessiveness was overcome by
clear and convincing evidence that the asbestos manufacturer's conduct was egregious, and
exhibited a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons exposed to asbestos products. Id. at
483, 488-89. This raises another question: Could the verdict in Engle be compared with
punitive damage awards in asbestos cases? There is a much longer line of decisions awarding
punitive damages in asbestos cases than in tobacco litigation. See generally GERALD W.
BOSTON, PUNITIvE DAMAGES IN TORT LAW, ch. 20 (1993) (explaining the history of punitive
damages in asbestos litigation). It is apparently claimed by some that the "disease processes"
in asbestos and tobacco cases are similar, although the warning and liability issues might be
different. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1181 n.92 (1995). Further, it has been stated
that "the asbestos industry [has] engaged in a pattern of deception remarkably similar to that
of the tobacco industry." Arthur B. LaFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Pub-
lic Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 194 (2000).
332. Henley II, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 38, 75.
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pletely overturned.333 The latter would also appear true if one undertook
simple arithmetic. Taking the Engle plaintiffs' apparent initial estimate of a
class size of 300,000,13  this would amount to $483,000 per class member
based on that $145 billion punitive award. Further, if the plaintiffs' subse-
quent estimate of a class size of 700,000 is more accurate, 35 this figure
would be less than half that amount, or approximately $207,000 per class
member. Based on comparable smoking-related verdicts in individual suits,
the cigarette makers appear to have no basis to complain about any disparity
with respect to the punitive award in Engle.3 3 6
333. It would seem that the amount of any other punitive damages awarded against a ciga-
rette manufacturer, or an award with which the cigarette manufacturer was threatened, would
be relevant in this regard.
334. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 443.
335. Id.
336. Although punitive awards are still being challenged in most of the cases, awards
rendered after the one in Engle also do not help the cigarette makers' case in regard to any
disparity. One punitive award that has survived such a challenge, however, occurred in 2001,
the year following Engle IV. See Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 645-46
(Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1567, 1567 (2006). In Boeken v. Philip Morris Inc., a
California jury awarded a sick smoker over $5.5 million in general damages and $3 billion in
punitives, although the punitive award was reduced first to $100 million, and later to $50
million. Id. The $50 million punitive award, which exceeded the 4 to 1 ratio but was less
than 10 to 1, stood after the United States Supreme Court declined to intervene. Id. There
were a number of other punitive awards against the cigarette makers following the one in
Engle and Boeken. In 2002, an Oregon jury ordered a cigarette maker to pay $150 million in
punitives in the case of a smoker who died of a smoking-related injury. Estate of Schwarz v.
Philip Morris Inc., 135 P.3d 409, 414 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). Ultimately, the state court of ap-
peals vacated the judgment for punitive damages and remanded for a new trial on the amount
of those damages, basing its decision on the trial court's failure to give jury instructions which
limited the jury's consideration of out-of-state evidence in apparent violation of the order of
State Farm. See generally id at 427-33. In another case in 2002, a federal district court
judge imposed a $15 million punitive award in favor of an injured smoker. See Fairclough,
Reynolds Ordered to Pay, supra note 311. In a third case in 2002, a California jury awarded a
record $28 billion in punitive damages to an injured smoker, although the award would later
be reduced to $28 million. See Philip Morris Hit with Record $28 Billion Punitive Award,
LAW. WKLY. U.S., Oct. 14, 2002, at 2; see also Woman with Cancer to Accept Smaller Award,
but Appeal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2002, at A4. In 2003, an Arkansas federal jury rendered a
verdict awarding $15 million in punitive damages to the family of a smoker who died of a
smoking-related injury, although the award was later nullified by the trial judge. See Linda
Satter, Jury: Smoker's Kin Due $19 Million, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, May 24, 2003, at 1A;
see also Tobacco Brief-Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co.: Judge Eliminates $15 Million in
Punitive Damages in Case, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2003, at CI 1. Also, in 2003, a New York jury
awarded the widow of a deceased smoker $8 million in punitive damages. See William Gla-
berson, $8 Million Award to Widow Punishes Tobacco Company, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004,
at B1. Although there appears to have been no cases awarding punitive damages against
cigarette manufacturers in 2004, another New York jury ordered a cigarette manufacturer to
pay $17.1 million in punitive damages to a sick smoker in 2005. See Bob Van Voris, Jury
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2. Possible Civil and Criminal Sanctions
A related question is whether the tobacco defendants' conduct in Engle
could have subjected them to any civil sanctions or even possibly criminal
punishment. It is important to mention that courts have recognized that there
are "common law tort duties that do not lend themselves to a comparison
with statutory penalties. ' 337 Further, as noted earlier, at least theoretically,
under Florida law, punitive damages are supposed to apply to wrongdoing
not coverable by criminal law.338 In St. John v. Coisman,339 a Florida appel-
late court found that "[t]here [was] no comparable criminal or civil statute
which punishes false arrest in Florida."34  In Williams III, discussed ear-
lier,341 the Oregon Appellate Court found "that [the State of] Oregon [did]
not provide civil sanctions for [the cigarette manufacturer's] conduct and that
the criminal statutes [referenced by the] plaintiff ... were not truly compara-
ble." '342 Whether the tobacco defendants in Engle had "fair notice," by way
of possibly civil and/or criminal sanctions, is not easily answered.34 3  It
would be noted, however, that the Third District would state that Engle in-
volved "the same alleged misconduct" as in the case brought by the State of
Florida against the tobacco companies.3" In that case, State v. American
Awards $18.8 Million to an Individual Smoker, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 30, 2005, at 3C. Al-
though it remains to be seen if, and how much, the cigarette makers pay in terms of punitive
damages in these cases, Engle's less than a half a million dollars per claimant in punitive
damages (assuming a class of 300,000 or more) may wind up being a bargain compared to
these cases.
337. Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997).
338. See infra notes 396-97.
339. 799 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
340. Id. at 1115.
341. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
342. See Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams IV), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App.
2004) (citing its earlier opinion in Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams 1), 48 P.3d 824,
824 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)). The criminal statutes relied on by the plaintiff dealt with the crime
of manslaughter. See Williams I, 48 P.3d at 842.
343. See generally Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
344. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle (Engle I), 853 So. 2d 434, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2003), app"d in part, quashed in part, remd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,2006).
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Tobacco Co.,345 Florida brought suit against the tobacco companies seeking
recovery of Medicaid expenditures it had made on behalf of smokers.
3 46
If the Third District is correct that the two cases involved "the same al-
leged misconduct, 3 47 then Florida's tobacco lawsuit might be relevant to this
inquiry.348
Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act3 4 9 formed the cornerstone
of Florida's litigation against the tobacco makers. 50 However, other statu-
tory provisions were utilized as well.3 5' Florida asserted that the cigarette
manufacturers violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
Act,352 the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act, 353 a statute prohibiting the sale of
cigarettes to minors, 314 two Florida misleading advertising statutes, 355 a Flor-
345. 707 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
346. Id. at 852. For a discussion of Medicaid, see supra note 238.
347. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468. The general theme underlying the Florida suit was that
the tobacco industry had conspired to conceal the addictive nature of nicotine and that smok-
ing caused injury. See Third Amended Complaint, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d 851
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Nos. 96-3434 & 96-4193), available at
http://stic.neu.edu/Fl/Fla3rd.htm.
348. See id.
349. FLA. STAT. § 409.910 (2006).
350. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 1-12. As noted, before the Flor-
ida suit would be brought, the Florida legislature amended Florida's Medicaid Third-Party
Liability Act making it easier for the State in any recoupment suit. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910
(1995); see also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1244 (Fla. 1996) (discussing history and impact of the 1994 amendment to the Act).
351. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 9 89, 178, 184-87, 190-93, 214,
220, 234-35.
352. See FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2006); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347,
174-89. Florida alleged that the tobacco companies engaged in "unconscionable acts or prac-
tices and unfair and deceptive acts or practices" in violation of this Act, which is designed to
protect consumers in commercial transactions. See id. T 187.
353. See FLA. STAT. § 499.001; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 174-89.
Florida alleged that the tobacco companies' cigarette products were drugs and devices within
the meaning of this Act and that the tobacco companies were guilty under the Act of false and
misleading advertising concerning the said products. See Third Amended Complaint, supra
note 347, 9 174-89.
354. See FLA. STAT. § 569.101; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 88-110.
One of the allegations made by Florida was that the tobacco companies targeted minors as the
source of new markets. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 88-110.
355. See FLA. STAT. §§ 817.06, .41; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 19 174-
89. While false advertising pertaining to the Florida Drug and Cosmetic Act must pertain to a
drug, device, or cosmetic, these provisions prohibit misleading advertising with respect to
generally any merchandise offered to the Florida public for sale. See Third Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 347, T 185.
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ida nuisance statute,356 and the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO).
357
While the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act normally limits Florida to
recovery of the monies it paid for medical assistance to Medicaid recipients,
it appears to permit a sanction in the form of treble damages "[i]n cases of
suspected criminal violations or fraudulent activity," '358 and Florida would
seek such a sanction in its suit against the tobacco makers.359 A party who
willfully violates Florida's unfair and deceptive trade practices statute,
known as Florida's "Little FTC Act,"36 may be subject to a civil penalty of
up to "$10,000 for each such violation."36' Similarly, a violation of the Flor-
ida Drug and Cosmetic Act can subject a party to a fine of up to "$5,000 per
violation per day." '362 One is considered criminally liable under the statute
prohibiting the sale of cigarettes to minors.3 63  Further, a violation of Flor-
ida's misleading advertising statute can lead to a criminal prosecution, 364 or a
civil action in which punitive damages are specifically authorized.3 65 A pub-
lic nuisance charge is a crime under Florida law. 366 Additionally, a violation
356. FLA. STAT. § 823.01; Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 1 186.
357. FLA. STAT. § 895.01 (1995); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 190-237.
358. FLA. STAT. § 409.910(17)(a) (2006).
359. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 177.
360. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 107-08, 108 n.2 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).
361. FLA. STAT. § 501.2075. Such party may also be liable for attorney fees as well. Id.
Florida sought both the civil penalty and attorney fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act in its action against the tobacco companies. See Third Amended Com-
plaint, supra note 347, 188.
362. FLA. STAT. § 499.066(3). Injunctive relief is also possible for violations of this Act.
Id. § 499.066(2).
363. Id. § 569.101.
364. Id. § 817.06(2).
365. Id. § 817.41(1), (6). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be
made or disseminated before the general public of the state, or any portion thereof,
any misleading advertisement. Such making or dissemination of misleading adver-
tising shall constitute and is hereby declared to be fraudulent and unlawful, de-
signed and intended for obtaining money or property under false pretenses.
(6) Any person prevailing in a civil action for violation of this section shall be
awarded costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, and may be awarded punitive
damages in addition to actual damages proven. This provision is in addition to any
other remedies prescribed by law.
FLA. STAT. § 817.41(1), (6). Florida courts have specifically recognized that this provision "is
penal in character ... [and] the type of penal statute the violation of which affords civil re-
lief." Vance v. Indian Hammock Hunt & Riding Club, Ltd., 403 So. 2d 1367, 1369 n.3 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing Rosenberg v. Ryder Leasing, Inc., 168 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964)).
366. FLA. STAT. § 823.01.
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of the Florida RICO Act is a serious criminal offense.3 67 Punishment could
entail criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, 68 and either: a) a fine of
up to $10,000;369 or b) in lieu of such fine where the offender derives pecuni-
ary value or "cause[s] personal injury or property damage or other loss,. . . a
fine [of up to three] times the gross value gained or [three] times the gross
loss caused, whichever is the greater, [may be imposed], plus court costs and
the costs of investigation and prosecution, reasonably incurred., 370 In addi-
tion to, or in place of the above, possible civil remedies include: 1) divesting
the offender of any interest in the enterprise; 2) imposing restrictions upon
the offender's activities; 3) dissolving or reorganizing the organization; 4)
suspending or revoking a license or permit granted to the enterprise by a state
agency; 5) forfeiting or revoking the charter of a Florida corporation or a
foreign corporation organized to do business within the state;37 and/or 6)
being subject to an action by the state for three times the actual damages the
state sustained as a result of the RICO violation.
3 72
If the claims asserted by the State of Florida in its lawsuit against the
tobacco makers are any indication, then there were both civil and criminal
sanctions to which the tobacco defendants in Engle could have been sub-
ject. 373  Further, while the United States Supreme Court in State Farm I
367. Id. § 895.04.
368. See id. § 775.082.
369. See id § 775.083(1)(b).
370. Id. § 895.04(2).
371. FLA. STAT. § 895.05(1)(a)-(e).
372. Id. § 895.05(7). Florida would seek triple damages under this provision. See Third
Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 217, 231, and 237. This provision also allowed
Florida to recover attorneys' fees-trial and appellate-and court costs, but not punitive dam-
ages. See FLA. STAT. § 895.05(7).
373. Is the Federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (2000), another possible sanction in which the tobacco defendants in Engle could
have been subject? The Federal RICO imposes criminal and civil liability on any person who:
1) invests income from a pattern of racketeering activity in an enterprise; 2) acquires through a
pattern of racketeering activity an interest in an enterprise; 3) conducts an enterprises' affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity; or 4) conspires to do any of these things. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(a)-(d). In 1999, one year before the Engle punitive award would be rendered, the
United States brought suit against the tobacco companies and their research organizations
"claiming that they engaged in a fraudulent pattern of covering up the dangers of tobacco use
and marketing to minors," basing its claim for damages and equitable relief on three federal
statutes, including the Federal RICO statute. United States v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Mor-
ris 1), 396 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2005). While the district court dismissed claims based
on the other statutes, it allowed the government's RICO claim to stand. Id. Later, the district
court ruled that the cigarette companies violated racketeering laws by deceiving the public
about the dangers of smoking, and although it did not impose any monetary penalties, it im-
posed other remedial measures. See United States v. Philip Morris Inc. (Philip Morris 11), No.
99-2496, slip op. at 1650-51 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2006).
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found that any claim about possible loss of business, disgorgement of profits,
and imprisonment were merely speculative in that case,374 can the same be
said with respect to the tobacco companies that were sued by the State of
Florida?375 Was the threat speculative or real?
3. Florida's Lawsuit Against Big Tobacco
Speaking of Florida's tobacco lawsuit raises another interesting ques-
tion relative to Gore's third guide post: Did that lawsuit itself provide the
tobacco defendants in Engle with "fair notice" that their conduct could entail
a substantial punitive award? 376 After the state's case was brought, the to-
bacco companies agreed, among other things, to pay Florida more than $11.3
billion.377 The Third District was probably correct in observing that Engle
and Florida's lawsuit against the cigarette makers involved the same "allega-
tions of misconduct., 378  However, the Florida Appellate Court appears to
have been wrong in trying to suggest that the claims for punitive damages
were the same in both cases.379 In this regard, it is important to understand
that section 768.72 of the Florida Statutes "requires a plaintiff to provide the
374. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S. 408, 428
(2003).
375. See State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
As shown, under the Florida statutes asserted by the state against the tobacco companies, said
companies could have been subject to substantial fines, imprisonment, and loss of any busi-
ness licenses within the state. See supra pp. 52-55. Further, in its lawsuit, Florida clearly
sought "disgorgement of any profits earned on the sale of the [tobacco] companies' products
in Florida." Am. Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d at 853. Florida appears to recognize the disgorge-
ment theory of damages. See, e.g., Montage Group, Ltd. v. Athle-Tech Computer Sys., Inc.,
889 So. 2d 180, 196 & n.15 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that "the remedy of dis-
gorgement was appropriate under the facts of this case"). Whether Florida would be entitled
to such remedy under the Florida RICO Act, however, might be questionable. See Philip
Morris 1, 396 F.3d at 1199 (rejecting the United States' claim that disgorgement is within the
equitable jurisdiction provided for under the Federal RICO Act).
376. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 585 (1996).
377. See Gady A. Epstein & Jacqueline Soteropoulos, State Kicks Butt, TAMPA TRIB., Aug.
26, 1997, at 1. The $ 11.3 billion was payable over 25 years. Id. The Florida Settlement
Agreement was entered into in 1997, three years before the Engle verdict. See Settlement
Agreement at 1, State v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 95-1466 AlH (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Aug. 25,
1997), available at http://stic.neu.edu/Fl/flsettle.htin [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
378. See Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem 'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
379. See id. at 468 (stating "[tihe claims for punitive damages in the Florida v. American
Tobacco Co. case and in this [Engle] action are based on the same alleged facts. The punitive-
damage claims in both cases addressed the same alleged misconduct and the same public
interest.").
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[trial] court with a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages before
the [trial] court may allow a claim for punitive damages to be included in a
plaintiff's complaint.""38 As the Supreme Court of Florida noted in Engle VI
regarding the state's tobacco lawsuit: "[Florida's] only claim for punitive
damages arose from the alleged violation of [the] Florida statutory provision
prohibiting misleading advertising. None of the other statutory provisions
alleged to be violated by the [tobacco companies] ... allowed the recovery
of punitive damages. 3 8' The trial court in State v. American Tobacco Co.
apparently found that Florida's Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act provided
only a factual basis for recovery of Medicaid costs, not punitive damages.382
It did, however, permit a claim for punitive damages to be asserted under
Florida Statutes section 817.41, the misleading advertising statute, since this
statute specifically authorized awards of such damages for violations of its
terms. 
3 83
380. Globe Newspaper Co. v. King, 658 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 1995). Section 768.72 of
the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part as follows:
In any civil action, no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a rea-
sonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would pro-
vide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages. The claimant may move to amend
her or his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages as allowed by the rules of civil
procedure.
FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (2006). The Supreme Court of Florida has construed this provision "to
create a substantive legal right not to be subject to a punitive damages claim ... until the trial
court makes a determination that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for recovery of puni-
tive damages." Globe Newspaper Co., 658 So. 2d at 519; see also Wilson v. Edenfield, 968 F.
Supp. 681, 683-84 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
381. See Engle v. Liggett Group Inc.(Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 17, n.7 (Fla.
July 6, 2006).
382. See Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium-Fact, Law, Policy, and
Significance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 757 (1998) [hereinafter Transcript]. One of the
attorneys representing Florida in its lawsuit against the tobacco companies later explained,
"[Florida was] limited in [its] punitives to fraud under Chapter 817. The judge had stricken all
of [Florida's] other theories of punitives, believing that [it was] limited to the Medicaid [a]ct."
Id. As noted previously, the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act specifically authorizes the
imposition of treble damages in certain instances. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
It is also clear that the Florida RICO Act, which was probably Florida's second most impor-
tant claim against the tobacco companies, did not authorize punitive damages where triple
damages were being sought under it, as Florida would seek in that case. See FLA. STAT. §
895.04 (2006); Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 217, 231, 237.
383. FLA. STAT. § 817.41(6) (2006). Section 817.41(6) plainly authorizes awards of puni-
tive damages for violations of its terms. Id. For a reading of this provision, see supra note
365. As one Florida appellate court explained, this section "creates an entitlement to punitive
damages." Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106, 109 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994). The fact that Florida was limited with respect to punitive damages is clearly reflected
by its Third Amended Complaint. See Third Amended Complaint, supra note 347, 185.
Florida's only request for punitive damages related to alleged violations of section 817. Id.
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Punitive damages did not play as big a role in Florida's case against the
cigarette makers as one might believe. The threat of such damages was lim-
ited solely to Florida proving a violation of its false advertising statute.384
The $11 billion that the tobacco companies agreed to pay under the Florida
Settlement Agreement would therefore appear to be more properly viewed as
compensatory-reimbursement to Florida for the cost it incurred through
Medicaid for injured smokers-as opposed to punitive in nature. 385 If this is
correct, the $11 billion figure could have been a barometer of the compensa-
tory damages to which the plaintiffs and their class in Engle might have been
entitled.3" 6 However, the Engle plaintiffs and their class were not as con-
strained as Florida was in its lawsuit. Florida was restricted to seeking re-
covery for those Medicaid costs that had occurred after July 1, 1994, the ef-
fective date of the amendment to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act.38 7
In addition, the trial court had apparently ruled that Florida "could not re-
cover future damages under" this Act.3"' Obviously, Medicaid payments
account for only a fraction of the total medical care costs attributable to
smoking, and the plaintiffs and their class in Engle would not be limited to
Medicaid incurred expenditures.38 9 Further, the plaintiffs and their class in
Engle would be entitled to seek compensatory damages consisting of more
than hospital and medical expenses.39' They would be entitled to seek dam-
Florida, however, did purport to preserve its right to assert punitive damages under section
768.72. See id. 10.
384. See id. 185.
385. Settlement Agreement, supra note 377, at 8-10.
386. This is true even if the then present day value of the award was said to only be $6
billion. See Transcript, supra note 382, at 757.
387. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239,
1256 (Fla. 1996) (ruling that the State of Florida could properly bring an action under the
Act's statutory authority, but that the Act only applied to causes of action that accrued after
July 1, 1994, the effective date of the 1994 amendments).
388. Transcript, supra note 382, at 756. One of Florida's attorneys explained that this
limited Florida's damages under Medicaid to $1.2 billion and meant that the state would have
to return to court every couple of years to seek damages against the tobacco companies. Id.
In its lawsuit, however, Florida would agree to give up its right to bring those future lawsuits.
Id. at 757 (attorney making clear that the Settlement Agreement "settles those future claims
that we were going to have to come back time and time again to get"); see Settlement Agree-
ment, supra note 377, at 11-12. To the extent that the monies payable under the Settlement
Agreement exceeded the amount then due Florida, it would appear that it primarily represents
damages in the form of reimbursement for future Medicaid and other health-related expenses,
and not punitive damages. Id. at 10.
389. According to Florida's Governor, the state was "spending over $400 million a year
for smoking-related, tobacco-related injuries to [its] Medicaid recipients." See Transcript,
supra note 382, at 738.
390. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 6.2(a)-(f).
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ages for items such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, lost earnings, and
loss of consortium. 391
The tobacco defendants in Engle had to know from Florida's lawsuit
against them and from the subsequent Florida Tobacco Settlement that they
had exposure to a sizeable compensatory award.39 Further, even though no
actual award of punitive damages was made in State v. American Tobacco,
Co.,393 an argument could certainly be made that Florida's lawsuit against the
tobacco makers also provided them with fair notice that their conduct might
support a large punitive award such as would be rendered in Engle as well.394
V. FLORIDA LAW ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Under Florida law, "punitive damages are recoverable in all actions for
damages based on [tortious acts] which involve the ingredients of malice,
moral turpitude, or wanton and outrageous [conduct]., 395 To support a claim
for punitive damages under Florida law, the plaintiff must allege and prove
conduct by the defendant
of "a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of
human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous ef-
fects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the pre-
sumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which
shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard
of the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference
to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional viola-
tion of them."
396
391. Id.
392. Could the same thing not be said about the lawsuits brought by all of the states
against the tobacco companies that were filed between 1994 and 1998 which resulted in an
unprecedented multibillion-dollar settlement prior to the Engle I verdict? For a listing of the
state cases brought against the tobacco makers, see Tobacco Lawsuit Summary Chart,
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/summary.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
393. 707 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
394. See Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A
Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 573
(2000). "The Florida jury's emotional response to the tobacco industry's alleged deception of
the public could have belonged to any one of the juries in the state lawsuits." Id.
395. 17 FLA. JUR. 2D Damages § 128 (2004).
396. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 n. 12 (Fla. 1959) (quoting Cannon v. State, 107
So. 360, 363 (Fla. 1926)).
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Florida law also recognizes that punitive damages serve the dual role of de-
terrence and retribution.39 7 Further, Florida law envisions that "[p]unitive
damages apply to wrongdoing not covered by the criminal law, where the
private injuries inflicted partake of public wrongs. ' 98 In fact, the Supreme
Court of Florida has stated that punitive damages are "the most satisfactory
way to correct evil-doing in areas not covered by the criminal law."3 99
It is clear under Florida law that it is within the jury's discretion
whether or not to award punitive damages and to determine the amount that
should be awarded.400 Traditionally, punitive damages "are to be measured
by the enormity of the offense, entirely aside from the measure of compensa-
tion for the injured plaintiff., 40 1 In determining the amount of punitive dam-
ages, the defendant's wealth has also historically been an important consid-
eration under Florida law.40 2
It has been noted that Florida courts are usually hesitant about disturb-
ing punitive damages verdicts returned by juries. 43 Further, it appears that
under Florida law, neither party has any recourse to a jury verdict regarding
punitive damages, unless such party can prove either fraud or an improperly
influenced jury.404 As discussed earlier, the Third District Court of Appeal in
397. See Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla.
1982).
398. Id. at 1042.
399. Campbell v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla. 1974).
400. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978).
401. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1043.
402. Bankers Multiple Line Ins. Co. v. Farish, 464 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. 1985). In this
regard, the Supreme Court of Florida has stated that "'the greater the defendant's wealth, the
greater it [sic] must be, the punitive damages assessed in order to get his attention regardless
of the amount of [actual] damages awarded to the plaintiff."' Id. (quoting Farish v. Bankers
Multiple Line Ins. Co., 425 So. 2d 12, 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)); see also Rinaldi, 314
So. 2d at 763.
403. Lassitter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976). The
Supreme Court of Florida has explained as follows:
Although the verdict may be for considerably more or less than in the judgment of
the court it ought to have been, still the court should decline to interfere, unless the
amount is so great or small as to indicate that the jury must have found it while un-
der the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake. In order to shock the sense
of justice of the judicial mind the verdict must be so excessive or so inadequate so
as at least to imply an inference that the verdict evinces or carries an implication of
passion or prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like.
Id.
404. See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson, 428 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1983).
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Engle IV appears to have determined that the jury had been improperly influ-
enced.4 5
To specifically determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive
under Florida law, courts consider the relationship between the amount
awarded and the degree of misconduct involved, as well as the defendant's
ability to pay the judgment. 6 It clearly appears that it was on this second
item-the defendant's ability to pay the judgment-that both the Third Dis-
trict and the Supreme Court of Florida based their conclusions on the fact
that the $145 billion punitive damage award in Engle was excessive under
Florida law.40 7 Certain observations, however, can be made with respect to
their apparent determination in that regard.
First, the trial court in Engle evidently felt that the tobacco defendants
could avoid financial ruin by simply raising cigarette prices, since this is how
the cigarette makers financed the payments under the tobacco settlement.4 8
Could there have been any merit to the trial court's position?
Second, while the combined net worth of all of the tobacco defendants
in Engle was supposedly only $8.3 billion, the net worth of just one of these
same defendants in the Williams case, discussed earlier, was said to be "over
$17 billion," more than double the purported combined figure in Engle.4 9 Is
there any merit to claims by plaintiffs that defendants sometimes purposely
decrease their net worth in order to avoid a high punitive award?
41°
Third, the Third District's determination that the tobacco defendants did
not have the ability to pay the judgment appears to have been primarily based
on the fact that the sum awarded was "roughly 18 times" their purported
combined net worth.4 1' However, as the Supreme Court of New Jersey has
noted, evidence of "ability to pay ... does not necessarily equate with net
405. See Liggett Group Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 467-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
406. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1043; see also Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Hickman, 445 So. 2d 1023, 1028 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
407. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 3, 25 (Fla.
July 6, 2006); Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 458.
408. Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, No.
94-08273, at 61 (Fla. 1lth Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000), available at
http://fl I.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/tobacco/englerjfinaljudorder.pdf.
409. Williams v. Philip Morris Inc. (Williams II1), 92 P.3d 126, 145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004);
see Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456-57.
410. See John T. Simpson, Jr., Comment, Discovery of Net Worth in Bifurcated Punitive
Damages Cases: A Suggested Approach After Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 37 S.
TEX. L. REv. 193, 223 (1996).
411. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at457.
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worth," because "[d]epending on the facts of a case, a defendant's income
might be a better indicator of the ability to pay.
' 412
Fourth, there is no suggestion that the jury in Engle was improperly in-
structed regarding the issue of the tobacco defendants' ability to pay a puni-
tive award and/or that such award could not bankrupt them.41 3 Assuming
that the jury was properly instructed in this regard, under Florida law, the
jury is presumed to have followed the instructions given to them, "[a]bsent a
finding to the contrary.,
4 14
Fifth, while evidence of the Florida and Master Settlement Agreements
might have been admissible in Engle for the purpose of avoiding or mitigat-
ing punitive damages because they may have been relevant to the tobacco
defendants' ability to pay, was the trial court's apparent instruction to the
jury not to consider such evidence 4 " a reversible error as found by the Third
District? 416 This would not seem to be a sufficient basis for reversing an
award of punitive damages under Florida law since this evidence (which is
merely mitigation evidence) appears to relate to a matter that is collateral to
the main issue. 4
17
Sixth, while not definitively stating that wealth may not be considered,
State Farm has called into question the role of wealth in the punitive dam-
ages calculation.4 1 8 Assuming, arguendo, that a defendant's wealth is not
always an appropriate consideration to enhance the amount of punitive dam-
412. Herman v. Sunshine Chem. Specialties, Inc., 627 A.2d 1081, 1089 (N.J. 1993).
413. See Jury Instructions Phase II B: Punitive Damages, No. 94-8273 CA 22, at 6 (11 th
Cir. 2000), available at
http://www.altria.com/download/pdf/media englejuryinstructions.pdf (delineating the fi-
nancial factors that the jury could use as guidelines in determining the effect a punitive award
may have) [hereinafter Engle Jury Instructions]; see generally Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 456-58
(noting that the court blamed the size of the award on juror passion and prejudice).
414. See Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 So. 2d 932, 942 (Fla. 2000);
see also Engle Jury Instructions, supra note 413, at 11 (instructing the jury that "[i]t is only a
defendant's current ability to pay a punitive damage award that is relevant, and not whether a
defendant can pay using a pay out or an installment plan," despite the Third District's later
finding that plaintiffs' counsel made improper comments regarding installment payments);
Wransky v. Dalfo, 801 So. 2d 239, 243 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing case for
failure to give jury instructions "that punitive damages should not be allowed to destroy or
bankrupt a defendant").
415. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 468-69.
416. Id.; Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 2 (Fla. July 6,
2006). In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida did not address this specific ruling by the
Third District. Id.
417. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
418. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm 1), 538 U.S.
408 (2003).
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ages, should this argument cut both ways where a defendant's wealth, or lack
thereof, is not always an appropriate consideration to avoid an otherwise
proper punitive damages award. In other words, should the possibility of
bankruptcy always be an absolute bar to an award of punitive damages?4 9
As shown above, there are a number of questions raised relating to the
conclusion by the Third District and Supreme Court of Florida that the Engle
punitive damages award was impermissibly excessive, even under Florida
law.
VI. CONCLUSION
To argue, as the Third District did, that mass torts, such as those found
in Engle, are not proper for a class action is one thing.42° To suggest, how-
ever, that the punitive award in that case was unconstitutionally excessive is
wholly another.
As demonstrated herein, an argument could certainly be made that the
jury's punitive award in Engle was not violative of the Gore guide posts as
the United States Supreme Court refined them in State Farm, and that the
award, therefore, was not unconstitutionally excessive under federal law.
The conduct of the tobacco defendants in Engle could certainly be said to be
reprehensible. As noted, most of the factors identified by the United States
Supreme Court, pertaining to the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct, appear to have been present in Engle.42' Further, the appellate
courts that have reviewed the awarding of punitive damages in the individual
tobacco cases have not found the first guide post to be an issue.422 While the
second guide post has impacted punitive damages awards since State Farm,
reprehensibility is nevertheless supposed to be the most important guide post
in determining a punitive damages award's reasonableness. 423  There also
may have been an acceptable ratio of punitives to compensatories to satisfy
the second guide post, but neither the Supreme Court of Florida nor the Third
District was willing to wait and see.424 As suggested herein, the contention
419. Welch v. Epstein, 536 S.E.2d 408, 424 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the proposi-
tion "that the law on punitive damages [in South Carolina] has evolved to the point of erecting
an irrevocable financial barrier to the imposition of punitive damages if harsh financial reali-
ties emanate from the award") (emphasis added).
420. See Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470.
421. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 202.
423. See State Farm I, 538 U.S. at 419.
424. As noted, the trial plan called for the jury to determine punitives first and then com-
pensatories for the class, which federal courts have found presents no constitutional infirmity.
See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). The Third District
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that it is not possible to complete the ratio guide post at the time the jury
returned the $145 billion punitive award does not by itself appear to provide
a basis to invalidate such an award. This was a multi-phase class action
where the compensatory damages to each member of the class had not yet
been determined. Steps should have been taken to ensure that recovery of
punitive damages was limited to only those class members who established
liability. The analysis under the ratio guide post could have either been es-
timated based on individual damages awards, deferred until all of the com-
pensatory damages were determined, or some combination thereof. Whether
Gore's second guide post was met or not is simply not clear. Further, it
could certainly be argued that the tobacco defendants in that case had fair
notice that their conduct might not only subject them to punishment, but to
severe punishment because of the punitive awards against them in the cases
prior to Engle425 and in the unprecedented litigation brought against them by
Florida as well as other states. Assuming, arguendo, that one believes the
cigarette makers were guilty of misconduct, as the jury in Engle apparently
did,426 the fact that a record setting punitive damages award was rendered in
that case really should have surprised no one, especially the cigarette makers.
Moreover, even if Florida law does not allow an award which would
force a defendant to file for bankruptcy, should this always be the case?
Florida law also says that punitive damages "are to be measured by the
enormity of the offense, 427 and that it is within the jury's discretion as to the
amount of any punitive damages.42' The jury in Engle exercised its discre-
tion and rendered an award of $145 billion in punitive damages to injured
simply did not allow Phase 3 in Engle to be completed. Further, what if the proper analysis is
not always simply a comparison of punitives to compensatories, but a comparison of the puni-
tives to the amount of harm, which may include harm that is uncompensated as well as poten-
tial harm? See supra notes 301-316 and accompanying text. From this perspective, is it
possible to view the Engle punitive award as a proxy for the thousands of Floridians, dead and
living, whose lives and health have been or may be immutably scarred by tobacco?
425. See supra notes 317-36 and accompanying text.
426. See Liggett Goup, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app'd in part, quashed in part, rem'd, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6,2006).
427. Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1043 (Fla.
1982). In Engle VI, the Supreme Court of Florida seems to be suggesting that post State Farm
jurisprudence no longer permits this. See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-
1856, slip op. at 24 (Fla. July 6, 2006). But see Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347
F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing shortly after State Farm, that "[the] standard princi-
ple of penal theory that 'the punishment should fit the crime' in the sense of being propor-
tional to the wrongfulness of the defendant's action" is still applicable to punitive damages).
428. Arab Termite & Pest Control, 409 So. 2d at 1041 (citing Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty,
359 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. 1978)).
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Florida smokers and their survivors.42 9 While the Engle verdict may have
been unprecedented and, by far, the largest ever in U.S. history, 43 it was no
ordinary case. It was a mass-tort class action with an estimated class size of
between 300,000 and 700,000 plaintiffs that actually went to verdict.4 31 The
Supreme Court of Florida quite properly did not adopt the Third District's
conclusion that the punitive award in Engle was indicative of an improperly
influenced jury,432 as this jury verdict may very well have been merely re-
flective of the magnitude of the offense committed in that case.
4 33
Tobacco use was and continues to remain the country's greatest health
hazard.434 It undoubtedly was and continues to be a major issue in Florida,435
as in every other state.4 36 Even if the imposition of the $145 billion punitive
429. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 441.
430. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 2000, at Al.
431. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 442-43. As noted earlier, no mass-tort case had apparently
gone to trial prior to Engle. See Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad, supra note 183, at 20.
432. Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 19-20.
433. Id. at 20. Although the punitive award in Engle has been criticized by many because
of its size, at least one observer believes that the "punitive award of $145 billion is letting the
tobacco industry off lightly." Brian H. Barr, Note, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The Improper
Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Injured Smokers, 28 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 787, 829 (2001). Supposedly, the plaintiffs in Dukes, see supra notes 283-85 and ac-
companying text, are "seek[ing] punitive damages between $450 and $510 billion" in that
employment discrimination case, alleging sex discrimination in pay and promotion. Eric S.
Dreiband, Willie Sutton Was a Piker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A7.
434. See MELISSA ALBUQUERQUE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
TOBACCO CONTROL STATE HIGHLIGHTS 2002: IMPACT AND OPPORTUNITY 7 (2002),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/statehi/pdf 2002/02FrontMatter.pdf. Tobacco use is said to be
"the single most preventable cause of death and disease ... in the United States." Id. Ap-
proximately 400,000 deaths each year are attributable to smoking. See id. To put this in
perspective, "[o]ne in every five deaths in this country is attributable to smoking." Id. at 3.
To put this in another perspective, tobacco is said to "kill[] more people each year in the
United States than acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), car accidents, alcohol,
homicides, illegal drugs, suicides, and fires, combined." Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61
Fed. Reg. 44396, 44398 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified in scattered parts of 21 C.F.R.).
435. At the time the Engle case was brought, Florida officials estimated that that "[e]very
day in Florida, 35 people die from a smoking-related illness." Linda Kleindienst & John
Kennedy, Law Declares Medicaid War on Tobacco, ORLANDO SENT., May 27, 1994, at C1. It
had been estimated that in 1992 alone that it had cost taxpayers $289 million to treat approxi-
mately 39,000 Florida Medicaid patients for smoking-related illnesses. Id. For 300,000 to
700,000 of such persons, this would amount to $2 billion to $5 billion, assuming that the
health care costs were incurred at the same rate. See id.
436. Of course, tobacco use is an issue all over the world. In fact, it is being projected that
tobacco will kill a billion people this century, which is ten times more than the one hundred
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award would have the ruinous consequences alleged by the cigarette makers,
would it really touch upon due process concerns, or would it simply be self-
inflicted and well-deserved punishment that was overdue-assuming that
they were responsible for the misconduct claimed?
VII. EPILOGUE
The Third District in Engle would comment that "[c]lass certification in
mass-tort actions such as [in that case] ha[d] been historically disfavored by
courts throughout the nation." '4 37 This is true. The underlying rationale is
that "[w]hen personal-injury and death claims are involved, a strong feeling
prevails that everyone enmeshed in the dispute should have his [or her] own
day in court and be represented by a lawyer of his [or her] choice. 438 The
problem with this rationale as it relates to tobacco is that cigarette manufac-
turers have been largely shielded from suits brought by individual smok-
ers.4 39 This has occurred, in large part, because the courts have improperly
construed the very law that was designed to deal with the health problem
associated with smoking, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
(FCLAA), 440 to provide cigarette manufacturers special protection from state
law tort claims under the guise of "preemption.""' This is unfortunate be-
cause state law tort claims serve the important functions of regulation and
compensation." 2 By precluding state law tort claims from being asserted
against cigarette manufacturers, this has given them protection not accorded
to others and has prevented any regulation of their behavior, such as forcing
them to make cigarettes that are less hazardous. 443 It has also denied those
injured by their product the right to even seek compensation based solely on
this federal Act that was never intended to be used in such fashion.4" Fur-
million that it is said to have killed in the twentieth century. See Andrew Bridges, Curbing
Tobacco Best Step to Cut Cancer, MIAMI HERALD, July 11, 2006, at 11 A.
437. See Liggett Goup, Inc. v. Engle (Engle IV), 853 So. 2d 434, 470 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), app 'd in part, quashed in part, rem "d, No. SC03-1856 (Fla. July 6, 2006).
438. 7AA CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1783 (3d
ed. 2005).
439. Engle IV, 853 So. 2d at 470.
440. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
441. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 544 (1992) (holding that the
FCLAA preempted state law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers).
442. See id
443. See id.
444. For more on the preemption problem, see Harold C. Reeder, Lindsey v. Tacoma-
Pierce County Health Dep't: Cipollone Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Ac-
tions, Federal Preemption and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 24
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 763 (2001).
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ther, one should not be misled by the few recent verdicts-record breaking
in fact-in favor of plaintiffs in individual suits, as the smokers in those
cases started smoking prior to 1969, when the FCLAA supposedly began
preempting state law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers." 5 That one
fact appears to have been crucial to these plaintiffs being able to get to a
jury."6 As the population continues to grow older, this "loophole" is closing
fast." 7 It "will not be of any assistance to [anyone] who began smoking after
1969." 44
8
The preemption fiasco is just one aspect, albeit a very important one, of
a larger problem, which is the "Law of Tobacco."" 9 "The Law of Tobacco
concerns ensuring the continued vitality of the tobacco industry by protecting
it, [not only] from liability suits, [but] other types of 'nuisances' such as ad-
vertising restrictions or FDA regulation. ' 450 The Third District's opinion in
Engle IV would appear to be another good illustration of the "Law of To-
bacco" in operation, where the appellate court reversed itself on the issue of
class certification and then made every possible ruling that it could in favor
of the tobacco defendants in that case.45' In stark contrast, the Supreme
Court of Florida showed great courage in Engle VI by first simply accepting
jurisdiction to review the case and then issuing a decision that did not bow to
the "Law of Tobacco. 45 1 As indicated by the premise of this article, the
only issue one might take with an otherwise well-written and well-reasoned
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida in Engle was its ruling, unanimous
no less, that the punitive award in that case was unconstitutionally exces-
sive.453
Engle may signal the end to future smokers' class suits.4 54 Even class
suits that are not specifically brought to recover damages for the health prob-
445. See Harold C. Reeder, The "Law of Tobacco " Is a Major Contributing Factor That
Hampers Effective Resolution to the County's Tobacco Problem, 6 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 17,
52-53 (2004) [hereinafter Reeder, "Law of Tobacco '].
446. Id. at 52.
447. Id. at 53.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 21.
450. Reeder, "Law of Tobacco ", supra note 445, at 21.
451. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (Engle VI), No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 53 (Fla. July 6,
2006).
452. Id. at 1, 53.
453. See id.
454. It would be interesting to see if the courts would reevaluate their stance on smokers'
class suits if the preemption problem did not exist. With a flood of lawsuits, possibly as never
seen before, a class action might be viewed more favorably.
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lems associated with smoking are being rejected by the courts.4" With pos-
sibly having an end to any real threat from either individual suits or class
actions, the future of Big Tobacco certainly looks bright.45 6 The question is:
at what cost-specifically, for how long and to what extent is this going to
prolong the health hazard associated with tobacco?
Reversal of the $145 billion punitive award was probably viewed as a
great victory for Big Tobacco. But was it really? Despite the discarding of
the mammoth punitive award, the cigarette manufacturers appear to have two
definite reasons not to be pleased with Florida's highest court, and they both
stem from the fact that the court did not completely dismantle the class. One
is obvious from the opinion while the other is not. Clearly, the tobacco de-
fendants could not be happy with the fact that class members will be allowed
to bring their own suit with the benefit of many of the findings by the jury in
Engle.4 7 This is going to encourage many to assert claims against the to-
bacco defendants who otherwise would not.58 This may also result in the
tobacco defendants paying significantly more than the almost $7 million (in
compensatory damages alone) that they currently are to pay to two of the
class representatives.4 59 The other reason, which cannot be gleamed from the
Supreme Court of Florida's opinion, involves the fact that when the tobacco
455. Last December, the Supreme Court of Illinois completely overturned a judgment of
$10.1 billion in a class action that claimed consumer fraud over "light" cigarettes. Price v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1, 50 (I11. 2005). The Illinois high court reversed the judg-
ment, which was $7.1 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitives, on the
ground that the FCLAA preempted claims against cigarette manufacturers under Illinois con-
sumer law. Id. at 50-51. See also Marrone v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 850 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio
2006) (reversing the certification of a limited class of cigarette purchasers from a six county
area in a consumer action brought over the way "light" cigarettes were marketed). But see
Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (certifying a class
of current and former smokers in a RICO action alleging that cigarette manufacturers induced
them to buy "light" cigarettes by falsely representing that they would experience reduced
health risks from lower amounts of tar and nicotine).
456. This is true despite the fact that the smoking rate in this country is said to be continu-
ing to decline. See Marc Kaufman, Smoking in United States Declines Sharply: Cigarette
Sales at a 54-Year Low, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at Al.
457. See Engle VI, No. SC03-1856, slip op. at 53.
458. Apparently, lawsuits have already been filed in response to the ruling by the Supreme
Court of Florida. See Christina Cheddar Berk, Cigarette Makers Ask for Review, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 9, 2006, at D3.
459. As noted earlier, following the verdict in Engle, one class member in a separate pro-
ceeding received a judgment of $37.5 million in compensatory damages. If this verdict is
upheld, it shows how the damages against the cigarette makers could easily accumulate.
Further, it would seem that all of the class members (including the three already with compen-
satory awards) would be permitted to seek punitive damages if the tobacco defendants are
found liable in their individual suits. See Weaver, supra note 312.
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defendants initially appealed from the $145 billion punitive verdict, they
apparently agreed that, in lieu of posting the full appeal bond, they would
"forfeit" $709 million which would be paid to the class no matter which side
won. 4 6 0 Of course, after the Third District reversed the case in its entirety,
including the class certification, it would be suggested that, since there was
no class to pay, this money would possibly be returned to the tobacco defen-
dants. 461 The decision by the Supreme Court of Florida has, therefore, made
it harder for the tobacco defendants to make the case that they are entitled to
this money back. For the tobacco defendants, there is still clearly a lot at
stake in Engle.
It will be most interesting to observe what happens in Engle from this
point forward. As this article was going to press, a motion for rehearing filed
by the tobacco defendants had still not been ruled upon by the Supreme
Court of Florida so the opinion in Engle VI was not yet final. Will the Su-
preme Court of Florida stand by its ruling in Engle V? Despite an obviously
careful and thoughtful opinion, there is still time for the "Law of Tobacco" to
interject itself before that Court. Further, even if Florida's Highest Court
holds firm, the tobacco defendants are likely to seek review from the United
States Supreme Court. Although from the surface, there does not appear to
be any basis for federal jurisdiction in Engle,462 with the "Law of Tobacco"
involved, one should not bet against the cigarette makers.
460. Vanessa O'Connell, Millions in Escrow Hang on Coming Ruling in Tobacco Case,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at B1.
461. See id.
462. Some, of course, had said the same thing about the other recent famous case that the
United States Supreme Court took from Florida, Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey article examines a wide range of legal issues involving pub-
lic employment in Florida during 2005-06. It begins with a discussion of the
law governing the hiring stage of public employment. Part II examines the
legal issues over: 1) hiring and retaining teachers; 2) privatization and com-
petitive bidding; 3) background checks on employees; 4) nepotism; 5) the
hiring of undocumented workers; and 6) ethics and conflicts of interest usu-
ally involving public officials.
Part III canvasses the law governing the terms of public employment.
For instance, this section weighs emerging developments in the Fair Labor
Standards Act governing minimum wage and overtime pay. This section
also notes the growing trend among Florida cities and counties to adopt so-
called living wage statutes that bring salaries in line with the cost of living.
In addition, this section addresses other legal issues including: 1) the off-
duty pay for police officers; 2) teachers' pay; 3) military pay; 4) missed work
due to hurricanes; 5) the wage gap between men and women; and 6) living
wage laws. Apart from hours and wages, Part III surveys recent develop-
ments not only involving health benefits and guns at the workplace, but also
workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and public pensions.
Part IV examines case law governing: 1) discipline; 2) retaliation; 3) whis-
tle-blowing; and 4) the First Amendment. Finally, Part V addresses em-
ployment discrimination.
II. HIRING TEACHERS, PRIVATIZATION, BACKGROUND CHECKS,
NEPOTISM, ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS, AND ETHICS
A. Legal Issues over Hiring and Retaining Teachers
Under Florida law, public school teachers must earn six continuing-
education credits every five years to maintain their teaching licenses.' Ac-
cording to the Miami Herald, thirty Miami-Dade teachers were faced with
1. Marc Caputo, Bill Could Shield Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 10, 2006, at 9B.
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being fired in 2006 for fraudulently obtaining continuing-education credits.2
In response, two Miami legislators proposed a measure aimed at making it
"tougher for the state to revoke or suspend an instructor's license obtained
fraudulently."3 Under the proposed legislation, the state must prove that the
teachers knew they were taking part in a fraud.4
According to the Miami Herald, "[a] study of five school districts found
that union seniority rules" commonly require schools to hire unfit teachers.5
According to a report cited by the Miami Herald, "many teachers transfer
because they had done poorly at their previous schools."6  Even so, the
teachers with such transfers often had sufficient seniority to be able to trans-
fer to any school with an opening.7 The report proposed that teacher hiring
decisions be "'based on the mutual consent of the teacher and receiving
school."' 
8
According to a hearing before the Florida Board of Education, the state
will need 30,000 more public school teachers in 2006. The expected vacan-
cies stem from state law mandating smaller classes.° The state board will
try to boost teachers' salaries in its effort to draw more teachers to Florida."
According to the Monroe County School District Superintendent, the "prob-
lem is not finding new qualified teachers. It's keeping them."'12 Troops to
Teachers, a government program that assists veterans in becoming teachers,
recruited 241 former soldiers in Florida between the years of 2001-02 and
2004-05 school years. 13
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Unfit Teachers Forced on Schools, Study Says, MiAMI HERALD, Nov. 17, 2005, at
10A.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting JESSICA LEVIN ET AL., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE CASE FOR
REFORMING THE STAFFING RULES IN URBAN TEACHERS UNION CONTRACTS (2005), available at
http://www.tntp.org/newreport).
9. Hannah Sampson, Challenge Ahead: Hiring Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19,
2005, at 1OB.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Cammy Clark, Keys Battling to Keep Teachers, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 13, 2006, at
6B. "[One hundred seventeen] teachers-about 19 percent of the [county's] 628 teaching
workforce-lefl the school district" in 2006. Id.
13. Peter Bailey et al., Reveille Call on First Day of School, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 15,
2006, at 8A.
129
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA WREVIEW
B. Privatization and Competitive Bidding Issues
Privatization, the conversion of governmental agencies into private enti-
ties, continues to be a high-profile issue in Florida. 14 For example, Dania
Beach city officials considered privatizing its employment of lifeguards as a
cost-saving measure like Hallandale Beach did two years earlier.' 5 Under
the plan, lifeguards employed by the city would be replaced by those who
work for a private company. 6 While use of private lifeguards is common at
pools and water parks, critics claim the ocean, with its hazards, requires pub-
lic lifeguards.' 7 In the face of heavy criticism from some residents, local
unions, and lifeguards, a Texas company rescinded its plans to supply private
lifeguards for Dania Beach.' 8 Finally, the city decided to keep public life-
guards on the beach, but outsourced those at pools. "
Proponents of privatization often tout efficiency and cost-cutting in
support of this policy. For example, a private company that began operating
Florida's troubled personnel system in 2002 promised to streamline, central-
ize, and computerize the state's human-resources system. 20 In 2006, how-
ever, a legislative audit found that the outsourcing contract, Florida's largest,
was rife with problems. 2' Besides hiring a worker who was later imprisoned
for identity theft, two whistle-blowers claimed the company illegally sent
public employees' private information "to India for processing. 22 A state
senator has proposed legislation that would give the lawmaking body more
control over outsourcing contracts despite objections lodged by then-
Governor Jeb Bush.23
In the education context and at the college level, outsourcing to part-
time contract workers means that only 53.8% of teachers nationwide are full-
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (8th ed. 2004).
15. Diana Moskovitz, City May Privatize Lifeguards, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 12, 2005, at
lB.
16. Id.
17. Diana Moskovitz, 150 Oppose Privatizing Lifeguards, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14,
2005, at lB.
18. Natalie P. McNeal, Lifeguard Plan Goes Under, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 2005, at
lB.
19. Diana Moskovitz, City Saves Lifeguards at Beach, Not Pools, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
22, 2005, at 3B.
20. Marc Caputo, Audit Questions Savings on Convergys' Contract, MIAMI HERALD, Apr.
25, 2006, at 9B.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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time faculty, as compared to 77.9% in 1970.24 While outsourcing teaching
positions saves money, a growing army of adjunct professors are left earning
low wages, receiving no benefits, and having no job security.25 According to
the Miami Herald, most adjuncts earn between $1800 and $2500 per class at
public colleges and universities and usually teach lower-level core courses.26
Since part-time teachers are usually in a hurry to leave campus for another
assignment elsewhere, there is little time to advise students or to write rec-
ommendations needed by students for jobs or graduate school.2 7 While reli-
ance on adjunct professors is beneficial when the motive is to expose stu-
dents to teachers with real life experience, such reliance is detrimental when
driven solely by the need to plug budget holes.28
Consistent with the practice of public entities, Miami-Dade County con-
tracting rules require competitive bidding.2 9 However, these rules have been
circumvented by the Miami-Dade Solid Waste Department, because it
awarded work to a company that outsourced part of the job to former waste
department employees, all without soliciting competitive bids.30 A report by
the county inspector general found "vague billing records, inadequate docu-
mentation, and lack of written authorization before the company initiated
work."'" The report recommended ending the no-bid contracting.32
A May 23, 2005 memo by the Federal Office of Management and
Budget makes clear that in assessing which types of jobs are inherently gov-
ernmental and thus not subject to outsourcing, federal agencies should look
at employees performing the functions and decide whether all of the workers
are performing inherently governmental work.33
24. Noah Bierman, Colleges Turn to Part-Time Teachers as Enrollment Swells, Cash
Shrinks, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 2005, at IA.
25. Id. at 12A.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Miami-Dade, Fla., Code pt. 1, art. 4, § 4.03(D), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10620&sid=9 (last visited Dec. 26,
2006).
30. Noaki Schwartz, Inspector General: Solid-Waste Deal Stinks, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
5, 2005, at 5B.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Memorandum from David H. Safavian, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of
Exec. Dept's & Agencies: 2005 Inventories of Commercial and Inherently Governmental
Activities (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2005/
m05-12.pdf.
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C. Background Checks on Employees
While 85% of all employers conduct no investigation of prospective
employees,34 in Florida, public agencies must undertake a background check
of anyone who works or volunteers at parks, playgrounds, child care centers,
or other venues where children meet.35 Moreover, a 1996 Florida law re-
quires fingerprinting and extensive background screening of all public school
employees.3 6 While background checks by employers have been challenged
on constitutional grounds, such cases are rarely successful.37
Since 2004, all volunteers at Miami-Dade County public schools must
submit to background screening by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and Florida Department of Law Enforcement.3" Only volunteers who have
one-on-one contact with students without teacher supervision must be fin-
gerprinted.39 In Broward County, volunteers are checked against Florida's
database for sexual offenders and predators and face a county criminal back-
34. Beatrice Garcia, Background? Check It Out, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 12, 1999, at 1C.
"Even expunged cases, however, often turn up in Internet-based criminal record searches
conducted with growing frequency by employers." Lee Romney, Group Pushes to Loosen
Limits on Ex-Inmates, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at B 1.
35. See Peter Bailey & Hannah Sampson, Schools Increase Scrutiny of Volunteers, Mi-
AMI HERALD, Aug. 21, 2005, at lB.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 231.02 (1995), amended by FLA. STAT. § 231.02(2)(b) (Supp. 1996)
(stating that "all other personnel currently employed by any district school system ... shall
submit a complete set of fingerprints"); see also Bailey & Sampson, supra note 35 (discussing
the ramifications of the fingerprinting law).
37. E.g., Fla. Pub. Employees Council 79, AFSCME v. Dep't of Children & Families,
745 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
38. Bailey & Sampson, supra note 35. Comments submitted to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in 2005 recommended that before allowing employers to use FBI databases for em-
ployment-related purposes, the DOJ should weigh such issues as the accuracy of the databases
and how well errors will be corrected. See, e.g., Letter from Jason B. Morris, President,
Background Info. Servs., Inc., to Richard A. Hertling, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Dep't of
Justice (Aug. 3, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/ncicteportjuly25.pdf; Letter from Gail
Simonton, Exec. Dir. & Gen. Counsel, NASCO, to Richard A. Herling, Deputy Ass't Att'y
Gen., Dep't of Justice, (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/olpdocketnasco.pdf;
Letter from Michael Sankey, Chief Exec. Officer, BRB Publications, Inc., to Richard A.
Hertling, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice (Aug. 5, 2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/hertling.pdf; Letter from Jennifer Huggins, Staff Att'y, Greater
Boston Legal Servs., to Richard A. Hertling, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., Dep't of Justice (Aug.
8, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ pdf/commentstoagrecs082005.pdf. The DOJ solicited the
comments through a notice published on June 6, 2005 in the Federal Register. Criminal His-
tory Background Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. 32,849 (June 6, 2005).
39. Criminal History Background Checks, 70 Fed. Reg. at 32,849.
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ground check.4" However, exceptions are made on a case-by-case basis for
volunteers who had minor incidents in the past.4
Unforeseen consequences have emerged since the Jessica Lunsford Act
took effect on September 1, 2005, "requiring fingerprinting and background
checks for contractors, vendors, sports referees, and others [with business on]
school property."4 2  For example, six National Football League (NFL)
Europe teams abandoned Florida high schools they used for preseason train-
ing camps on account of the new law.43 Similarly, builders are shying away
from school projects because of the new law, raising construction costs in the
process. 44 Reluctant contractors claim some Hispanic workers refuse on
cultural grounds to submit to fingerprinting. In addition, employers must
pay the eighty-two dollar fee to fingerprint each worker.4 6 The problem has
been compounded by some schools that insist on ruling out people who have
committed minor crimes from school premises.47 While most employers do
not mind the background checks, many find the fingerprinting overly bur-
densome.48
D. Nepotism: Legal Issues over Hiring Relatives
Florida prohibits employment discrimination on grounds of marital
status, 49 but also somewhat confusingly has an "anti-nepotism" law.50 Sev-
40. Bailey & Sampson, supra note 35. San Francisco is the first city in California to
prohibit questions about criminal convictions from initial job application forms. Romney,
supra note 34. A broader Boston ordinance enacted in October 2005 bars "the city from con-
tracting with any private employer who discriminates against applicants with criminal records
unrelated to job duties." Id.
41. Bailey & Sampson, supra note 35.
42. Rani Gupta, Predator Law Impacts School Construction, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 24,
2005, at 7B.
43. NFL Europe Must Abandon School Fields, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 24, 2005, at 7B.
44. Gupta, supra note 42.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 760.01(2) (2006).
50. See id. §§ 112.3135, 760.10(8)(d); see also Amy Sherman, Family Hiring Dispute
Flares, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2005, at lB. Nepotism still flourishes "primarily because of
the growth of family-owned businesses and companies that view the practice as an opportu-
nity to build loyalty, trust, and responsibility among their work forces." Hanah Cho, Nepotism
Occurs Despite Negative Perceptions, MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 2006, at 4E.
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eral courts have addressed the question of whether the "marital status" statute
undercuts the "anti-nepotism" law."
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida narrowly interpreted the state's
ban on marital status discrimination by ruling that Florida shall not recognize
a marital discrimination claim premised on a company's response to the ac-
tion of one's spouse.52 The Court made clear that the common usage of the
term "marital status" refers to whether an individual is "married, single, di-
vorced, widowed, or separated;" it does not cover retaliation against an em-
ployee for the actions of that employee's spouse.53
In 2005, the state-funded Early Learning Coalition of Miami-
Dade/Monroe allegedly employed or did business with relatives or friends of
six coalition staff members. 4 The Coalition received money from the state
"to oversee preschool and school readiness efforts in Miami-Dade and Mon-
roe counties., 55 Results of a state inspector general's investigation are pend-
ing.5
6
E. Strengthening Employer Sanctions over Hiring Undocumented Workers
Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986," 7 it is unlaw-
ful for employers to hire undocumented illegal aliens.5 8 The employer owes
a duty to verify an alien's work status by examining documents to see if it
"reasonably appears on its face to be genuine."59 At times, employers re-
ceive notice from the Social Security Administration that an employee's so-
cial security information does not match data on record. 61 Until now, em-
ployers suffered no penalty if they failed to investigate. 61  But under new
rules proposed by the Department of Homeland Security, employers would
be required to investigate after notification of discrepancies or face potential
51. See, e.g., Belton-Kocher v. St. Paul Sch. Dist., 610 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000) (noting that anti-nepotism rules violate the state's prohibition against marital status
discrimination absent a compelling and overriding bona fide occupational qualification).
52. Donato v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146, 1155 (Fla. 2000).
53. Id.
54. Carol Marbin Miller, Nepotism Probe Target Points to Agency Successes, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 15, 2005, at 6B.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2000 & Supp. III 2004)).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2000).
59. Id. § 1324a(b)(1)(A).
60. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 71 Fed.
Reg. 34,281 (proposed June 14, 2006) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
61. Seeid.at34,281-82.
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penalties.62 Employers who attempted to clear up discrepancies would be
protected from court action.63  A second regulation allows employers to
maintain employment records in electronic form, saving employers who have
thousands of employees or a high turnover the cost and storage space that
paper records require. 64
President Bush hoped to make "an overhaul of the nation's immigration
laws" his signature domestic initiative of 2006.65 However, differences
among President Bush, the House, and the Senate, meant that the long odds
for passage of the Bill in 2006 grew even longer." The House Bill would
make it a felony to live in the United States illegally and rejects any chance
for undocumented aliens to win legal status. 67  The Senate Bill seeks to
strengthen border control, while at the same time giving illegal immigrants a
chance to become citizens after paying a fine.68 President Bush's approach
calls for stronger enforcement, while providing avenues to legalize the illegal
work force and to carve a potential path to citizenship.69
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Williams v. Mohawk Indus-
tries Inc.,70 ruled that claims by employees that their employer hired illegal
workers as part of a conspiracy to hold down wages and lower workers'
compensation claims were valid under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act and state law.7
While there are twenty-one million immigrants and only seven million
unemployed Americans, "the majority of immigrants [have not] 'taken' jobs;
they must be doing jobs that would not have existed had the immigrants not
been here., 72 However, economists disagree over whether immigrants hurt
62. Id. at 34,282-83. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
renamed the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and moved from the Justice
Department to the Department of Homeland Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 68
Fed. Reg. 9824, 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 200).
63. Safe Harbor Procedures, 71 Fed. Reg. at 34,283.
64. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(3) (2005).
65. Adam Nagourney et al., Bush's Immigration Plan Stalled as House G.O.P. Grew
Anxious, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at Al.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 411 F.3d 1252 (1 th Cir. 2005).
71. Id. at 1257.
72. Roger Lowenstein, The Immigration Equation, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., July 9, 2006, at 36,
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the economic prospects of the Americans they compete with, but the consen-
sus of most is that, overall, immigration is good for the country.
7 3
Some Florida cities have proposed their own controversial laws on un-
documented immigrants.74 For example, Palm Bay in Brevard County and
Avon Park in Highlands County are weighing fines for businesses that hire
workers without legal residency status.75 These measures would also bar city
contracts from businesses employing undocumented immigrants. 76 Critics
claim that such ordinances will violate civil rights laws and may be pre-
empted by federal immigration law.77 Avon Park had to reconsider its posi-
tion, because such a ban might have blocked the construction of a Wal-
Mart. 78 Under such ban, Wal-Mart would be in violation for hiring illegal
immigrants.79  As a result, Avon Park's proposed immigration ordinance
failed on July 24, 2006, by a 3-2 vote by the City Council.
80
F. Ethics and Conflicts of Interest
Many states have enacted so-called "codes of governmental ethics" that
set standards of conduct not only for public employees, but also for persons
such as lobbyists who interact with government officials and employees.8'
Florida requires that violations of its code of ethics be proven by clear and
convincing evidence of wrongdoing. 2 Under a new law enacted in 2005,
Florida legislators may no longer take gifts or meals from lobbyists.8 3 How-
ever, according to the Miami Herald, many state lawmakers continue to raise
money for their political organizations from corporations and lobbyists that
have an interest in what the legislature undertakes. 84 Despite a 2004 rule
change that forced all legislators to register any political committees with
whom they have an affiliation, some observers speculate that these political
organizations amount to a huge loophole for lawmakers to dodge the new
73. Id.
74. Cities Propose Laws on Migrants, MIAMI HERALD, July 10, 2006, at 5B.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Aid Ban Imperils Wal-Mart, MIAMI HERALD, July 14, 2006, at 8B.
79. See id.
80. Casey Woods, Immigration Opens Big Split in Small Town, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9,
2006, at IA.
81. Erika Bolstad, County Weighs Lobbyist Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 7, 2006, at 1B.
82. Latham v. Fla. Comm'n on Ethics, 694 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
83. See FLA. STAT. § 112.3148(7)0) (2006).
84. Gary Fineout, Cash Flows Despite New Ban on Gifts, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 19, 2005,
at lB.
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gift ban. 8' In 2006, a group of lobbyists asked a Leon County judge to en-
join one of the nation's toughest restrictions on gifts from lobbyists to legis-
lators.86 Florida's ban, effective January 1, 2006, angered many lobbyists
who were also obliged to reveal how much they get paid.87 The lobbyists
have challenged the new law as "deeply flawed across the board procedurally
and it also violates First Amendment and equal protection rights guaranteed
by the [United States] Constitution. 8
On a local level, Broward County commissioners are considering
whether to enact their own "ethics rules that [would] bar them from accept-
ing any gifts or meals from lobbyists," mirroring restrictions passed by legis-
lators statewide.89 "Currently, county commissioners can accept gifts worth
less than $100 from lobbyists without reporting them" to the Florida Com-
mission on Ethics. 90 Since 2001, lobbyists that conduct business with the
Broward County Commission are required to register and reveal yearly any
fees for securing a contract for a client.9
Joining the ethics bandwagon in 2005, Florida's Attorney General
called for the elimination of the revolving door at "state-run entities where
former employees [leave and form] companies only to return seeking con-
tracts from their former employer."92  Currently, state "law requires state
employees to wait two years before doing business with their former
agency." 93 Under the new law, violations would be investigated by the Flor-
ida Commission on Ethics, with restitution and fines up to $10,000.94 Soon
after, Citizens Property Insurance (Citizens) executives told the Florida
House Committee it was about to impose ethics rules along the lines of those
proposed by Florida's Attorney General. 95 In 2005, conflict of interest
85. Id.
86. Gary Fineout, Lobbyists Appeal Gift Ban Before Judge, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 17,
2006, at 8B.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Bolstad, supra note 81.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Mary Ellen Klas, Crist: Tighten Rules on State-Run Firms, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18,
2005, at 8B.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Mary Ellen Klas, Citizens Ponders Ethics Rules, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 2005, at
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claims emerged when former Citizens executives hatched a plan to form a
private insurance firm that would seek business from Citizens.96
The Florida Legislature is considering a measure that will outlaw the
ethically-dubious practice of "double dipping" whereby state legislators re-
ceive a salary as a state legislator and draw pay from another job that is state-
funded.97 The bill, for example, will prohibit state lawmakers from working
for public schools, a city, or a county.9" In addition, the bill makes it a con-
flict of interest for a lobbyist to serve on the Florida Commission on Ethics.99
However, if enacted, the law will not apply to any current lawmakers or take
effect until January 2016. 100
The ban on the practice of "double dipping" is similar, but not identical,
to laws that regulate the practice of dual office holding.' On occasion, the
ban on dual office holding is lifted where the second office is merely con-
ceived as an added duty of the first office. 10 2 For example, a Florida court
ruled that a city commissioner was not barred outright from holding office as
a pension trustee if pension administration is a regular duty shared with the
office of commissioner. 103
Beyond the statutory concept of dual office holding is the common law
doctrine of incompatibility of office.'0 4 Incompatibility of office is deemed
to arise where one office falls under the control of the other, thereby enabling
the office holder to favor one position over the other.'o5 Faced with this con-
flict, the office holder is forced to yield one of the positions if holding both
might disserve the public interest.' 06 The potential for conflict rather than
actual conflict triggers the ban.'07 Under Florida's Constitution, neither serv-
ing as notary public nor holding a commission with the National Guard of
state militia triggers divestiture.'
96. Id.
97. Gary Fineout, 'Double Dipping' by Legislators Is Under Attack, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 15, 2006, at 7B [hereinafter Fineout, Double Dipping].
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Compare Fineout, Double Dipping, supra note 97, with City of Orlando v. State
Dep't of Ins., 528 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
102. See City of Orlando, 528 So. 2d at 469.
103. Id.
104. Gryzik v. State, 380 So. 2d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 5(a).
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III. TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
A. Hours and Wages
1. Fair Labor Standards Act Issues
The national minimum wage has been frozen at $5.15 an hour since
September 1997, "marking the second longest [term] that the [country] has
had a stagnant minimum wage since" the enactment of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA) in 1938.'09 States are free to raise the minimum wage
within their own borders." 0 "In 2004, Florida voters [overwhelmingly] ap-
proved a constitutional amendment that set the state minimum wage at $6.15
an hour and ... [scheduled] annual adjustments for inflation.""' On January
1, 2006, the Florida Legislature adjusted the minimum wage to $6.40 an
hour." 2 According to the Miami Herald, about "400,000 of Florida's 8.5
million workers earn ... minimum wage.""' 3 In the past year, the Depart-
ment of Labor issued several opinion letters dealing with calculating over-
time pay:
" One letter offered aid in assessing overtime when an employee
performs both exempt and nonexempt tasks.' 14 As a rule, em-
ployers owe overtime for all hours worked if the primary duty
is nonexempt work. "5
" One letter made clear that changes to the law governing the ex-
ecutive exemption from overtime pay rules, affected by the
2004 revisions in the FLSA regulations, are clarifications and
not substantive changes. 1
6
109. Rick Klein, Democrats to Woo Voters with Wage Increase Issue, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 28, 2005, at 3A. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (2000).
110. See Klein, supra note 109.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Advisory Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Deputy Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
FLSA2005-14 (Mar. 17, 2005).
115. See id.
116. Advisory Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Deputy Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
FLSA2005-19 (Aug. 2, 2005).
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" One letter clarified that a graduate degree requirement for social
workers satisfies the learned professional exemption from over-
time, while a general college degree for caseworkers did not. 117
" One letter explained that although an employer is typically re-
quired to pay the average aggregate wage when a firefighter
works two jobs at different pay levels, employers who can show
that the pay scheme is not aimed at selling workers short or
evading the FLSA may pay for overtime based on two distinct
wages. 8
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ruled that, under FLSA, time
spent walking between the area where workers put on and take off (don and
doff) protective gear, that is "integral and indispensable""' 9 to the "principal
[activity]"'' 2 plus time spent waiting to doff, is compensable. 2' By contrast,
time devoted to waiting to put on the first article of gear, that signals the be-
ginning of a non-stop workday, is excluded from the scope of the FLSA un-
der section 4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. '22
A Tampa federal court ruled, in Bogacki v. Buccaneers Ltd. Partner-
ship,123 that a worker who files a retaliation claim under the FLSA may re-
cover emotional distress damages alongside lost wages, liquidated damages,
costs, and attorneys' fees. 1
24
2. Off-Duty Pay for Police Officers
The Miami-Dade Police Benevolent Association (PBA) conducts an
off-duty work program aimed at providing police officers as added security
for private businesses.125 However, according to a report by the Inspector
General, the head of the PBA received over $100,000, since 2003, for patrol-
ling the union office. 126 According to the report, this is "a 'flagrant abuse' of
117. Advisory Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Deputy Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
FLSA2005-50 (Nov. 4, 2005).
118. Advisory Letter from Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., Deputy Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor,
FLSA2005-1NA (Feb. 14, 2005).
119. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, No. 03-1238, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2005) (quoting Steiner
v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)).
120. Id. (quoting Steiner, 350 U.S. at 256).
121. Id
122. Id. at 19.
123. 370 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
124. Id. at 1201, 1206.
125. Scott Hiaasen, Union Boss" Off-Duty Pay Under Fire, MIAMI HERALD, May 31, 2006,
at IA.
126. Id.
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an off-duty work program," which was designed to be "self-sustaining, with
businesses, not taxpayers, bearing all the costs."'27
3. Teachers' Pay
About 900 Florida International University (FIU) faculty had been
working without a labor contract since 2003.128 However, in 2006, FIU's
faculty signed a three-year landmark contract that will aid the fast-growing
public school in recruiting better faculty. 129 The contract, which guarantees
each faculty member a minimum pay hike and the right to arbitrate griev-
ances before an internal panel, is the first contract for the FIU faculty since
Florida eliminated its Board of Regents. 3 0
In 2006, hundreds of South Florida teachers mounted a silent protest by
wearing blue shirts in part to express their anger over a state plan to tie
teacher salaries to student test scores."'3 In 2005, Miami-Dade public school
teachers agreed to a one-year contract that included almost $53 million in
salary increases. '32 Under the new contract, a school teacher's starting salary
would increase from $33,275 to $34,200. 133 As a result of the new contract,
the average salary of Miami-Dade teachers would rise to $48,307, about
$8,000 more than the state average and almost $3,000 above the national
average salary for all teachers. 13
South Florida's high cost of housing has often deterred new teachers
from working in the area. 135 A starting salary of $35,000 makes it very diffi-
cult for new teachers to afford to buy even a one-bedroom condo. 136 To ad-
dress this problem, the Broward School Board entertained proposals by a real
estate developer to reserve 50 apartment units in a redevelopment area for
127. Id.
128. Noah Bierman, FlU Faculty Approves New 3-Year Contract, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
16, 2006, at lB.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Mary Ellen Klas, Teachers Dress in Blue to Protest, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006,
at 8B.
132. Matthew I. Pinzur, Early Deal Hikes Dade Teachers' Pay, MIAMI HERALD, July 30,
2005 at lB.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Steve Harrison, Homing in on a Headache, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 24, 2005, at 3B.
136. Id.
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teachers by selling the units to the teachers below market value. '37 Under the
plan, "the School Board [would offer] teachers a $20,000 loan, refundable if
they teach for five years."' 38  Moreover, the School Board is weighing
whether to lobby the state legislature to grant an additional homestead ex-
emption for teachers. 39 "[T]he Miami-Dade County School Board recently
approved a program" to provide discounts to teachers for public transit as an
employee benefit. '40
4. Military Pay
Under federal law, employers are only required to keep the same or
similar job and pay and benefit packages for any workers called to active
duty. 14' A bill introduced in the Florida Legislature in 2005 will assist state
National Guard and Reserve soldiers who lose wages when they are called
up for active duty. '42
The Broward County Sheriffs Office exceeds federal standards, main-
taining jobs for reservists by paying them "half of the difference between
what the military pays them and what [the employer] ordinarily pays
them."' 143  State-wide, "Florida has more than $1.8 million available in
matching grants" for any employer who supplements pay to workers "called
to active federal military duty."44
In Coffinan v. Chugach Support Services, 145 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reem-
ployment Rights Act (USERRA), '46 an employer is not a successor in inter-
est to another employer absent a merger or transfer of assets between the two
entities. 141
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Niala Boodhoo, Housing Aid is a Recruitment Tool, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 13, 2006,
at 20A.
141. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4312(a), 4316(a) (2000) (commonly referred to as Uniformed Ser-
vices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994).
142. See Phil Long, State Eyes Cash Relieffor Guard, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 14, 2005, at
lB.
143. Dalia Naamani-Goldman, Military Praises Employers, MIAM HERALD, Apr. 29,
2005, at 5B.
144. State Offers Grants for Military Pay, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14, 2006, at 3C.
145. 411 F.3d 1231 (1 lth Cir. 2005).
146. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4333. This Federal Act codifies veterans' reemployment
rights. Id.
147. Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., 411 F.3d 1231, 1237-38 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
[Vol. 31
142
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
2006] 2005-2006 SURVEY OF FLORIDA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW 143
The final rules issued by the Department of Labor on December 19,
2005 state that employees returning from military service are entitled to un-
broken pension participation, vesting, and accrual of benefits. 148 The final
rules apply to state and local governments as well as private employers.1
49
Returning service members must receive the same seniority, status, and pay
as they would have earned had they not left for military service. 150 Addition-
ally, disability incurred during military service does not foreclose reinstate-
ment at the same seniority, status, and pay. 5 ' Employers owe a duty to rea-
sonably accommodate a returning service member's disability. 52
5. Missed Work Pay Due to Hurricanes
As a general rule, hourly employees are not paid for hours they do not
work. " Only salaried employees, who are exempt from overtime, are enti-
tled to be paid for time missed in the wake of a hurricane. 154 Hourly workers
need not be paid even if the workplace closes due to power failure or hurri-
cane damage.' Such employees may be eligible for unemployment or dis-
aster assistance. 156 Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) is only avail-
able for workers "left jobless as a direct result of a declared disaster. '57
However, "DUA cannot supplement regular unemployment compensa-
tion."'
158
6. The Wage Gap Between Men and Women
Men, on average, earn more money than women.'59 "[A] woman earns
only 77 percent as much as her male counterpart with the same job descrip-
148. See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 70
Fed. Reg. 75,246, 75,309-10 (Dec. 19, 2005) (codified as amended at 20 C.F.R. pt. 1002)
[hereinafter USERRA].
149. Id. at 75,291.
150. See id. at 75,275.
151. See id. at 75,277.
152. Id.
153. Jim Wyss, Will You Get Paidfor Missed Work? MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 1, 2005, at 1C.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 5C.
158. Wyss, supra note 153, at 5C.
159. See David Leonhardt, Women Outpace Men in Wage Gains, TIMES UNION, Feb. 17,
2003, at Al.
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tion and experience."'" African-American women earn even less, while
Hispanic women earn the least of all.'61 The wage gap has not narrowed in
ten years. 162 Over a lifetime, the wage gap can make an enormous difference
in retirement savings, among other things.163 April 25th has been declared
National Pay Equity Day and it serves to draw attention to the inequity of the
wage gap. '
7. Living Wage Laws
In 2005, full-time workers earning minimum wage netted $12,300 an-
nually, about "40 percent below the federal poverty level for a family of
four." 6 To remedy the plight of the public-sector working poor, Miami-
Dade County enacted a living wage ordinance in 1999.166 Miami Beach fol-
lowed in 2001 and Broward County in 2002.167 A study of Miami-Dade
County's living wage ordinance found that after earning an extra $5,720 a
year, workers were better able to reduce debt, save more, and live better. 168
"The ordinance covers all county employees and service contractors, Public
Health Trust workers, and ground service providers at Miami International
Airport."' 6 9 In 2006, the Miami City Commission "unanimously gave tenta-
tive approval to a living wage ordinance for city workers and employees of
[city contractors]."' 7 ° If approved, covered "workers would be guaranteed an
hourly wage of $10.58, if they receive health insurance coverage," or $11.83
an hour if health insurance is not offered. 171
160. Cindy Krischer Goodman, Seeing Red, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006, at 1C.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Arthur Rosenberg, Public-Sector Workers Deserve a Fair Day's Pay, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 30, 2005, at 25A.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Niala Boodhoo, County's Living Wage Success with Workers, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
16, 2006, at 3C.
169. Id.
170. Michael Vasquez, Tentative Approval for Living Wage Rule, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
24, 2006, at 3B.
171. Id.
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B. Health Benefits
According to a recent study, 41% of working-age Americans with mid-
level incomes lack full-time health insurance, up from 28% in 2001.172 To
make matters worse, more employers are eliminating coverage or offering
health benefits that are too expensive for many workers to afford.'73
In 2006, Florida International University became the first Florida uni-
versity-public or private-"to offer six months' paid leave to either parent"
in order to care for a newborn child. 
17 4
Alongside workplace smoking bans, more and more public and private
employers are forcing "employees who use tobacco to pay higher health [in-
surance] premiums."' 75  In light of the fact that smokers cost employers
around 25% more than nonsmokers when it comes to healthcare, some com-
panies "charge smokers higher premiums, [ranging] from ... $20 to $50 a
month."' 76 For a number of reasons, public employers are increasingly hir-
ing only non-smokers: not only individuals who do not smoke at work but
also individuals who do not smoke at all. In this regard, the Supreme Court
of Florida has ruled that there is no privacy violation for a city to require job
applicants to sign affidavits vowing they had not used tobacco for a year. '77
More and more, public and private employers provide dependent health
benefits to "spousal equivalents" of its employees. 178 For example, in 2006,
172. More Mid-Income Uninsured, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 26, 2006, at 7A. On January 1,
2007, the first-of-its-kind legislation takes effect in Maryland requiring private employers
with more than 10,000 employees to spend at least 8% of payroll on health care benefits. Fair
Share Health Care Fund Act of 2006, S.B. 790, 2006 Md. Laws ch. 3 (to be codified at MD.
CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-104).
173. More Mid-Income Uninsured, supra note 172.
174. Noah Bierman, FlU Faculty Approves New 3-Year Contract, MIAMI HERALD, Feb.
16, 2006, at lB.
175. Lisa Comwell, Smokers Feel the Heat from Employers, MIAMi HERALD, Feb. 17,
2006, at 3C. Two states, Alabama and Kentucky, have passed on to state employees the cost
for smokers by raising health insurance premiums for smokers. Ariel Hart, National Briefing
South: Alabama: Trying to Limit Health Spending for State Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
2004, at 26A.
176. Cornwell, supra note 175.
177. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995). In the private sector, a
Michigan insurance benefits administrator "began testing its 200 employees for smoking in"
2005. Jeremy W. Peters, Company's Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2005, at 5C. Employees face random testing and if they flunk, they are dismissed. Id.
178. See Bierman, supra note 174.
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Florida International University "join[ed] the University of Florida in extend-
ing healthcare benefits to same-sex domestic partners."179
Seven years after "Broward County became one of the first local gov-
ernments in Florida to extend domestic partner benefits to employees," "only
a few cities in Broward have followed [suit]"' 8°  Like Broward County,
"Hollywood, Miramar, Oakland Park, and Wilton Manors [offer] domestic
partner benefits" to employees.'' In 2005, the Miami Beach City Commis-
sion approved a measure that "required city contractors to [offer] the same
benefits for domestic partners as they do for spouses."' I8 2 The ordinance is
unique in Florida.'83
Medical insurance costs for United States workers and retirees
amounted to $13,382 in 2006 for a family of four, up 9.6% from 2005.' 14
Moreover, 14% of employers in one survey "expect to eliminate retiree
health benefits for current workers."'' 8 ' About 160 million workers, retirees,
and their families are covered by health insurance purchased by employ-
ers. 1
86
Kidcare is Florida's subsidized health insurance program for children. ' 87
A child is eligible for coverage only if both parents work. '88 In the past, en-
rollment periods were limited, but Governor Jeb Bush signed a law that enti-
tles parents to enroll their children in Kidcare at any time. 89
C. Guns at the Workplace
In 2006, the National Rifle Association supported a measure that would
punish "Florida employers with prison time and lawsuits if they [forbade
their workers] from keeping [firearms] in their cars in workplace parking
179. Id. The Supreme Court of Alaska ruled in 2005 that "it was unconstitutional to bar
benefits to the same-sex partners of public employees." National Briefing Northwest:
Alaska: Ruling on Same-Sex Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at 16A.
180. Amy Sherman, Partner Benefits Again an Issue, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 13, 2006, at
lB.
181. Id.
182. Gay-Benefits Package Passes, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 2005, at 3B.
183. Id. Broward County gives preference to contractors who extend domestic partnership
benefits, but does not require them. Id.
184. Business Briefs: Medical Costs Are Up, MIAMI HERALD, July 6, 2006, at 1C.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Deborah Circelli, Enrollment Now Open for State KidCare Program, DAYTONA
NEws-J, June 11, 2005, at 03C.
188. See id.
189. Id.
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lots."'9 In response, Florida employers claim the law intrudes on their pri-
vate property rights."'9 The bill would not apply to schools where guns are
banned by law. 92 Under the bill, employers would be relieved of liability in
the event an employee committed a crime with a gun left in their car.'93
"Shootings accounted for three-quarters of the 551 workplace homicides in
the United States" in 2004. 194
D. Workers' Compensation
"In 2000, Florida had the highest workers' compensation rates [nation-
wide]."' 95  In 2003, Florida's workers' compensation insurance underwent
reform and insurance rates declined 14%. 196 In 2005, Florida's Chief Finan-
cial Officer, who was running for Governor, proposed "a [twenty-two] per-
cent cut in workers' comp[ensation] insurance rates."'97
E. Unemployment Compensation
In 2005, Florida's unemployment rate was at an all-time low of 3.8%.'9'
With the Federal Reserve raising interest rates eighteen times in an effort to
forestall inflation, overall spending is reduced, employers hire fewer work-
ers, and unemployment rises. Commentators disagree about whether infla-
tion or rising unemployment poses the greater concern. 199
190. Marc Caputo, NRA Bill Would OK Guns in Cars at Work, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 8,
2006, at Al.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Anti-Gun Businesses Soon May Be Under Fire, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 3, 2005, at 7B.
194. Id. (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Changes to the Current
Employment Statistics Survey, http://www.bls.gov/ces/cesww.htm (last visited Dec. 26,
2006)); see also PAUL BABIAK & ROBERT HARE, SNAKES IN SUITS: WHEN PSYCHOPATHS GO TO
WORK 17-18 (2006).
195. Stephanie Horvath, State CFO Calls for Deeper Cuts in Comp Rates, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 5, 2005, at 4C.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Roberto Santiago, Florida Workers Have Scant Job Protection, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
5, 2005, at 5B.
199. Compare Mark Weisbrot, Rate Hikes Help Bankers, Not Average Americans, MAMI
HERALD, July 7, 2006, at 21 A, with Mark J. Perry, Economy Going Just Fine, MIAMI HERALD,
July 7, 2006, at 21A.
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F. Public Pensions
In 2006, of the nearly $240 million the City of Miami plans to collect in
taxes, about $80 million will go to fund its "generous-and occasionally
scandal-plagued-pension funds., 20 0 Apparently, the fund suffered years of
neglect during the 1990s, when the City of Miami narrowly avoided bank-
ruptcy and relied on stock market gains to shore up retirement benefits.
21
The troubled fund faces not only public resentment over budget-crippling
payments, but also charges of faulty management. For example, a city audi-
tor found that twenty-five public employees were deemed permanently dis-
abled without medical evidence of their injuries.20 2
IV. DISCIPLINE, RETALIATIONS, AND DISCRIMINATION
A. Discipline
A Martin County deputy sheriff was dismissed for using the video cam-
era in his patrol car to zoom in on and record bikini-clad girls while on
duty. 20 3  The deputy is challenging his dismissal and nothing is final until a
panel conducts a hearing and votes on whether the discipline is warranted.2°
A Lauderhill firefighter-paramedic was dismissed for not reporting to
duty during a hurricane, and his firing was subsequently upheld in 2005.05
The firefighter refused to work, stating that he had been drinking wine; how-
ever, department policy bars on-call employees from drinking alcohol once a
hurricane watch goes into effect. 206
B. Retaliation, Whistle-Blowing, and the First Amendment
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court handed down two major deci-
sions involving retaliatory discharge: one concerning Title VII, 207 and an-
200. Jack Dolan & Michael Vasquez, Swelling Pension Costs Put Big Dent in Miami's
Budget, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 22, 2005, at 6B.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Jill Taylor, Deputy is Fired for Using Video Camera to Ogle Girls, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 8, 2006, at 7B.
204. Id.
205. Evan S. Benn, Fired Firefighter Loses Appeal, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 24, 2005, at 2B.
206. Id.
207. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, No. 05-259, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 22,
2006).
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other implicating the First Amendment. °8 In the latter, Garcetti v. Cebal-
los,2 "9 a supervising deputy district attorney claimed that he was retaliated
against for writing a memo in the course of his employment that pointed out
inaccuracies in an affidavit police used to secure a search warrant.1 0 The
United States Supreme Court ruled that public employees who utter state-
ments in the course of their official duties are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes and, consequently, are not constitutionally im-
mune from employer discipline stemming from their communications. 1
Writing on behalf of five justices, Justice Kennedy made clear that the dispo-
sitive factor was not that Ceballos expressed his views inside his office rather
than publicly, but that the employer is properly entitled to exercise control
over what it has commissioned or created.1 2 In dissent, Justice Souter
wrote:
that private and public interests in addressing official wrongdoing
and threats to health and safety can outweigh the government's
stake in the efficient implementation of policy, and when they do
public employees who speak on these matters in the course of their
duties should be eligible to claim First Amendment protection.2 3
In the other retaliatory discharge ruling, the United States Supreme
Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White21 4 markedly
strengthened legal protection against retaliation for employees who protest
discrimination or harassment on the job. 2 5 Title VII, the basic federal law
banning discrimination in employment, also "prohibits employers from re-
taliating against [employees] who complain about discrimination. '216  Ac-
cording to Justice Breyer's unanimous opinion, retaliation does not need to
result in dismissal because any "materially adverse employment action that
208. Garcetti v. Ceballos, No. 04-473, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 30, 2006).
209. Id. "[T]he decision raise[s] questions about the extent to which whistle-blowers who
make their complaints public might now face greater danger of retaliation." Linda Green-
house, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free-Speech Protection, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at
A14.
210. Garcetti, No. 04-473, slip op. at 1-2.
211. See id. at l0.
212. Seeid at l0-11.
213. Id. at 1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
214. No. 05-259, slip. op. at 1 (U.S. June 22, 2006).
215. Id. at 3; see Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Gives Employees Broader Protection
Against Retaliation in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A24 [hereinafter Green-
house, Supreme Court].
216. Greenhouse, Supreme Court, supra note 215.
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'might have dissuaded a reasonable worker '' 21 7 from protesting discrimina-
tion qualifies as prohibited retaliation under Title VII.
2 18
According to the New York Times, around "20,000 retaliation cases
were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2004. ' '219
This new ruling by the United States Supreme Court is likely to substantially
increase the number of retaliation cases.220
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the six-year statute
of limitations for qui tam suits under the False Claims Act (FCA) does not
govern whistle-blower retaliation suits. 2 1 Instead, FCA retaliation claims
are governed by the more "analogous state statute of limitations. 222
On September 29, 2005, the United States House Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform approved a measure that would strengthen whistle-blower
protections for federal employees, including the right to jury trials.223
At the state level, a former marine biologist sued the State of Florida
under Florida's Whistle-Blower's Act, 24 alleging that his protests over a
plan to broaden the highway into the Florida Keys cost him his job.225 In
2005, the Hallandale Beach Civil Service Board recommended that a fire-
fighter-paramedic finally be promoted and awarded back pay after he was
continually passed over for promotion, because the "decisions he made while
on the Civil Service Board" were controversial.226
C. Employment Claims
From 2004 to 2005, the backlog of discrimination claims filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) increased 12%,
amounting to 33,562 claims last year.227 Since 2001, "[t]he EEOC has lost
20% of its staff since 2001, when a hiring freeze was instituted, and it now
217. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 05-259, slip op. at 13).
218. Id.
219. Id. This number has "doubled" since 1992. Id.
220. Greenhouse, Supreme Court, supra note 215.
221. See Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, No. 04-169,
slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 20, 2005).
222. Id. at 12.
223. See FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PROTECTION OF DISCLOSUREs ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 109-544,
pt. 1, at 6 (2006).
224. FLA. STAT. §§ 112.3187-.31895 (2006).
225. Luisa Yanez, Biologist Who Lost Job Fights Firing in a Lawsuit, MIAMI HERALD,
Aug. 4, 2005, at 3B.
226. Diana Moskovitz, Board Rules Fireman Unfairly Passed Over, MIAMI HERALD, Oct.
20, 2005, at 5B.
227. Marni Goldberg, Job-Discrimination Claims Pile up with Budget Cuts, L.A. TIMES,
June 17, 2006, at A6.
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faces budget reductions, with the Bush administration proposing to cut the
agency's budget by $4 million next year., 22' For over forty years, "the
EEOC has investigated workplace discrimination based on sex, race, age,
national origin, religion, and disability. ' 229 To make matters worse, a con-
troversial reorganization plan recommends a national call center staffed by
non-professionals, instead of trained specialists, to answer public ques-
tions.23°
According to a 2005 EEOC Advisory Letter, it is unlawful to compel
answers to internet job questionnaires that inquire about "race, color, relig-
ion, sex, national origin, age, and disability. 23 l In the 2005 fiscal year, the
EEOC helped secure roughly "$378 million in total monetary benefits" for
job discrimination victims, "down from ... $415.4 million in fiscal [year]
2004. "232
In Florida, employers are not allowed to terminate or discriminate
against employees on the basis "of age, race, religion, sex, national origin, or
pregnancy., 233 In addition, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993234
prohibits terminating an employee for taking a leave in certain circum-
stances.2 35 One provision of an anti-bullying bill, currently making its way
through the Florida Legislature, prohibits "'bullying and harassment' of...
school employees in Florida's public schools." '236
V. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Generally
Title VII covers employers with "fifteen or more employees. 237  In
2006, the United States Supreme Court, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,238 ruled
that the fifteen-employee requirement is not similar to a jurisdictional issue,
which can be raised at any time, but instead is merely a defense to the dis-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Advisory Letter from Peggy R. Mastroianni, Assoc. Legal Counsel, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n, Internet Hiring (Oct. 27, 2005),
http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2005/intemet hiring.html.
232. EEOC's Benefits Dropped Slightly in 2005, Charge Filings Continued Three-Year
Decline, 74 U.S.L. WK. 2376, Jan. 3, 2006.
233. Santiago, supra note 198.
234. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.100-.800 (2006).
235. Id. § 825.112(a)(1)-(4).
236. Fix Anti-Bullying Bill, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 25, 2006, at 28A.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
238. No. 04-944 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2006).
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crimination claim. 239 This defense can be waived by failure to raise it in a
timely fashion.24 °
B. Race and National Origin
Both federal and state laws ban employment discrimination based on a
person's race.24" ' During the past year, the rulings in this area had the effect
of binding Florida employers.242 Under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992
(FCRA), 243 employers are prohibited from discriminating in the workplace
on grounds of race, among other categories. 2" The Sovereign Immunity
Tort Law (SITL) 245 allows persons to sue state agencies, counties, and subdi-
visions of state government.246 The provision, however, limits recovery.247
In Gallagher v. Manatee County,2 8 a Florida appellate court ruled that a
$100,000 cap in the SITL applies to all damages that an employee can re-
cover under the FCRA.249
Hostile work environments may be based on race as well as on sex.250
In Webb v. Worldwide Flight Service, Inc.,251 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a judgment of $100,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages, under the FCRA, to a victim of racial com-
ments that created a hostile work environment.252 In 2005, "[a] Fort Lauder-
dale police officer was suspended without pay ... for [uttering] racist re-
marks to a teenager and [then] lying about it [in the course of] an investiga-
tion.' 253 Additionally, "[s]even lawyers' groups representing minorities and
women [proposed that] Broward County judges . . . undergo training to be
239. See id at 2, 12.
240. See id. at 2.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2) (2000); FLA. STAT. § 760.10(1)(a)-(b) (2006).
242. See, e.g., Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192 (11 th Cir. 2005).
243. FLA. STAT. § 760.01-. 11 (2006).
244. Id. § 760.10(1)(a).
245. Id. § 768.28.
246. Id. § 768.28(1).
247. Id. § 768.28(5).
248. 927 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
249. See id. at 916, 919.
250. Compare id. at 914 (ruling against workplace gender-based discrimination), with
Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (ruling against work-
place racial discrimination).
251. 407F.3dat1192.
252. Id. at 1193.
253. Darran Simon, Police Officer Is Suspended for Alleged Racist Remark, MIAMI
HERALD, July 29, 2005, at 3B.
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more sensitive toward black and Hispanic defendants." ' 4 Further, in Or-
lando, an elementary school teacher resigned over a letter she wrote.2 55 The
letter was published in a Spanish-language daily newspaper "disparaging
Hispanics and other minorities. 2 56 Also, the Davie Town Council decided
not to terminate a planning board member charged with circulating a cartoon
that some on the council considered racist.257 Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit
ruled that a district court properly reduced a national origin bias award of
back pay and compensatory damages from $700,000 to $1258 because the
claimant failed to produce any evidence of his actual earnings while em-
ployed.259
C. Gender and Same-Sex Discrimination
Over the past two years, various examples of gender discrimination in
both state and federal settings have arisen. In 2005, the United States De-
partment of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped collecting data on the
number of women employees in the workplace for its monthly payroll em-
ployment survey.2" Further, in 2005, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that an employee, who sues for sex discrimination in pay, under an
annual salary review system, could recover on her disparate pay gap claim
only as far back as the last salary decision that affected her pay, within Title
VII's 180-day filing period. 26' Also, in 2006, the EEOC sued a Miami-based
company for pregnancy discrimination, alleging that the employer illegally
dismissed a worker after she mentioned she would need a cesarean.262 Ac-
cording to the EEOC, pregnancy discrimination claims in Florida "have al-
most doubled since 1992.' '263
In the same-sex discrimination arena, "most urban police departments
[nationwide] are actively recruiting gays and lesbians[;] ... in South Florida,
254. Beth Reinhard, Judges Urged to Act Nicer, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2006, at 1B.
255. Teacher Quits Over Anti-Latino Remarks, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 2005, at 7B.
256. Id.
257. Nikki Waller, Cartoon Sender to Stay on Planning Board, MIAMI HERALD, July 7,
2006, at 6B.
258. Akouri v. Fla. Dep't of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
259. Id. at 1342.
260. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Changes to the Current Employment Statistics Survey,
http://www.bls.gov/ces/cesww.htm (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
261. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169,1189 (1 th Cir. 2005).
262. EEOC Sues Firm for Discrimination, MIAMI HERALD, July 7, 2006, at 3C.
263. Id.
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most gay police officers remain in the closet., 264 "[O]nly three [South Flor-
ida police departments]-Miami Beach, Key West, and Fort Lauderdale-
have liaisons to the gay community. ' 265 While gay police officers are no
longer bullied or abused by co-workers in South Florida, most continue to
stay in the closet for fear of harassment.266 "[In] Florida, gay workers...
have no specific protection against being [dismissed] on the basis of their
sexual orientations., 267  Florida Law Enforcement Gays and Lesbians
(LEGAL) is an organization that has about eighty members. 68
D. Age Discrimination
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court settled a difference of opinion
amongst the circuits by ruling that a disparate impact analysis is an available
framework under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).269
Employers, however, may still prevail by raising the potent defense of "rea-
sonable [factors] other than age" under the ADEA.270
E. Disability Discrimination
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court ruled that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) "validly abrogate[d] [the] state[s']
sovereign immunity" in lawsuits for money damages, from prisoner suits that
raise constitutional violations. 271' This ruling has potential implications for
public employers in Florida because the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in 1998 that public employers may also face liability under Title II of
the ADA.272
Although the ADA prohibits disability-related questions before an ap-
plicant is hired, an EEOC advisory letter carves out an exception when an
employer seeks to hire individuals with disabilities "as part of an affirmative
264. Wanda J. DeMarzo & Steve Rothaus, Despite Some Progress, Many Gay Officers
Still in Closet, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 28, 2006, at 23A.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
270. Id. at 242-43.
271. United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2006).
272. Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 825
(llth Cir. 1998).
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action program. 2 73 According to a 2005 EEOC advisory letter, pregnancy-
related disabilities are treated the same as other disabilities when relating to
fringe benefits.274
The circuit courts are split over whether employees regarded as disabled
are entitled to the same reasonable accommodation as employees who are
actually disabled. 75 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals follows the mi-
nority view that employees regarded as disabled are entitled to the same rea-
sonable accommodation as employees who are actually disabled.276
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2005 that although the
"don't-look-back" rule bars a trial court from revisiting whether a "prima
facie case [exists] after all the evidence is [introduced], 277 the issue of the
employee's disability can be reconsidered even after the case is submitted to
the jury.278
VI. CONCLUSION
The period of 2005-06 produced a wide array of public employment le-
gal issues. Every stage of employment, from hiring, to the terms of em-
ployment, to employment discrimination, to discipline and discharge, creates
issues at the federal, state, and local levels. In contrast to private sector em-
ployment, which by and large escapes public scrutiny, public sector em-
ployment captures widespread media attention. Besides case law and legisla-
tive enactments, news stories afford a wealth of insight and detail to this cor-
ner of the law.
273. Advisory Letter from Christopher J. Kuczynski, Ass't Legal Counsel, Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Comm'n, ADA: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examina-
tions-Pre-Offer, (Nov. 8, 2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2005/
ada inquiriesexaminationspreoffer.html.
274. Advisory Letter from Peggy R. Mastroianni, Assoc. Legal Counsel, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n, ADA and Title VII-Disability Retirement Benefits (July 29,
2005), http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2005/adatitlevii-disabilityretirementbenefits.html.
275. D'Angelo v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1235 (1 1th Cir. 2005).
276. Id.
277. Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151-52 (1lth Cir. 2005).
278. See id. at 1153-54.
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ployer.' Under Florida law, however, if the two employees are "assigned
primarily to unrelated works," then the injured employee also has a right to
bring common law tort claims against the employee who was negligent.2
Therefore, in Florida, employees have a chance to collect twice-under both
workers' compensation and common law tort awards-for workplace inju-
ries caused by the negligence of an unrelated co-employee.3
Florida courts have struggled with the application of the "unrelated
works" exception to workers' compensation since it was enacted by the Flor-
ida Legislature in 1978. 4 The Legislature did not give any guidance to the
courts in defining what is meant by "unrelated works."5  As a result, for
many years it was left up to the courts to structure a test that will fairly inter-
pret the law.6 Generally, the courts struggled with whether to interpret "un-
related works" in a broad or narrow sense, because it is unclear if the legisla-
ture intended for the exception to be applied frequently or infrequently.7
The Supreme Court of Florida has attempted to answer this question of
statutory interpretation created by the legislature.8 However, two Supreme
Court of Florida decisions resulted in contrary findings, meaning the test for
determining whether a co-employee's works are unrelated remains unclear.9
This article will discuss the evolution of the "unrelated works" excep-
tion to workers' compensation law. Part II will discuss workers' compensa-
tion laws in Florida and the origins of the "unrelated works" exception. Part
III will discuss the different methods that Florida courts have used to define
the exception. Part IV will discuss Taylor v. School Board of Brevard
County (Taylor 11)1 ° and its effect on the exception. Part V will discuss
Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena 11)"1 and its expansion of Taylor
II. Finally, this article will propose a new test for the application of the "un-
related works" exception.
1. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §
1.01 (2006).
2. FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1)(b)(2) (2006).
3. See id.
4. See Act effective July 1, 1978, ch. 78-300, § 2, 1978 Fla. Laws 847.
5. See Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 2004)
(Lewis, J. concurring); see also FLA. STAT. § 440.02 (2006).
6. See Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 8.
7. See id. at 5; see also FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2006).
8. See Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I1), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (Fla. 2006);
Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 5.
9. See Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1174; Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 5-6.
10. 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004).
11. 928 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2006).
[Vol. 31
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II. ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND THE
"UNRELATED WORKS" EXCEPTION
A. Workers' Compensation Law
1. Generally
Workers' compensation refers to "laws [that] provide compensation for
loss [resulting] from the injury, [disablement], or death of a worker caused
by industrial accident, casualty, or disease ... based on the loss or impair-
ment of the worker's wage-earning power."" Workers' compensation laws
are not based on tort liability.' 3 Thus, for recovery, no proof of fault is re-
quired. 4 Instead, coverage turns on the relationship between the injuring
event and the employment. 5 Once that "course of employment" relationship
is present, it is assumed that the employee will be covered automatically. 6
Benefits of workers' compensation include only that amount which will al-
low the employee to "exist without being a burden to others."' 17 This is dras-
tically different than regular tort recovery, which seeks to restore the plaintiff
to where he was before the incident. 8
While the amount of recovery under workers' compensation is less than
an anticipated recovery under common law, it is a necessary tradeoff that
mutually benefits the employer and employee.' 9 Employees receive the right
to automatic recovery should they be injured on the job, while employers'
liability is greatly reduced due to the elimination of unknown jury verdicts
and potentially large sum awards.20 Furthermore, some argue that if com-
pensation payments were higher, perhaps equivalent to tort recovery, the
purpose of the workers' compensation statute would be lost, because larger
than necessary payments would encourage malingering.2'
12. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 4 (2003).
13. See FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (2006); LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.03(1).
14. See § 440.11; LARSON& LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.01.
15. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.03(1).
16. Id. § 1.01.
17. Id. § 1.03(5).
18. Id.
19. See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2006).
20. See id.
21. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.03(5).
2006]
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2. Purpose
Florida's Legislature has codified the purpose of workers' compensa-
tion laws. 22 The statute expresses the legislature's intent "to assure the quick
and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker
and to facilitate the worker's return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable
cost to the employer., 23  The law "is designed to promote efficiency and
fairness" between employees, employers, and insurance carriers. 24 Further,
the legislature specifically intends "that workers' compensation cases shall
be decided on their merits. 2 5  Additionally, disputes concerning the facts
and workers' compensation laws are not to be interpreted liberally in favor of
either the employee or the employer. 26 Rather, workers' compensation laws
should be interpreted using "basic principles of statutory construction. 27
In examining this statute, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
there are two basic purposes behind workers' compensation law: "(1) [T]o
see that workers in fact were rewarded for their industry by not being de-
prived of reasonably adequate and certain payment for workplace accidents;
and (2) to replace an unwieldy tort system that made it virtually impossible
for businesses to predict or insure for the cost of industrial accidents. 28
Mutual benefits for the employer, the employee and his dependants, and
society as a whole have resulted from this legislation. 29 The employee gets
an automatic reasonable recovery and the employer, as well as co-
employees, receive the reduction in liability from multiple unknown and
unforeseeable case outcomes.30 Workers' compensation law is intended "to
speed an employee's compensation while insulating both employer and em-
ployee from the costs and delays inherent in purely judicial adversarial pro-
ceedings."'" This mutual advantage has "a stabilizing influence on business
and the general economy" by making definite and predictable outcomes,
22. §440.015.
23. Id.
24. Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So. 2d 84, 90 (Fla. 2005).
25. Id.; § 440.015.
26. § 440.015.
27. Id.
28. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 2004) (citing
McLean v. Mundy, 81 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1955)) (alteration in original).
29. See Shaw v. Cambridge Integrated Servs. Group, Inc., 888 So. 2d 58, 61-62 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.03(2); 57 FLA. JUR. 2D Work-
ers' Compensation § 2 (2003).
30. See Shaw, 888 So. 2d at 61-62; see also Zundell v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 636 So.
2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1994); 57 FLA. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 2.
31. Zundell, 636So. 2dat 12.
[Vol. 31
159
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
FLORIDA'S "UNRELATED WORKS" EXCEPTION
should an employee be injured on the job.32 This in turn allows for reason-
able workers' compensation insurance coverage and reduces the fear of ris-
ing insurance costs or dropped coverage due to an unpredictable loss of a
common law tort action.33 Furthermore, the law relieves pressures on soci-
ety by placing the burden of care of injured employees on industry rather
than society itself, by preventing those that were dependent on the em-
ployee's wages from being "charges on the community.,
34
B. "Unrelated Works" Exception
Most states recognize, within their workers' compensation statutes, that
co-employees are immune from common law tort claims.35 The effect of this
clause bars all suits against co-employees. 36
While Florida follows the majority in granting immunity to co-
employees, it is the only state which has two exceptions to the immunity.37
First, co-employee immunity in Florida is not applicable when an employee
"acts, with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and wanton disregard
or unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence [and] when such
acts result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause such injury or
death.",38 The second instance, in which co-employee immunity does not
apply, is "when each [employee] is operating in the furtherance of the em-
ployer's business but they are assigned primarily to unrelated works within
private or public employment."39
The first exception is common among most states.4" Co-employees
who act with intent to injure or with gross negligence cannot take advantage
of the immunity granted by the workers' compensation statute. 4' This means
that if co-employees act in such a manner, they can be sued by the injured
employee under common law tort theories. 42 Many states only exempt inten-
32. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Driggers, 65 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1953).
33. See id.
34. McCoy v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 87 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 1956); see Sullivan v.
Mayo, 121 So. 2d 424, 430 (Fla. 1960).
35. LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 111.03(l).
36. Id.
37. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 440.1 1(1)(b)(2) (2006).
38. § 440.11(1)(b)(2).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 111.03(1).
41. See § 440.11 (1)(b)(2).
42. See, e.g., Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena IT), 928 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2006).
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tional acts, but Florida goes a bit further by exempting grossly negligent acts
as well.43
The second exception, the "unrelated works" exception, is what this ar-
ticle will focus on. This "unrelated works" exception is unique to Florida."
The legislature has stated that when employees are "assigned primarily to
unrelated works," co-employee immunity will not apply, meaning the injured
employee can sue the co-employee under common law tort theories.45 In
most instances, even though the employee has the right to bring common law
tort claims against his co-employee, the employer is added to the suit for
various reasons.46
In a case involving governmental co-employees, the civil action is auto-
matically brought against the government employer when the "unrelated
works" exception applies. 7 It has been argued that Florida's sovereign im-
munity statute, which bars all claims against the state, would supersede the
statute that granted standing to government employees.48 Courts have held
to the contrary, however, and thus government co-employees who fall under
the "unrelated works" exception can bring their common law tort claims di-
rectly against the state employer. 9
In the case of a non-governmental employer, the outcome is generally
the same.5° When the "unrelated works" exception is found to apply, it is
presumed that the employee can make common law tort claims against the
employer directly based upon respondeat superior tort principles.5 ' Thus,
the employer, as well as the employer's insurer, will be liable for these "un-
related works" cases as long as the employee is acting within the scope of his
employment. 2
With employers bearing the brunt of these "unrelated works" cases and
no guidance from the Florida Legislature about what they intended "assigned
primarily to unrelated works" to mean, courts have been left to establish their
43. § 440.11 (1)(b)(2); see LARSON & LARSON, supra note 1, § 111.03(1).
44. Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor II), 888 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 2004).
45. § 440.11 (1)(b)(2).
46. See id.
47. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1168; Holmes County Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176,
1179 (Fla. 1995). See FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2006).
48. State Dep't of Corr. v. Koch, 582 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
49. See id. at 8; see also Duffell, 651 So. 2d at 1179. The common law right to recovery
was created by the "unrelated works" exception. Koch, 582 So. 2d at 8.
50. See Lluch v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
5 1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004) (defining respondeat superior as
"[t]he doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful
acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency").
52. Duffell, 651 So. 2d at 1179 (Anstead, J., concurring).
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own tests to determine if works are unrelated. 3 The next section is a sum-
mary of various Florida appellate court decisions which have dealt with this
issue.
III. VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF "UNRELATED WORKS" BEFORE
TAYLOR AND ARA VENA
Given the lack of legislative history and definitional guidance, Florida
courts in all jurisdictions have struggled with interpreting what the legisla-
ture intended "unrelated works" to mean.54 Depending on the jurisdiction,
the courts have used a variety of tests or a combination of tests to determine
its meaning which, in turn, determines whether the exception to workers'
compensation immunity from suits will apply. 5'
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that exceptions to the rule are
to be interpreted narrowly. 6 "An exception is [to be] carved out of the gen-
eral rule or coverage of the statute. The coverage of the statute is the norm
and the exception is the unusual . . . ."5' Therefore, following this rule of
construction, the "unrelated works" exception should be interpreted nar-
rowly. 8 Florida courts have determined the same because "[a]n expansive
construction would obliterate the legislative intent that the system operate at
a 'reasonable cost' to the employer."59 Interpreting the statute broadly would
lead "to a profusion of suits and a proliferation of costs."6 Moreover, these
costs are likely to be passed on to the employer.6'
Regardless of what test is used to determine what "unrelated works"
are, any analysis that views "unrelated works" in a broad sense will result in
fewer instances of the exception applying.62 Interpreting works in a broad
sense means more employees of the same company are viewed as working
on related works.63 Thus, a broad finding which includes more employees
53. See Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I1), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1173 (Fla. 2006).
54. See id. at 1168.
55. See id. at 1168-69.
56. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 82 (2002).
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So. 2d 460, 463 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 462; see also Holmes County Sch. Bd. v. Duffell 651 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla.
1995) (Anstead, J., specially concurring).
62. See Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena II), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1168 (Fla. 2006).
63. See id.
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within a related group leads to fewer instances when the "unrelated works"
exception will apply. 64 This is the result of a narrow interpretation of the
"unrelated works" statute.65 Conversely, a broad view of the phrase "unre-
lated works," leads to more works being deemed unrelated and, thus, is an
expansive and broad interpretation of the statute.66
The next section will discuss the different tests the courts have used and
the outcomes that have resulted.
A. Same-Project Test
The same-project test is the analysis most widely used in Florida
courts. 67 This test takes a broad approach in interpreting works by looking at
the project that the co-employees are working to accomplish.68 Under the
same-project test, courts do not apply the exception if the projects that the
co-employees are working to accomplish are the same.69 If the projects are
the same, then the employees are not "assigned primarily to unrelated works"
or, in other words, are assigned to related works.7 °
The problem becomes that a court's application of this test can vary
greatly depending on how it decides to view the employees' projects. 7, For
instance, taking a big picture point-of-view, a court could decide that co-
employees in a hotel are all working on the same project of providing a ser-
vice to guests. 72 Another court viewing the same case could, for example,
determine that the hotel comptroller is working on the project of keeping the
books and the hotel housekeeper is working on the project of cleaning
rooms. 73 In the latter case, the employees would be working on different
projects, and thus "unrelated works. 74 In the former case, again using the
same-project test, all employees of the hotel who work on the general project
64. See id. at 1173-74.
65. See id. at 1169.
66. See id at 1168-69.
67. See generally Sanchez v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 784 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor 1), 790 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Laing, 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999);
Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Abraham v. Dzafic,
666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So.
2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
68. Vause, 687 So. 2d at 262-63.
69. See id
70. See id at 261-63.
71. See Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I1), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1168 (Fla. 2006).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1168-69.
74. See id.
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of providing a service to guests would be considered not "assigned primarily
to unrelated works."75 Therefore, since the size of a judge's view-finder can
vary greatly, this test alone has the possibility of providing inconsistent re-
sults. 76
Surprisingly, the potential variation problem outlined above has not
necessarily been the case in "unrelated works" decisions. In fact, most Flor-
ida appellate courts that have applied the "same-project test" have used a big
picture approach and, therefore, found that the co-employees were assigned
to related works. 
7
In Dade County School Board v. Laing,78 the plaintiff, a teacher, was
"leaving [his] classroom when he was hit by a golf cart [driven] by a school
custodian."79 The teacher, who claimed workers' compensation, could only
bring a common law tort claim if co-employee immunity was exempted in
one of two ways.8" Here, the "unrelated works" exception applied, because
the trial court held that the custodian and the teacher were assigned to "unre-
lated works."'8  Therefore, this ruling, read together with Florida statutes,
allowed the teacher to pursue his negligence claim against the school
board.82 The Third District Court of Appeal, however, overturned this ruling
and noted that "the fact that employees have different duties does not neces-
sarily mean they are involved in 'unrelated works."'8 3 The court then used
the "same-project test" and stated that "[t]he pertinent factor is whether the
co-employees are involved in different projects, . . . [and] the focus is upon
the nature of the project involved, as opposed to the specific work skills of
individual employees."84  Here, the court noted that the project the co-
employees were working on was "providing education[al] related services to
75. Seeid.at1168.
76. Compare Miami-Dade County v. Aravena (Aravena 1), 886 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing lower court decision allowing "unrelated works" exception), with
Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Laing, 731 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
77. See generally Sanchez v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 784 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Taylor v. Sch. Bd. (Taylor 1), 790 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Laing, 731 So. 2d at 19; Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Johnson v. Comet
Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
78. 731 So. 2d at 19.
79. Id. at 20.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9)(a) (2006).
83. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20 (emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection,
Inc., 435 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
84. Id. (citing Vause v. Bay Medical Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
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students at Hialeah High School."85 As a result of this broad language, the
effect of the "same-project test" was that regardless of what jobs school em-
ployees were assigned, they were all related in the eyes of the court.86
Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc. ,87 was the basis for the Laing de-
cision.88 In Johnson, however, the employees were employed by different
employers even though they were both working on "the same construction
project ... ."89 One worked for a general contractor as a common laborer,
and the other worked as "a welder for [a] subcontractor. '" 90 This case, which
was the first to consider the meaning of the "unrelated works" statute, looked
to previous cases that discussed the "broad scope of immunity afforded [to] a
subcontractor for injuries to an employee of a general contractor."9' Using
this previously established theory of broad immunity, the court held that be-
cause the two employees were assigned to the same construction project, the
fact that they had different employers did not matter. 92 Thus, the "same-
project test" was born, starting a trend of narrowly construing the "unrelated
works" statute by looking at the general project of the employees. 93 Gener-
ally, other courts that have used this test have viewed the employees' "pro-
ject" in the broadest possible sense, and the result was the infrequent applica-
tion of the "unrelated works" exception.94
In Vause v. Bay Medical Center,95 the First District Court of Appeal fol-
lowed the Johnson decision. 96 The Vause case involved a nurse who passed
away from decompression sickness after giving treatment to a patient in a
85. Id.
86. See id.; see also Sanchez v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 784 So. 2d 1172, 1172-73 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a teacher who was sexually assaulted by a school secu-
rity guard was not assigned primarily to "unrelated works" because both the teacher and the
guard were engaged in activities related to providing educational services). Thus, there was
"no distinction between the teacher-custodian relationship in Laing and the teacher-security
personnel relationship." Id. at 1173.
87. 435 So. 2d at 908.
88. Laing, 731 So. 2d at 20.
89. Johnson, 435 So. 2d at 909.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Motchkavitz v. L.C. Boggs Indus., Inc., 407 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1981);
Younger v. Giller Contracting Co., 196 So. 690 (Fla. 1940); Williams v. Corbett Cranes, Inc.,
396 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Aderhold v. Blair Contracting Co., 350 So. 2d
550 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Mack v. Cook & Pruitt Masonry, Inc., 186 So. 2d 831 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)).
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1174 (Fla.
2006).
95. 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
96. See id. at 262-63.
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hyperbaric chamber.97 The nurse's primary assignment within the hospital
was to the obstetrics department, but on the day of the accident she was
working in the hyperbaric medicine department.98 The issue decided was
whether the nurse was "'assigned primarily to unrelated works' from her
co-employees who were alleged to have been negligent, merely because the
nurse's main duties in the hospital were normally in a different department of
the hospital.99 The First District Court of Appeal, relying on the "same-
project test," analogized this work situation to the situation in Johnson."°
Taking a big picture approach, the court noted that the co-employees' duties
all included the "provision of health care to a patient, ...[and they] were
both involved in the same project,... the care of one particular patient."''
Furthermore, the court noted that even the administrators of the hospital, who
were not present during the treatment in question, were involved in the pro-
ject of "[t]he provision of health care to patients of the medical center."' °
Thus, following this case, all employees working on the project of patient
care would be assigned to related works, and the broad immunity against co-
employee suits contemplated by the legislature was strongly intact. 103
The Vause dissent did not agree with this assessment. 1" Judge Miner
opined that being "primarily assigned to unrelated works within the em-
ployment, does not mean that ... [the employee's] work assignment at the
time of injury must be unrelated to his primary assigned employment." 105
Rather, the court should look at the primary assignment of the injured, and if
he is carrying out an assignment that is unrelated to his primary assignment,
immunity should not be afforded. 0 6 Here, Nurse Vause was primarily as-
signed to the obstetrics department, unrelated to the works of those in the
97. Id. at 260. "Decompression sickness can result from the formation of nitrogen bub-
bles in the blood or body tissue due to changes of atmospheric pressure .... A hyperbaric
chamber is an artificial environment which is used to cure decompression sickness. The hy-
perbaric chamber is a cylindrical metal tank." Id. (quoting Complaint at 12-13, Vause, 687
So. 2d at 260). It is standard for a nurse to "get inside the chamber with the patient during the
treatment process to administer medication or provide other necessary assistance to the pa-
tient." Id. (quoting Complaint 13, Vause, 687 So. 2d at 260).
98. Vause, 687 So. 2d at 261 (citing Complaint 16, Vause, 687 So. 2d at 261).
99. Id. at 262 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1991) (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (l)(b)(2) (2006))).
100. Id. at 263.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Vause, 687 So. 2d at 261.
104. Id. at 266-700 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 267-68.
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hyperbaric medicine department, her secondary assignment. 17 This is in
sharp contrast to the majority opinion, which compared the works of co-
employees rather than the works of the primary and secondary assign-
ments. 10 8 But even using that model, Judge Miner disagreed that the co-
employees' works were related.' 09 "In terms of relatedness, it seems to me
that providing nursing service ...is light-years away from overseeing the
turning of dials and gauges.., or establishing protocols for operation.., or
administering the overall affairs of the hospital.""'  Furthermore, Judge
Miner concluded that under the majority opinion's broad construction of the
hospital employees' works, he could not "conceive of any situation ...
[where the exception would] ever apply.""'
In many instances, the "same-project test" does not deliver consistent
outcomes when determining whether works are unrelated because it may be
unclear as to which project the employees are working. In State Department
of Corrections v. Koch,"' looking at two co-employees who worked for the
State of Florida, the court noted that it was obvious they were assigned pri-
marily to "unrelated works" because the injured employee worked for the
Department of Transportation (DOT), and the allegedly negligent employee
worked for the Department of Corrections (DOC).' The DOC employee
had just picked up a truck used to transport inmates, and while leaving, fa-
tally hit the "DOT employee who was crossing the street on his way to
work.
, 114
The Koch court never decided on the "unrelated works" issue because
neither party disputed that the works were unrelated.' However, had they
disputed the claim, the "same-project test" would have resulted in different
interpretations of the same situation. 116 One interpretation could be that the
employees were assigned primarily to different projects and "unrelated
works," because the DOC employee was responsible for prisoner care and
the DOT employee was responsible for road maintenance.' However, a
second interpretation could broaden the view of the DOC employee's work
107. Id. at 269.
108. Vause, 687 So. 2d at 263.
109. See id. at 269 (Miner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 582 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
113. Id. at6.
114. Id. n.1.
115. Id. at7.
116. See id. at 6 n. 1.
117. See Koch, 582 So. 2d at 6 n.1.
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to show that he was working on the same project as the DOT employee."'
Expanding one's view of the scope of the DOC employee's work shows that
he was using the truck to pick up prisoners for the purpose of transporting
them to road-side maintenance locations, the very same project that the DOT
employee was assigned." 9 Thus, different work projects and purposes will
be determinative, depending on whether the view of an employee's work is
broad or narrow. '20
Furthermore, if one follows the Vause dissent, which suggested looking
at the workers' primary assignments regardless of what they were doing on
the day in question, a court could determine that the two employees' works
were unrelated."'2 If the primary assignments purposes did not match, then
the employees would be considered "primarily assigned to unrelated
works."1 22  As illustrated by the different applications of the same-project
test, there is a lot of room for inconsistent interpretation.
B. Bright-Line Test
The bright-line test was developed as an attempt to break through what
appeared to be inconsistent rulings about the "unrelated works" exception. 123
In an effort to make decisions consistent across the board, it was held in Lo-
pez v. Vilches, 124 that inconsistent decisions "might be reconciled by apply-
ing a test based on the physical location where the employees were primarily
assigned and the unity of their business purpose."'' 25
In Lopez, the plaintiff was injured while operating a vehicle maintained
by his co-employees. 126 The Second District Court of Appeal looked to the
meaning of the word "works" in the dictionary and found one of the defini-
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Compare Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I1), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Fla.
2006) (using a narrow view of the employees' work), with Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Laing,
731 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (using a broad view of the employees' work).
121. See Vause v. Bay Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258, 267-68 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(Miner, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
122. Id. at 269.
123. Compare Vause, 687 So. 2d 258, 263 (holding that immunity applied because the co-
employees were both assigned to the same-project of "provision of health care to patients of
the medical center"), with Holmes County Sch. Bd. v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla.
1995) (affirming a decision which found that a school bus driver and a custodian were en-
gaged in unrelated works).
124. 734 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999), overruled by Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of
Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888 So. 2d I (Fla. 2004).
125. Id. at 1097.
126. Id. at 1096.
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tions to be '[a] factory, plant, or similar building or system of buildings
where a specific type of business or industry is carried on."' 127 Using this
definition, the court applied a physical location test to determine if works
were unrelated. 2 ' If the primarily assigned location of work was different
for the co-employees, then the immunity granted to co-employees may not
apply. 29 Applying this new rule to the current case, the court noted that the
location of the workers was different and compared their duties against each
other. 3 ' One was involved in vehicle maintenance and the other was in-
volved in "general funeral home duties."'31  Consequently, since the loca-
tions and the duties were different, the court found that their works were
unrelated and the exception to co-employee immunity could apply, and re-
manded the case for trial. 
132
It is important to note here that the dissent did not agree with the bright-
line test used by the majority. 33 Judge Quince used the same-project test to
determine that both co-employees' works were related because each of them
had duties relating to the vehicle in question.'34 The location, in the Dis-
sent's view, was irrelevant.'35
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has also used the bright-line test to
determine whether the works were unrelated, and thus, whether the exception
would apply. 136 In Palm Beach County v. Kelly, 137 a county employee on his
way home from work in his car was struck by another county employee's
car. 38 The plaintiff worked in maintenance at the Palm Beach Airport and
the allegedly negligent co-employee worked as an equipment operator for the
airport. 131 Their reporting locations were the same, but they worked on dif-
ferent projects in different locations during the work day and had unrelated
duties. 40 The court held that because the employees were primarily in dif-
ferent locations throughout the day and had two separate purposes, mainte-
127. Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2056 (3d
ed. 1992)).
128. See id. at 1097.
129. See Lopez, 734 So. 2d at 1097.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1098.
133. Id. (Quince, J., dissenting).
134. Lopez, 734 So. 2d at 1098 (Quince, J., dissenting).
135. See id.
136. Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So. 2d 460, 464 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003); Palm Beach County v. Kelly, 810 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
137. Kelly, 810 So. 2d at 560.
138. Id. at 561.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 562.
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nance and operation, they were unrelated and the co-employee immunity
would stand. 4' The court also used the same-project test and determined
that the same outcome would result because "Kelly and John had different
job duties and did not work cooperatively as a team but, rather, worked on
two entirely different projects."' 14 2
In Fitzgerald v. South Broward Hospital District,'43 the Fourth District
Court of Appeal agreed with the approach used in Kelly.' 44 The plaintiff, a
nurse, was injured while using the restroom when a bathroom stall's door fell
off its hinges. 145 The plaintiffs complaint alleged that but for the negligent
acts of her co-employee, she would not have been injured. 146 To determine if
the co-employees' works were unrelated, the court used the same-project test
and the bright-line test and came up with the same result under both tests. 147
While the plaintiff and his co-employee had different duties in the hospital,
the projects of each were broadly held as "the treatment of patients."' 48 Fur-
thermore, applying the bright-line test, the court held that the employees
worked in the same physical location with a "unified business purpose."'
14 1
Therefore, because the application of both tests reached the same result, the
court held that the works were related and the co-employee immunity would
remain. "'
IV. TAYLOR v. SCHOOL BOARD OFBREVARD COUNTY
In Taylor v. School Board of Brevard County (Taylor 1), 1" the plaintiff,
Lawrence Taylor, was injured when a wheelchair lift fell on him while work-
ing as a bus attendant.'52 He claimed that his employer, the School Board,
was responsible for his common law tort claim against his co-employees
based on the "unrelated works" exception.'53 "The trial court granted a
summary judgment in favor of the school board on the grounds that the al-
leged negligent employees, school board transportation department mechan-
141. id.
142. Kelly, 810 So. 2d at 562.
143. 840 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
144. Id. at 464.
145. Id. at 461.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 464.
148. Fitzgerald, 840 So. 2d at 464.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 790 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
152. Id. at 1157.
153. Id.
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ics, and Taylor, a school bus attendant whose responsibilities included opera-
tion of the wheelchair lift which caused his injury, were assigned to related
works." 54 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal noted that Taylor
and the alleged negligent mechanics worked at the same location that Taylor
"was responsible for the operation of the wheelchair lift" and the mechanics
were responsible for the maintenance and repair of the wheelchair lift.'55
Since Taylor and his co-employee were involved in some way with the
wheel chair lift, the court affirmed the trial court's opinion that the co-
employees were working on related projects.'56 However, the court noted
that its opinion did not follow the bright-line test used by the recent Lopez
Court to determine if the co-employees' works were unrelated. '57
Because of this conflict, the Supreme Court of Florida granted review of
the Taylor I and Lopez decisions.'58 In the Supreme Court's per curiam
opinion, the justices attempted to resolve the inconsistent opinions and tests
by determining "whether the Legislature intended that the unrelated works
exception be construed liberally or narrowly."' 59 Looking to the intent of the
legislature, the only clause referring to their intent in enacting the workers
compensation statutes was that, because this is a "mutual renunciation of
common-law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike,"' 6°
workers' compensation laws should not be construed "liberally in favor of
the employee or the employer."' 6' Furthermore, workers' compensation is
intended to be self-executing and "not an economic or administrative bur-
den." 62 The Legislature further points out ambiguous laws should be inter-
preted using "the basic principles of statutory construction."
63
[T]he basic purpose behind workers' compensation law [is] two-
fold: (1) [T]o see that workers in fact were rewarded for their in-
dustry by not being deprived of reasonably adequate and certain
payment for workplace accidents; and (2) to replace an unwieldy
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1157-58.
156. See TaylorI, 790 So. 2d at 1158.
157. See id.; see also Lopez v. Vilches, 734 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999), overruled by Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
2004) (holding that two co-employees whose responsibilities both involved the same funeral
home vehicle but worked in different locations were assigned to unrelated works).
158. Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 2.
159. Id. at 4.
160. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2006).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 56, at 82.
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tort system that made it virtually impossible for businesses to pre-
dict or insure for the cost of industrial accidents. 164
The Taylor H court was faced with the decision of whether to interpret
the "unrelated works" exception liberally or narrowly. 165 A liberal construc-
tion would include more work situations as unrelated, and a narrow construc-
tion would result in fewer work situations deemed to be unrelated. 166 The
court determined that the statute should be narrowly interpreted in its per
curiam opinion; however, Justice Lewis and Justice Pariente did not believe
that lower courts were given enough guidance on how to interpret the statute
in the future. 1
67
A. Per Curiam Opinion
The Taylor I1 court's analysis began by pointing out how easy it is to
view any two co-employees' positions as either related or unrelated, depend-
ing on how the works are viewed.168 On the one hand, "all employees of the
same employer could always be considered engaged in related works since
they are all charged to carry out the mission of the employer."' 169 On the
other hand, "some distinction could always be drawn between the work of
most employees so as to make their work unrelated." 170 This point is the
reason why the "unrelated works" exception has been so hard to interpret,
and why the varying interpretations have come up with a wide variety of
conclusions. 17'
The Court then held that the statute must be interpreted narrowly.
172
The Court observed that applying the exception liberally would handicap the
purpose of workers' compensation. 173 This interpretation compensates em-
ployees based on the fault of their co-employees. 74 The Court explained
that while the exception should be applied narrowly, they could not illustrate
164. Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 3 (citing De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So.
2d 204, 206 (Fla. 1989)).
165. Id. at 4.
166. See id. at 4-5.
167. Id. at 6 (Lewis, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 5.
169. Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 5.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 13 (Lewis, J., concurring).
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id.
174. See Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 5.
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a test to encompass the many factual circumstances that could arise under the
"unrelated works" exception. '75 Instead, the Court noted that only when it is
clearly demonstrated that the works are unrelated will the exception apply. '76
The Court also noted that the Lopez bright-line location test is disapproved,
agreeing with the dissent that all of the employees had duties related to the
vehicle in question. 177
B. Justice Lewis' Concurrence
Justice Lewis, while agreeing with the majority in Taylor II, wrote an
opinion that lays out a new test to determine if works are unrelated and
greatly expands upon the application of the "unrelated works" exception. 178
Justice Lewis felt that the majority opinion applied the exception too nar-
rowly and said that the majority "fails to adopt parameters to provide assis-
tance to the lower courts in the application" of the exception.179 He also said
that difficulty in applying one test to a myriad of factual occurrences should
not result in a failure to provide analytical parameters to the lower courts.1 80
This concurrence, illustrating the varying opinions on this issue, then at-
tempted to develop the parameters that were overlooked in the majority opin-
ion. 181
Justice Lewis notes that the majority opinion is based on a faulty prem-
ise that co-employee immunity principles result from a "'mutual renunciation
of common law rights."",18' There was not a mutual renunciation because
negligent employees did not give up any rights since their employers are the
ones that provide benefits. 183  He also noted that the legislature could have
provided a broad immunity to co-employees if they had intended to, but
175. Id. The "unrelated works" exception to the workers compensation scheme:
should be applied only when it can clearly be demonstrated that a fellow employee whose ac-
tions caused the injury was engaged in works unrelated to the duties of the injured employee.
While we would like to be more precise in providing guidance to those initially charged with
deciding disputes based upon this exception, we are limited by our lack of precise knowledge
of the legislative intent behind the exception and the reality that we could not hope to contem-
plate the myriad of factual circumstances that may give rise to the issue.
Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 6; see also Lopez v. Vilches, 734 So. 2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (Quince, J., dissenting), overruled by Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I1),
888 So. 2d I (Fla. 2004).
178. Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 6 (Lewis, J., concurring).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 13.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id. at 8.
183. See Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 8-9.
[Vol. 31
173
: Nova Law Review 31, 1
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
FLORIDA'S "UNRELATED WORKS" EXCEPTION
since they added the "'unrelated works' exception ... to immunity," they did
not intend for it to be so broad. 184 Therefore, in determining the new pa-
rameters, Justice Lewis wanted the exception to apply more often than it
would under the Taylor H majority opinion.' 5
In doing so, he defined works as having two components, operational
and locational.'86 Noting this, he split up the myriad of factual occurrences
into four categories to determine whether each would fall under the "unre-
lated works" exception.' 87 First, co-employees with the same workplace
location and assigned to the same project or team would be related. 88 Sec-
ond, co-employees with different workplace locations but still assigned to the
same project or team would also be related.' 89 Third, co-employees with
both different workplace locations and assigned to different projects or teams
would be unrelated.' 90 Finally, co-employees that worked at the same loca-
tion, but were assigned to different projects or teams, would probably be
unrelated, but the court should first view factors to necessarily determine the
relatedness of the works. '9' The factors include "the size of the facility, the
diversity of the acts performed there, and the relationship of the diverse ac-
tivities being performed at the location.' ' 192 Furthermore, the concept of
team or project "should not be so broadly defined as to render the exception
meaningless, nor defined so narrowly as to permit the exception to totally
eviscerate the fundamental rule of co-employee immunity."' 193
C. Reaction to Taylor II
The Taylor H decision's effect on the "unrelated works" exception is
clear. The Court has made it known that the exception should be interpreted
narrowly.' 94 Further, the exception is only applied when it is clear that
works are unrelated.' 95 The reason for this narrow construction of the excep-
tion is clear because "[a]n expansive construction would obliterate the [legis-
184. Id. at 9.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 14.
188. Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 14.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 14-15.
192. Id. at 15.
193. Taylor 1I, 888 So. 2d at 14-15.
194. See id. at 6.
195. Id. at 5.
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lature's] intent that the system operate at 'a reasonable cost' to the em-
ployer."''
96
However, there are many unanswered questions regarding what the
definition of "works" is, and what exactly is considered "unrelated works."'
197
These questions and the fact that the Court stated that the application should
be narrow makes it difficult to apply the exception at all.'98 Thus, the clear
result following Taylor II is less cases where the co-employee's immunity is
removed. 199
Defense attorneys were happy with this decision and its outcome. 2"°
Plaintiff s attorneys believe the decision was "essentially a judicial repeal of
the unrelated works exception. 20' Furthermore, employers and their insur-
ance providers are better off because of this opinion due to the limited appli-
cation of the exception.2 2
The Taylor II holding did not last long. Due largely to the lack of guid-
ance given to the lower courts, the Supreme Court decided to revisit the "un-
related works" exception in Aravena 1. 203 The Taylor II holding was not
overturned, but the narrow application of the Taylor II case, described above,
was greatly expanded, and the exception was given a new test to determine
its application.2°4
V. ARA VENA V. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY
In Aravena I, a school crossing guard was killed when a car veered off
the road due to the traffic lights malfunctioning at that intersection.205 The
traffic lights were maintained by the county but were not repaired even
though the county was aware of the malfunction.20 6 The trial court denied a
196. Id. at 6 (quoting Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So. 2d 460, 463 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
197. See William S. Dufoe, The "Unrelated Works" Exception to Workers' Compensation
Immunity, 79 FLA. B.J. 45, 48 (Jan. 2005).
198. Recent Developments, Florida Case Law: Worker's Compensation, 32 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 983, 987 (2005).
199. See id. at 988.
200. See Tracy Raffles Gunn, Amicus Case Highlight: Taylor v. School Board of Brevard
County, TRIAL ADvoc. Q., Spring 2005, at 6.
201. See Joseph H. Williams, Letter, More on Unrelated Works Exception, 79 FLA B.J. 4,4
(Mar. 2005).
202. See Gunn, supra note 200, at 6.
203. Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena I1), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 2006).
204. See Miami-Dade County v. Aravena (Aravena 1), 886 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2004).
205. Id. at 304.
206. Id.
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motion for judgment, not withstanding the verdict for the county, saying that
the two county employees, the traffic signal repair personnel and the crossing
guard, were assigned primarily to unrelated works. 27 Thus, the exception
would apply and Aravena, the husband of the crossing guard, would be able
to bring a wrongful death action against the county.2 °s
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal did not agree with the
trial court.20 9 Citing Taylor II, the court noted that the co-employees here
worked on somewhat similar projects and their work could not be deemed
unrelated. 210 Both co-employees worked on projects relating to the regula-
tion of pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 21 ' Each relied on the other in this
situation, in order to fulfill the county's goal of safe moving traffic2 12 The
court opined, "[t]o hold otherwise would contravene the overall legislative
intent of the workers' compensation law, which 'was meant to systematically
resolve nearly every workplace injury case on behalf of both the employee
and the employer. ' ' 213 Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's ruling and ruled in favor of the employer.2"4
The Third District Court of Appeal, looking at recent "unrelated works"
cases, compared the Kelly case from the Fourth District Court of Appeal to
its holding."' Kelly held that the exception would apply to the plaintiff, who
worked in maintenance at the Palm Beach Airport, and his co-employee, who
worked as an equipment operator for the airport, because their works were
unrelated.21 6 While they had the same job location, the co-employees
worked on entirely different projects and had different duties, according to
the court, and was a clear example of "unrelated works."2 7
Aravena I, when taking a broad approach to viewing the jobs of the co-
employees, is distinguishable from Kelly.2t8 The employees had similar gen-
207. Id.
208. See id.
209. Aravena 1, 886 So. 2d at 304.
210. Id. at 305.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Taylor v. Sch. Bd. Of Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888
So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2004)).
214. Aravena 1, 886 So. 2d at 305.
215. Compare id. (holding inapplicable the "unrelated works" exception to workers' com-
pensation immunity), with Palm Beach County v. Kelly, 810 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the "unrelated works" exception applied to the workers' compen-
sation case).
216. Kelly, 810 So. 2d at 562.
217. See id.
218. Compare Aravena 1, 886 So. 2d at 303, with Kelly, 810 So. 2d at 560.
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eral purposes of regulating vehicular and pedestrian traffic.21 9 However, the
Third District Court of Appeal in Aravena I said that it was not clearly dem-
onstrated that the employees' works were unrelated as required by Taylor
11. 220
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Pariente
The Aravena II opinion was written by Justice Pariente, who concurred
with Justice Lewis' opinion in Taylor II.22' The Court noted that Aravena I
"expressly and directly conflicts with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's
decision in" Kelly.222 The conflict existed because the Court described the
Aravena I case and the Kelly case as having similar factual situations.223
Both the Aravena I and Kelly facts were described as "employees who work
at different physical locations for different departments, have different su-
pervisors, and perform different duties and functions in their primary as-
signments. 224 The Court disagreed with the prior Aravena I decision, which
viewed the co-employees as having related purposes, essentially a broad use
of the same-project test. 225 The Aravena II Court also noted that the facts in
Kelly showed more of a connection between the employees as the employees
"in Kelly began and ended their days at the same location., 226 Because the
Court found the facts to be similar, and the Kelly case held the works were
unrelated, and the Aravena I court held that there was a stronger connection
between the Aravena employees, the Court held the two decisions were ir-
reconcilable. 227 This finding of conflict is what gave the Court jurisdiction to
decide on the issue of "unrelated works. 228
The Court reviewed the decisions from all of the district courts of ap-
peal. 229 The Court then reviewed the previous Supreme Court of Florida
219. Aravena 1, 886 So. 2d at 305.
220. Id.
221. Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena II), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1164 (Fla. 2006); see
Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I), 888 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla. 2004).
222. Aravena 11, 928 So. 2d at 1164.
223. See id. at 1166.
224. Id. at 1164-65.
225. See id. at 1174; see also Aravena I, 886 So. 2d at 305.
226. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1166.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1167.
229. Id. at 1168-70.
The scope of the unrelated works exception has been addressed by all of the district courts
of appeal .. . The First, Third, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal applied a broad
"same-project" test ....
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decision, Taylor II, and confirmed its holdings that "the unrelated works ex-
ception must be interpreted narrowly" 230 and should only be applied when "it
can clearly be demonstrated that a fellow employee whose actions caused the
injury was engaged in works unrelated to the duties of the injured em-
ployee., 23  According to Taylor II, the common goal between the employ-
ees, a bus driver and a bus mechanic, was to provide safe transportation to
the students. 32 Clearly, the Taylor II Court utilized a broad approach in
viewing these employees' works. 233
However, in Aravena II, the Supreme Court of Florida, after recogniz-
ing and agreeing with the Court's broad approach in Taylor II, held that
"'regulat[ing] vehicular and pedestrian traffic"' was an overly broad defini-
tion of the co-employees duties in Aravena, and found their works to be un-
related. 234  The Court then rationalized why one broad definition of duties
was not the same as another in a different case.235 In Taylor, both "had du-
ties relating to the same equipment," which caused the injury and both
worked out of the same facility.136 Here, the Court noted, plaintiff "and the
traffic signal repair personnel did not work out of the same facility or with
the same equipment. "237 Therefore, reliance solely on a broad definition of
duties, the Court notes, without regard to other factors, is not supported by
Taylor I.238 "[T]he Third District erred in holding that [plaintiff] and the
... [T]he Second District Court of Appeal in Lopez applied a narrower bright-line test
that focused on the physical location of the coemployees and the scope of their duties
[and] [t]he Fourth District has noted the two differing approaches of the other district
courts .... [but] has declined to adopt either approach ....
Id. at 1168-69 (citations omitted).
230. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1169; see Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor If),
888 So. 2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 2004).
231. Taylor II, 888 So. 2d at 5.
232. Id. at 5-6.
233. See id
234. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1170 (quoting Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena 1),
886 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.; see Lluch v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1146, 1149-50 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that co-employees whose duties had nothing in common, worked in separate
locations, and took directions from different supervisors were assigned primarily to unrelated
works). The Supreme Court of Florida noted that Luch was similar to Aravena in that they
each worked for different employers, they were not supervised by the same people, and they
did not have similar duties. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1172. There was further distinction to
the fact that the co-employees did not work in the same location, whereas in Luch they did,
and were still considered assigned primarily to unrelated works. Id.
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traffic signal repair personnel were engaged in related works" '239 and "ig-
nored the other factors"" considered in Luch v. American Airlines, Inc. 
241
This led the Supreme Court of Florida to adopt a new factors test which
includes both location and operational components that must be considered
when a court is determining whether co-employees are "'assigned primarily
to unrelated works.'
242
These include: (1) whether the coemployees work at the same lo-
cation; (2) whether the coemployees must cooperate as a team to
accomplish a specific mission; (3) the size of the employer; (4)
whether the coemployees have similar job duties; (5) whether the
coemployees have the same supervisor; and (6) whether the co-
employees work with the same equipment.243
In order to determine whether works were unrelated, this Court in-
structed lower courts on how to apply the new factors test. 2" First, a court
must look to whether the co-employees are working at the same location, and
then determine if they are working on the same team in order to accomplish a
specific mission for the employer.245 The Court noted that if the co-
employees are working at the same location, then they are more likely to
have related works.246 If the employees are not, then they are less likely to
have related works.247 Once the location is determined, a court must then
look to whether or not a team exists by analyzing the last four factors: 1)
employer size; 2) job duties of the co-employees; 3) supervisor; and 4)
equipment used. 248
Thus, Aravena H gave birth to a new factors test. 249 As compared to
Taylor H1, the result of this test is an expansion in the application of the "un-
related works" exception.250 The majority in Aravena II stated "we hope that
239. Aravena 11, 928 So. 2d at 1173.
240. Id. at 1172.
241. Id.; see Lluch, 899 So. 2d at 1146; see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
242. Aravena 11, 928 So. 2d at 1173 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 440.1 l(b)(2) (2006)).
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Aravena H, 928 So. 2d at 1173.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 1176 (Wells, J., dissenting). In comparing the decision in Taylor H to the
majority opinion in Aravena II, Justice Wells stated "By broadening this exception so that
many county employees will not be subject to workers' compensation immunity, the majority
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the factors we have identified will provide guidance to the lower courts in
applying this exception narrowly without eviscerating it." '51
B. Justice Wells' Dissent
Justice Wells did not approve of the majority opinion in Aravena 11, be-
cause it was "a substantial variance from the majority opinion ... in Taylor[/]."252 The Taylor 1H opinion was characterized as narrowly interpreting the
exception so as not to "'obliterate the legislative intent that the [workers'
compensation scheme] . . . operate at "a reasonable cost" to the em-
ployer. "'253 Agreeing with this, Justice Wells indicated that the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal interpreted it correctly in Aravena .254 The Aravena I
court could not clearly demonstrate that the works of the traffic signal repair
personnel and the crossing guard were assigned to "unrelated works," be-
cause each co-employee was responsible in some way for regulating vehicu-
lar and pedestrian traffic.2 55 Justice Wells concluded that the decision of
"[t]he district court should not be quashed for following this Court's majority
opinion." '256
Furthermore, Justice Wells noted that the majority opinion greatly ex-
panded the application of the exception.2 57 This expansion "subjects coun-
ties to many employees collecting both workers' compensation benefits and
common law damages from counties., 25 8 In turn, if the exception is applied
more frequently, lawsuits will become even more unpredictable and expen-
sive, thus causing increased liability for employers.259 In Justice Wells'
view, this result is contrary to prior decisions issued by the Supreme Court of
Florida.26°
subjects counties to many employees collecting both workers' compensation benefits and
common law damages from counties." Id. at 1175-76.
251. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1174.
252. Id. at 1175 (Wells, J., dissenting).
253. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor I1), 888 So. 2d 1, 6 (Fla.
2004)).
254. Id; see Miami-Dade County v. Aravena (Aravena 1), 886 So. 2d 303, 305 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
255. Aravena 11, 928 So. 2d at 1175 (Wells, J., dissenting) (citing Aravena 1, 886 So. 2d at
305).
256. Id. at 1175.
257. Id. at 1175-76.
258. Id.
259. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
260. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1175-76 (Wells, J., dissenting). Justice Wells cited Holmes
County School Board. v. Duffell, 651 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1995), stating that it "only made sense
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Justice Wells also thought the Court should have held the "unrelated
works" cases to be a question of law, rather than, as in Lluch, a question of
fact.26 1 However, the majority did not resolve this issue and left it to the
lower courts for decision. 262 To regard the issue as a question of fact would
put the determination into the hands of a jury.263 However, "different juries
can conclude that the same jobs are both within the unrelated works excep-
tion and not within the unrelated works exception ... [thus] lead[ing] to in-
equitable results." 2"
VI. ARA VENA'S EFFECT ON THE "UNRELATED WORKS" EXCEPTION
The clear result of Aravena II is an expansion of the "unrelated works"
exception when compared to the Taylor II holding.265 The Aravena IH Court
laid out the factors to use when determining whether the exception will ap-
ply. 266 However, it appears that the majority decision opened the legal flood-
gates and put employers under great liability for their employees' workplace
torts.267 It appears that the Aravena II majority held that in order to effectu-
ate the Taylor II holding, "the exception should be narrowly tailored. 2 68 To
be narrowly tailored, "courts should ... consider whether the coemployees
must cooperate as a team to further a specific mission of the employer, not..
[a] general mission. ' 269 This is faulty logic, because when comparing the
specific missions of employees, the outcome will most likely be that the
works are unrelated and, therefore, the exception will not be applied nar-
rowly. For example, in the hypothetical outlined briefly in the introduction
of this paper, only if the co-employees of the hotel participated in the same
project or specific mission, would their works be considered related.270 If the
injured employee was a front desk clerk and the negligent employee was a
housekeeper, their general missions of providing guest services would be the
because the unrelated works exception was very narrow and only a few county employees
would have the right to both." Id. at 1176.
261. Id.; see Lluch v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1146, 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
262. Aravena 1l, 928 So. 2d at 1176 (Wells, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1175.
266. Id. at 1173.
267. Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1175-76 (Wells, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 1173.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., id
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same.271 However, their specific missions would be different. 272 Therefore,
when looking at the number of different positions in one hotel, it is easy to
see the unlikelihood that a negligent employee would work on the same spe-
cific mission as an injured employee. 273 Thus, most co-employees' works
will be unrelated, allowing the "unrelated works" exception to be frequently
applied, and leading to many more common law claims to be filed against
employers. 274 This result does not comport with the Taylor II holding that
the exception should be narrowly tailored. Rather, Aravena II will result in a
broad application of the exception. 75
The great divide in interpreting the "unrelated works" exception lies in
the above analysis. Courts that compare the specific missions of employees
instead of the general missions are going to apply the exception more fre-
quently.276 This leads to frequent litigation and increased liability for the
employer.277 The purpose of workers' compensation is therefore defeated.27s
There is no reasonable cost to the employer when the employer is subject to
common law tort claims where the outcomes are impossible to predict. 79
Furthermore, there is no quick and efficient delivery of benefits when so
many cases are stuck in the court system creating an economic and adminis-
trative burden.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
The "unrelated works" exception has been puzzling Florida courts for
years.280 Many courts have established tests in attempts to define what the
legislature meant by "assigned primarily to unrelated works." '281 Since the
Aravena II interpretation is contrary to the Supreme Court of Florida's previ-
ous Taylor II decision, controversy is sure to remain within the courts. There
271. Id.
272. AravenalI, 928 So. 2d at 1173.
273. Id. at 1170.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 1173; see Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County (Taylor II), 888 So. 2d 1, 6
(Fla. 2004).
276. See Dufoe, supra note 197, at 46-47.
277. See id. at 48.
278. Id.
279. See Gunn, supra note 200, at 6 (stating that case law reflects inconsistency in the
application of the "unrelated works" exception); Dufoe, supra note 197, at 45-46 (discussing
various outcomes that reflect the unpredictability of workers' compensation claims and com-
mon law tort claims).
280. See, e.g., Aravena 11, 928 So. 2d at 1163; Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 1; Lluch v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
281. See supra Parts III-V.
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is no disagreement that the Florida Legislature should enact a statute which
defines "unrelated works., 282 Until that is done, courts must look to case law
that defines the "unrelated works" exception. Unfortunately, the case law is
inconsistent.13  Taylor II prescribes that the exception should be narrowly
tailored, and Aravena II develops a test in which the outcome is a broad ap-
plication of the exception.284 Florida courts now need to reconcile both hold-
ings.
Perhaps the factors test can still be used from the Aravena II case.285
However, instead of looking to the specific missions the employees are
working to accomplish, courts should analyze the employee's general mis-
sion.286  Furthermore, when viewing the general mission of employees,
courts should be careful not to include every person working for the em-
ployer.287 Courts should also be mindful not to be too specific when defining
an employee's general mission.288 For example, in the hypothetical dealing
with the hotel discussed earlier, the general mission of the housekeeper and
the front desk clerk is to provide guest service. 289 However, a comptroller
for the same hotel, or someone working completely behind the scenes with
no guest contact, has a different general purpose.290 In this case, the comp-
troller will have the general mission of behind the scenes management. 29' A
general mission of making a profit for the hotel is too broad because it would
include all employees working for the hotel. Similarly, a general mission to
input revenue statistics is too specific, excluding all others in his workplace.
Certainly, the makeup of each business is different. However, using the em-
ployer's organizational chart and these general principles as a guide, the right
balance between too specific and too general can be achieved.
282. See Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1174, 1176 (Bell, J., specially concurring & Wells, J.,
dissenting); Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 1, 13 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only).
283. See supra Part VI.
284. Compare Taylor 11, 888 So. 2d at 6 ("[Tlhe unrelated works exception should be
narrowly construed."), with Aravena II, 928 So. 2d at 1173 ("[T]he courts should also con-
sider whether the coemployees must cooperate as a team to further a specific mission of the
employer, [and] not... the same general mission.").
285. SeeAravenal1,928 So. 2dat 1173.
286. See supra Part VI.
287. See, e.g., Taylor I1, 888 So. 2d at 14-15 (Lewis, J., concurring in result only) ("[T]he
concept . . . should not be so broadly defined as to render the exception meaningless nor de-
fined so narrowly as to permit the exception to totally eviscerate the fundamental rule of co-
employee immunity.").
288. See id.
289. See Aravena I1, 928 So. 2d at 1163 (outlining how to differentiate between an em-
ployee's specific and general missions).
290. See id.
291. See id.
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Moreover, this test, if applied to the facts of Aravena II, will recognize
that both the crossing guard and the traffic signal repair personnel each had a
general mission of regulating pedestrian and vehicular traffic.29 2 This recog-
nition, that the co-employees were each regulating pedestrian and vehicular
traffic, would have led to the correct result of finding the co-employees'
works to be related. Applying this same test to Lluch, on which the Aravena
H decision was based, would also lead to the correct result that the em-
ployee's general missions were unrelated.293 Lluch was primarily responsi-
ble for the cleaning and maintenance of offices, whereas his co-employee
was a baggage handler.294 It is clear that their works were unrelated, because
their general missions were different.295 Furthermore, applying the factors
provided in Aravena II shows that the co-employees worked at different lo-
cations and had different employers.2 96 Thus, using the general mission test,
along with the factors test, results in the co-employees' works in Luch to be
completely unrelated. 297
Without this proposed general mission test, Florida courts will continue
to struggle with the interpretation of the "unrelated works" exception.29
When interpreting this exception, courts must recognize that while the legis-
lature did not define "unrelated works," they have indicated that the workers'
compensation scheme should operate "at a reasonable cost" to employers.299
Without any change, the "unrelated works" exception will be applied more
frequently and will greatly increase employers' liabilities and costs,"
thereby defeating the initial purpose for enacting workers' compensation.3 1
With this in mind, courts can now narrowly apply the "unrelated works" ex-
ception without eviscerating it completely.30 2 This would ensure that the
exception is accurately tailored to the existing legislative intent.
292. Seeid.at1170.
293. See Lluch v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 899 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
294. Id. at 1149.
295. Id. at 1146-47. Lluch's general mission was the maintenance and cleanliness of
ramps, offices, gates, and common areas, whereas ABM's general mission involved maintain-
ing the baggage loading area and conveyor belt. Id.
296. See id. at 1146.
297. See Lluch, 899 So. 2d at 1146-47.
298. See Dufoe, supra note 197, at 48.
299. See FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2006).
300. See Dufoe, supra note 197, at 47-48.
301. §440.015.
302. Aravena v. Miami-Dade County (Aravena l), 928 So. 2d 1163, 1174 (Fla. 2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a car accident involving two vehicles that is caused solely due
to the negligence of one driver, whereby the other driver is injured.' An
ambulance quickly arrives at the accident scene and rushes the injured driver
to a nearby hospital, where he receives extensive medical treatment.2 After
he is discharged from the hospital, he is handed a bill totaling $80,000 of
medical expenses.' Fortunately, the injured driver's medical expenses are
covered by his employer-sponsored health plan,4 governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).5 However, as a result of the acci-
dent he also suffers an estimated $500,000 in non-economic damages, as-
suming a price can be placed on his pain and suffering.6 The injured driver
hires an attorney and sues the party responsible for the accident.7 After
months of negotiations, the injured driver finally recovers a settlement in the
amount of $100,000.8 Although this will only compensate him for a fraction
of his actual damages, he feels fortunate to recover anything at all.9 After
$20,000 in attorney's fees, his net recovery is $80,000.10
The next day, he receives a letter from his ERISA insurer, demanding
reimbursement of the $80,000 in medical expenses that the insurer paid on
his behalf.1' Confused and bewildered, the employee pulls out a copy of his
health plan, and finds, amidst the hundreds of pages, a subrogation clause. 12
The clause reads something like this:
This subrogation provision applies when you are sick or injured as
a result of the act or omission of another person or party. Subroga-
tion means the [c]ompany's right to recover any payments made to
you or your dependent by a third party... because of an injury or
illness caused by a third party. Third party means another person
or organization.
1. This hypothetical is based loosely on a federal court case. See Mid Atl. Med. Servs.,
Inc. v. Sereboff (Sereboffl), 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (D. Md. 2004).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
6. See SereboffI, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Sereboffl, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
12. See id. at 697-98.
[Vol. 31
186
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
2006] CREATIVE LA WYERING IN ERISA REIMBURSEMENT A CTIONS 189
If you or your dependent receives benefits and have a right to re-
cover damages from a third party, the [c]ompany is subrogated to
this right. All recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit,
settlement, or otherwise) must be used to reimburse the [c]ompany
... for benefits paid. Any remainder will be yours or your de-
pendents. The [c]ompany's share of the recovery will not be re-
duced because you or your dependent has not received the full
damages claimed, unless the [clompany agrees in writing to a re-
duction. '
3
The injured driver finds this provision unjust.'4 He believes that be-
cause the insurer has been collecting the premium payments, the insurer
should not be reimbursed until after he has been fully compensated for his
injuries. 5 The insurer, on the other hand, maintains that the enforcement of
the provision is just because the injured driver agreed to these terms by sign-
ing the insurance policy.' 6 As such, the injured driver refuses to reimburse
the insurer and the insurer files a lawsuit against him 7 to enforce the provi-
sion under ERISA section 502(a)(3). 8 Depending on how the settlement
proceeds are allocated, the creativity of the injured employee's attorney, and
how the insurer's attorney states a claim, a court may or may not require the
injured employee to fully reimburse the insurer. 9
This Note discusses the issue of subrogation and reimbursement actions,
brought by ERISA insurers, as they relate to situations such as the one pre-
sented in the hypothetical above. Part II presents a brief summary of ERISA
and when it applies. This part also provides an overview of what reim-
bursement and subrogation actions are and when they arise under ERISA.
Part III details federal circuit interpretations of the law established by the
United States Supreme Court in the landmark case, Great- West Life & Annu-
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See id. at 693.
15. See id.
16. See SereboffI, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
17. Id. at 693.
18. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE § 2-99 (Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds.,
1999); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000). See, e.g,. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
52 (1987) (referring to the civil enforcement provision as "ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)").
19. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002)
(refusing to reimburse the insurer for medical expenses paid because the settlement proceeds
were allocated to a trust that was not in the beneficiary's possession and the insurer's attorney
sought a legal remedy); but see Sereboff v. Mid Atil. Med. Servs., Inc. (SereboffII1), No. 05-
260, slip op. at 5 (U.S. May 15, 2006) (requiring reimbursement for medical expenses because
the settlement proceeds were placed in an account that was in the beneficiary's possession and
the insurer's attorney sought an equitable remedy).
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ity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.2 ° Part IV discusses Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff II), 2 l the most recent United States Su-
preme Court decision on the issue of ERISA reimbursement, and compares
the facts and holding of this case to those of Knudson. Part IV also explains
how SereboffIII clarified the conflict among the circuits regarding this issue,
which was created by the Knudson decision. Part V focuses on the likely
effect that the SereboffII ruling will have on future reimbursement and sub-
rogation actions brought by ERISA insurers. Finally, Part VI suggests solu-
tions to the problems that will likely result from the SereboffIII decision.
II. ERISA AND REIMBURSEMENT
In order to fully understand the issues analyzed in this note, a basic un-
derstanding of ERISA, subrogation, and reimbursement is necessary. Sec-
tion A of this part provides an overview of ERISA, why this statute was en-
acted, and a description of the ERISA provisions that are applicable to insur-
ers' reimbursement and subrogation actions. Section B defines and differen-
tiates subrogation and reimbursement and explains when they apply in
ERISA actions.
A. ERISA Generally
ERISA22 is a series of federal statutes that was enacted in 197423 in re-
sponse to the mismanagement and failure of many employer-sponsored pen-
sion funds.24 This failure resulted in employees receiving only a small per-
centage of their promised benefits or none at all.2 5 Congress' primary pur-
poses for enacting ERISA were to regulate these pension funds and protect
employees. 26 However, the courts expanded the scope of ERISA's coverage
20. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
21. No. 05-260, slip op. at 5.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
23. § 146 1(a). "The provisions of this subchapter take effect on September 2, 1974." Id.
24. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 683, 684
(2001). "Some received a lump-sum payment worth a fraction of the pension they expected,
and others got nothing at all." Id.; see also ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, §
2.
26. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 939, 939-40 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). "It is hereby further
declared to be the policy of this Act to protect ... the interests of participants in private pen-
sion plans .... " Id. at 940; see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 1 (1973), as reprinted in
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beyond pension fund regulation to all employer sponsored benefit plans.27
Since ERISA's enactment, courts have concluded that Congress' goals in-
clude developing a uniform federal common law, 2 ensuring the solvency of
employee benefit plans,29 and encouraging employers to provide fringe bene-
fits to their employees.3" The two sections of ERISA that embody these pur-
poses and goals are sections 51431 and 502.32 Section 514 outlines ERISA's
preemptive effect on state laws, 33 and section 502 outlines ERISA's exclu-
sive remedial scheme.34
Section 514, sometimes called the "preemption clause,' 35 provides that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan., 36 ERISA describes an "em-
ployee benefit plan" as any plan "established or maintained (1) by any em-
ployer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations representing
employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both., 3 7 The statutory text of ERISA does not indicate
how close of a relationship is required to satisfy the "relate to" language for
ERISA preemption; however, the United States Supreme Court has defined
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639. "The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individ-
ual pension rights .. " Id.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000). This Act "shall apply to any employee benefit plan." Id.
28. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995). See also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
It is thus clear that ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employ-
ers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating
complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce consid-
erable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with ex-
isting plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by
only a single set of regulations.
Id.
29. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-3.
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 4639-40. The bill was designed to promote the
expansion of these plans and increase the number of employees receiving them. Id. at 4640.
31. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-107. Section 514 of ERISA is
also printed in the United States Code under § 1144, and the two provisions are used inter-
changeably. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000); ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18. §
2-107.
32. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-99.
33. Id. § 2-107.
34. Id. § 2-99.
35. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added); ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note
18, §2-107 (emphasis added).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000).
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the phrase "relate to" as having a "broad common sense meaning., 38  In
1995, the Court clarified that although Congress intended this provision to be
applied broadly, it did not intend for it to preempt state laws that have only
an indirect economic effect on the subject matter of an ERISA plan.3 9 A
clause in section 514 limits the scope of ERISA from being read too broadly,
by carving out an exception for state laws that regulate insurance.4 ° It also
clarifies that self-insured employee benefit plans do not constitute insurance
companies that are exempt from ERISA. " In other words, an employer that
acts like an insurance company by providing a set of benefits to its employ-
ees, such as promising to pay medical expenses, is governed by ERISA.42
These types of benefit plans fit easily into the category which ERISA defines
as an "employee welfare benefit plan., 43 This is important because the vast
majority of Americans receive their health coverage through some sort of
employee welfare benefits plan governed by ERISA. 44 Having the majority
of Americans' health plans governed by the same federal statute, as opposed
to many different and perhaps conflicting state and local statutes, furthers
38. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating that the broad com-
mon sense meaning of the phrase "relate to" means having "a connection with or reference
to").
39. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 661-62 (1995).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). Section 1144(b)(2)(A) states that "nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any [s]tate
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.
41. § 1 144(b)(2)(B). Section I1 44(b)(2)(B) states:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be en-
gaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
42. Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the
Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Section 1002(1) describes the term "employee
welfare benefit plan" as follows:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or un-
employment ....
Id.
44. Timothy S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts Managed Care,
1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001) (estimating that eighty-eight percent of
Americans with private health insurance have employment-based coverage).
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Congress' goal of creating a uniform federal common law.45 Section 514
also has the effect of complete federal preemption, meaning that a defendant
may remove any related lawsuit filed in state court to federal court, even if
the plaintiff did not plead a federal law violation.46
Section 502, ERISA's "[c]ivil enforcement" 47 provision, enumerates
the exclusive remedies available in ERISA actions.48 This provision states
the following:
A civil action may be brought ... by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any pro-
vision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan.49
The other appropriate equitable relief language, of subsection B of this
provision, has been interpreted to not include claims for punitive, consequen-
tial, or other state specific damages resulting from a breach of the benefits
plan contract.5° Limiting the available remedies and enabling defendants to
remove ERISA actions to federal court help achieve Congress' intended
goals of ensuring the solvency of employee benefit plans and encouraging
employers to provide benefits to their employees.
45. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995).
46. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). According to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule," a defendant may not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction if the
plaintiff has not raised a federal law issue in the complaint. Id. However, the Court in Metro-
politan. Life Insurance. Co. established that ERISA section 514(a) completely preempts state
law claims, and according to the complete preemption doctrine, there is federal subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims. Id. at 66. "Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make
causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of [section] 502(a) re-
movable to federal court." Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
48. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (stating that "ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive").
49. § 11 32(a)(3) (emphasis added).
50. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (emphasis added) (noting that
section 502(a)(3)'s provision for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recov-
ery of consequential damages); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
144 (1985) (asserting that the language of ERISA does not support "a private right of action
for compensatory or punitive relief").
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B. An Insurer's Action for Reimbursement or Subrogation
Subrogation and reimbursement are related doctrines intended to pre-
vent unearned enrichment and injustice." Subrogation is the principle
whereby a fiduciary,52 who has indemnified 3 a beneficiary, is substituted for
that beneficiary in a suit against a third party for compensation of losses sus-
tained by the fiduciary, caused by that third party.54 An insurer's subroga-
tion rights often arise out of a contractual provision in an insurance policy."
Enforcement of these rights is disfavored by state judiciaries and legis-
latures, because it seems to violate the public policies against assigning per-
sonal injury claims and the prohibition against splitting causes of action.56
However, "[o]ver the past thirty years. . . insurers have continually sought"
enforcement of these provisions.5 7 To avoid violating these public policies,
the insurance industry redesigned the language of their contracts to grant
them the right of reimbursement5 8 instead of subrogation.59  The effect of
this redrafting was to "create the economic reality of subrogation ... without
51. A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 846 (2d ed. 1995).
52. A fiduciary is "[a] person who... act[s] for the benefit of another person on all mat-
ters within the scope of their relationship." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004).
For the purposes of this article, the ERISA insurers are the fiduciaries acting for the benefit of
the ERISA beneficiaries.
53. To indemnify means "[t]o reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third
party's or one's own act or default." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783-84 (8th ed. 2004).
54. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora's Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV.
237, 238 (1996) [hereinafter Baron, Subrogation]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed.
2004).
55. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238.
56. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (2006) ("In actions arising out of the main-
tenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement
from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits paid or payable by a program,
group contract or other arrangement .... ."); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 147 S.E,2d 860, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding a subrogation provision "void and of
no effect" because the provision "amounted to no more than an agreement to assign a personal
injury claim"). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 797 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1990) (upholding Missouri's anti-subrogation law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJane,
326 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (stating that not allowing subrogation of medical
expenses follows the rule that one cannot split causes of action for the benefit of "the insured
public and the public at large").
57. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
58. Reimbursement simply means repayment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (8th ed.
2004).
59. See, e.g., In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
"the language of the Plan's subrogation provision does not call for the full assignment of the
insured's rights but, rather, mere reimbursement of amounts forwarded by the Plan").
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its language., 6' This is a prime example of the creative lawyering that will
be discussed later in this Note.
III. KNUDSON: THE LAW ESTABLISHED
In the landmark case Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson,6' the United States Supreme Court established the law regarding
ERISA subrogation and reimbursement actions brought by insurers to re-
cover medical expenses paid on behalf of their beneficiaries.62 Section A of
this part presents the facts and holding of Knudson, while Section B dis-
cusses the federal circuits' conflicting interpretations of the law.
A. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
ERISA's text is silent as to whether it applies to a fiduciary's action for
reimbursement or subrogation. 63 However, courts have consistently applied
ERISA to such actions. 64  The United States Supreme Court decided
Knudson in 2002.65 In Knudson, an ERISA plan beneficiary was injured in a
car accident. 66 Her ERISA insurance plan contained a reimbursement provi-
sion that provided the insurer a right to recover for any expenses it had paid
on behalf of its beneficiary, from any third party settlement awarded to the
beneficiary. 67 The insurer paid $411,157.11 of the beneficiary's medical
expenses. 6' The following year, the beneficiary filed a tort action in a Cali-
fornia state court against the third party responsible for the car accident, and
60. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Ct. App. 1976) (Friedman,
J., concurring).
61. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
62. See id. at 221.
63. Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.3d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 1997); see also Roger M. Baron, Public Policy Considerations Warranting Denial of
Reimbursement to ERISA Plans: It's Time to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55
MERCER L. REV. 595, 617 (2004) (noting that "nothing in the ERISA scheme endorses reim-
bursement or suggests that reimbursement is permitted under ERISA") [hereinafter Baron,
Public Policy].
64. See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1120-21
(10th Cir. 2004); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 688
(7th Cir. 2003); Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot &
Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
65. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 204.
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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subsequently recovered a $650,000 settlement.69 The settlement allocated
approximately $250,000 to a Special Needs Trust, pursuant to California law,
and the remaining sum was given to the beneficiary's attorney for fees and
other expenses.7" Prior to the state court's approval of the settlement, the
insurer filed an action in federal court under section 502(a)(3) to enforce the
reimbursement provision, which would require the beneficiary to pay
$411,157.11 to the insurer from the third party settlement proceeds. 71 The
district court granted summary judgment to the beneficiary on this claim,"
which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately found that the
insurer was seeking to impose personal liability on the beneficiary for a con-
tractual obligation to pay money.74 Because "[a] claim for money due .
under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law,"' 75 it is not recoverable
under the other equitable relief terminology of section 502(a)(3). 76  The
Court dismissed the insurer's claim that its restitution action was equitable
and clarified that 'restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at
law' . . . which depends on . . . the nature of the underlying remedies
sought., 7  However, Justice Scalia also stated the following:
[A] plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form
of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or prop-
erty identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff
could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defen-
dant's possession. A court of equity could then order a defendant
to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to give a
security interest (in the case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who
was, in the eyes of equity, the true owner. But where "the property
[sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have been dissipated so
69. Id.
70. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207-08. The Court also allocated $13,828.70 to the insurer for
past medical expenses but the insurer did not cash the check. Id. at 208.
71. Id. The insurer subsequently filed a complaint seeking a temporary restraining order
against continuation of the state court proceedings for approval of the settlement, which was
denied. Id.
72. Id.
73. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on different
grounds. Id.
74. Id.at209-10.
75. Id. at 210 (quoting Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d
398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000)).
76. See id. at 221.
77. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
[Vol. 31
194
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
2006] CREATIVE LAWYERING IN ERISA REIMBURSEMENT ACTIONS 197
that no product remains, [the plaintiffs] claim is only that of a
general creditor," and the plaintiff "cannot enforce a constructive
trust of or equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant]."78
B. Confusion Among the Circuits
Justice Scalia's statement that a plaintiff could possibly seek equitable
restitution by bringing an action for a constructive trust or equitable lien has
led to some confusion as to whether reimbursement and subrogation provi-
sions are enforceable under section 502(a)(3). 79 Knudson seems to answer
this question in the negative. 80 Following Knudson, the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals refused to recognize insurers' claims for reimburse-
ment of medical expenses paid on behalf of their beneficiaries. 8 1 However,
the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals permitted
reimbursement and subrogation actions by insurers if certain criteria were
met. 82
The courts that outright opposed an insurer's action for reimbursement
focused on the following portion of the Knudson opinion:
78. Id. at 213-14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 215, cmt. a (1937))
(citations omitted).
79. Compare Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003),
overruled by Primax Recoveries Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2006), with Admin.
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004).
80. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209, 221. The Court affirmed the judgment "that judicially
decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third
party is not equitable relief and is therefore not authorized by §502(a)(3) [of ERISA]." Id. at
209.
81. Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2004), abrogated by
Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 5, 11 (U.S. May
15, 2006) (refusing to recognize an insurer's subrogation claim and affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at
624; Westaff (USA), Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by
Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (refusing to recognize insurer's reimbursement cause of
action by affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action).
82. See Willard, 393 F.3d at 1125 (finding that insurers were entitled to restitution in the
form of an equitable lien because the criteria were satisfied); Primax Recoveries, Inc. v.
Young, No. 02-2115" slip op. at 3 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003) (finding for the insurer because the
possession requirement was met), http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022115.U.pdf,
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the reimbursement action was equitable because the fund satisfied the identifi-
able requirement); see also Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,
Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the reimbursement
action was equitable because the possession requirement was met).
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Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability on
respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that
was not typically available in equity. "A claim for money due and
owing under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law .... '
"Almost invariably ... suits seeking ... to compel the defendant
to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money dam-
ages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek
no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's
breach of legal duty.",
83
The courts that opposed insurer reimbursement actions based their ra-
tionale on the underlying nature of the remedies sought, as opposed to the
cause of action chosen by the plaintiff. 84 Therefore, those courts held that
even if an insurer sued based upon theories of constructive trusts or equitable
liens, its claim was essentially a legal contract claim, and thus unenforceable
under ERISA.85 Further, those courts emphasized that reimbursement claims
are unenforceable "regardless of whether the plan participant or beneficiary
recovered from another entity and possesses that recovery in an identifiable
fund.",8 6 This statement discounts the theory on which the opposing jurisdic-
tions relied.
The courts that entertained the idea of enforcing reimbursement and
subrogation provisions of ERISA plans focused more on the following lan-
guage in Knudson:
Here, the funds to which the petitioners claim an entitlement under
the Plan's reimbursement provision-the proceeds from the set-
tlement of respondents' tort action-are not in respondents' pos-
session .... The basis for the petitioners' claim is not that respon-
dents hold particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to pe-
titioners, but that petitioners are contractually entitled to some
funds for benefits that they conferred.
87
The courts that allowed reimbursement insisted that the Knudson in-
surer could not recover only because the beneficiary did not possess the set-
83. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 918-919 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
84. See Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at 623.
85. See Qualchoice, Inc., 367 F.3d at 649; Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at 623.
86. Qualchoice, Inc., 367 F.3d at 650.
87. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214 (emphasis omitted).
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tlement funds.88 Because of this lack of possession, it was determined that
the insurer's action is a legal contract claim, not an equitable claim. s9 From
this conclusion, along with Justice Scalia's previous statement regarding
constructive trusts and equitable liens, 90 arose a three-part test to determine
whether a claimant is seeking "[other] appropriate equitable relief under
[section] 502(a)(3)." 9' The three-part test, also referred to as the possession
theory,92 requires that the insurer "seek to recover funds (1) that are specifi-
cally identifiable, (2) that belong in good conscience to the [insurer], and (3)
that are within the possession and control of the defendant beneficiary." 93
IV. SEREBOFFIHI: THE LAW CLARIFIED
In 2006, the issue of ERISA reimbursement was once again in front of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff 111). 94 In Sereboff I11, the Court established
that it may be possible for an ERISA insurer to recover medical expenses
paid on a beneficiary's behalf if certain criteria are met.9 Section A of this
part presents the SereboffIII case. Section B compares the facts and holding
of Sereboff III with those of Knudson Finally, section C breaks down and
analyzes the three-part test that must be satisfied in order for an insurer to
enforce an ERISA subrogation or reimbursement provision.
88. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1124
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating that in Knudson, "the Court ultimately determined that equitable
restitution was not an available remedy because the funds claimed by the fiduciary were not in
the plan beneficiary's possession"). See also Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare
Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003); Admin.
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2003).
89. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2003) (con-
cluding that the action sought legal relief because the plan participant possessed only an un-
cashed check; therefore, the participant did not possess an identifiable fund); Varco, 338 F.3d
at 687-88 (concluding that the action sought equitable relief because the plan participant
possessed identifiable funds); Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir.
2002) (concluding that the action sought legal relief because, like Knudson, the settlement
funds were not in the beneficiary's possession).
90. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
91. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added).
92. Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (S.D. Iowa 2003). "This
Court finds the possession theory is the correct read of [Knudson]." Id.
93. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
94. Sereboff v. Mid Ati. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 1 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
95. See id. at 3-6.
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A. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff III)
As a result of Knudson, the various jurisdictions treated ERISA reim-
bursement provisions differently.96 Some outright refused to enforce them,
while others applied the possession theory.97 This resulted in inconsistent
decisions which were contrary to the ERISA goal of developing a uniform
common law. 98 The United States Supreme Court attempted to clear up the
confusion on May 15, 2006, when it decided the case of SereboffIll in which
the beneficiaries of an employer-sponsored health insurance plan, covered by
ERISA, were involved in a car accident and suffered injuries. 99 The insurer
paid the beneficiaries' medical expenses, which amounted to $74 ,8 6 9.37 .1"°
The beneficiaries filed a state tort action against third parties, seeking dam-
ages for their injuries. 1 ' After the suit was commenced, the ERISA insurer
asserted a lien on the anticipated proceeds from that suit for compensation of
the medical expenses it had paid on the beneficiaries' behalf.102 Subse-
quently, the beneficiaries settled with the third parties for $750,000 which
was then distributed.'03 Because the funds had been distributed, the insurer
sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to require
the beneficiaries to set aside, from the settlement proceeds, an amount suffi-
cient to fully reimburse it for the medical expenses."°  The beneficiaries
agreed to set aside $74,869.37 from the proceeds in an investment account
"until the [d]istrict [c]ourt rule[d] on the merits of [the] case and all appeals,
if any, [were] exhausted."' 10 5
The district court found in favor of the insurer and ordered the benefici-
aries to pay the insurer $74,869.37 from the investment account. 106 On ap-peal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, and then
96. See supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
97. Compare Westaff (USA), Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002), ab-
rogated by Sereboff Iff, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (refusing to recognize an insurer's reim-
bursement action), with Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356-57 (recognizing an insurer's reim-
bursement action and applying the possession theory).
98. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995) (citing Senator William's statement that ERISA was intended to "elimi-
nat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent [s]tate and local regulation of employee benefit
plans" 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197, 29,933 (1974)).
99. SereboffIff, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SereboffII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. Id. at 3.
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the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 07 The Court found that
the insurer's action was for other appropriate equitable relief under section
502(a)(3), because the insurer sought payment by means of "constructive
trust or equitable lien on a specifically identified flud" that was in the bene-
ficiaries' possession.' 8 As such, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
judgment.' 9 This resolved the issue of whether an insurer could recover
upon a reimbursement or subrogation provision in an ERISA plan. "0 How-
ever, another question arises: Why did the United States Supreme Court
come to such a different conclusion in Sereboff III than it did in Knudson
when the facts of the cases were so similar?" This would not be an issue if
the Court had overturned or abrogated Knudson after ruling on Sereboff II,
but it did not, it merely distinguished the cases based on a fact that seems
arbitrary. "12
B. Sereboff III Compared to Knudson
The United States Supreme Court notes the similarities between the
facts of Knudson and those of SerebofflII. 13 In both cases, the beneficiaries
of ERISA plans were injured in car accidents.' " Additionally, both plans
contained reimbursement or subrogation provisions entitling the insurer to be
reimbursed from third party settlements recovered by the beneficiary." 5
Further, both insurers sought to collect for the medical expenses they had
paid on the beneficiaries' behalves.' 16 Even though these two cases arose
from almost identical facts, the Court permitted one insurer to collect and not
the other. 7
The Court explains that in Knudson, the other appropriate equitable re-
lief requirement was not met because "'the funds to which petitioners
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Serebofflll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11.
110. Seeid. at5.
111. Compare SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 1, with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
112. Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5 (noting the similarities between Sereboff I
and Knudson yet distinguishing the cases based on how the collateral third party settlement
checks were distributed).
113. Id. at4-5.
114. Id. at4.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Compare Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002)
(refusing to enforce the reimbursement provision), with Sereboff ll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11
(enforcing the reimbursement provision).
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claim[ed] an entitlement' were not in [the beneficiary's] possession, but had
instead been placed in a 'Special Needs Trust' under California law."
18
However, the requirement was met in Sereboff II because the funds "were
'within the possession and control of the [beneficiaries, since the funds
were]' . . . set aside and 'preserved in the [beneficiaries'] investment ac-
counts. '""'" The Court notes that this distinction is the difference between
seeking a constructive trust or equitable lien, which are equitable remedies,
and imposing personal liability on a defendant, which is legal. '20
Based on this rationale, it appears as though a beneficiary is able to
avoid enforcement of an ERISA reimbursement provision by simply allocat-
ing third party settlement funds so that the insurer could not satisfy the pos-
session theory requirements.
C. A Deeper Understanding of the Possession Theory
As indicated above, all three requirements of the possession theory must
be satisfied for an insurer to enforce a reimbursement provision.' 2 ' Subsec-
tion 1 presents the first possession theory requirement-that the funds sought
be specifically identifiable-and illustrates how this requirement is satisfied.
Subsection 2 analyzes the second requirement-that the funds belong in
good conscience to the insurer-and how this requirement is met. Subsec-
tion 3 discusses the last requirement-that a beneficiary must possess the
funds-and identifies which funds are and are not in a beneficiary's posses-
sion.
1. The Specifically Identifiable Requirement
The first requirement for an insurer to exercise its reimbursement or
subrogation rights is that the funds which the insurer seeks to assert a con-
structive trust or equitable lien on be specifically identifiable. 22 This stems
from the requirement that a constructive trust and equitable lien can only be
118. SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5.
119. Id. at 5 (quoting Mid Atil. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff (Sereboff fl), 407 F.3d 212,
218 (4th Cir. 2005)).
120. Id.
121. See Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Bom-
bardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d
348, 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
122. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356. The Plan must "seek to recover funds .. that are
specifically identifiable." Id.
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invoked on a specific res, 12 3 either the funds belonging to the insurer or prop-
erty that has been exchanged for those funds.'24 However, where one can
show only that another has received funds, but cannot demonstrate that those
specific funds are still in the other's possession, there is no identifiable fund
on which to assert a trust or lien.'25 As such, the only remedy available
would be a general debt that may be pursued only at law.'26 In theory, if a
beneficiary cashed a third-party settlement check and buried the money,
there would be no identifiable fund on which the insurer could seek a trust or
lien. '27 However, the check would have to have been cashed and not merely
deposited in a bank account, because a bank account is specifically identifi-
able and therefore subject to a constructive trust or equitable lien.'28 In addi-
tion to the obvious ethical restraints, cashing and hiding funds in this manner
will likely prove unsuccessful. 2 9 Before a settlement agreement is even
made and a check disbursed, it is likely that the insurer will place a lien on
the anticipated proceeds.' 30 This lien is one that a court will likely en-
force. '' Even if the insurer did not have such foresight, it may just as easily
seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring a suf-
ficient portion of the settlement proceeds to be set aside before or after dis-
tributing the funds. 13 2 Because of these options, which the insurance compa-
nies' attorneys prudently exercise, the specifically identifiable requirement is
generally satisfied. 131
123. A res is a fund. Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.
2003).
124. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.1(3) (2d ed. 1993).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id
128. See id.
129. See DOBBS, supra note 124, § 4.3(2).
130. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 2
(U.S. May 15, 2006) (noting that the insurer's attorney asserted a lien on the anticipated pro-
ceeds); see also Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (Ct. App. 1976).
131. See SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (enforcing the equitable lien on the settle-
ment proceeds).
132. Id. at 2; see e.g., Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,
Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2003).
133. See SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5; Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 355; Bauhaus
USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 451 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the insurer was "con-
testing title to a specific and identifiable quantum of funds").
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2. The Belonging in Good Conscience Requirement
The second requirement an insurer must meet in order to enforce a re-
imbursement or subrogation provision is that the identifiable funds which it
seeks to assert a trust or lien on belong to the insurer in good conscience. "'
There has been little debate on this topic mainly because these suits generally
arise from a clear and unambiguous reimbursement provision of an ERISA
plan, which the employee has signed. '35 However, one might argue that the
settlement funds do not belong in good conscience to the insurer. As stated
previously, a constructive trust or an equitable lien can only be asserted on a
res that is traceable to the insurer.136 Usually, either the actual funds that
belong to the insurer or property exchanged for those funds will suffice. 137
In ERISA reimbursement actions, the funds belonging to the insurer-the
funds actually disbursed to the beneficiary pursuant to the ERISA policy-
are generally used for their intended purpose of payment for the beneficiary's
medical expenses. 38 Therefore, the only res belonging to the insurer would
be the hospital beds, medication, or services purchased with those funds. 
39
An insurer might argue that the settlement funds received are repayment
for the medical treatment provided to the beneficiary. Since the insurer has
reimbursement rights, the funds belong to it in good conscience and the in-
surer should be fully reimbursed before the beneficiary collects anything.
Generally, however, the majority of these types of settlement funds are cate-
gorized as compensation for the beneficiary's injuries and suffering, not
medical expenses. 4 ° So, perhaps the funds do not belong in good con-
science to the insurers.
Further, given that the insurers have been collecting premiums and
ERISA's purpose was to protect employees, one may argue that beneficiaries
134. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits
Plan (The Plan) must seek funds "that 'belong in good conscience' to the plan." Id.
135. See id. In several cases, the policy "terms contained an express, unambiguous reim-
bursement provision which made the disputed funds 'belong in good conscience' to the [in-
surer.]" Id. This ignores the fact that the terms of a beneficiary's ERISA plan policy are
generally negotiated by his or her employer, who may or may not be acting in the benefici-
ary's best interest. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 570 (2002).
136. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 6.1(3).
137. Id. n.1.
138. See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 350; Bauhaus USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 440.
139. See DOBBS, supra note 124, § 6.1(3) (stating that only the property regarded as the
source of the debt or the property substituted for it can be the subject of a constructive trust).
140. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207-08
(2002). Only $13,828.70 of the $650,000 settlement was allocated to medical expenses, even
though the medical expenses actually amounted to over $400,000. Id.
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should be fully or at least partially reimbursed before insurers."'4 This con-
cept is embodied in the make-whole doctrine. 142 At least three federal cir-
cuits have adopted this doctrine.'43 These circuits agree that the make-whole
doctrine is the default rule in ERISA reimbursement actions, yet not applica-
ble when the ERISA policy clearly and specifically gives the insurer "prior-
ity to the funds recovered and [the] right to any full or partial recovery."' 144
Other circuits have refused to adopt the make-whole doctrine. 45 The United
States Supreme Court did not address this particular doctrine in Sereboff III
or in Knudson.146 Further, neither decision conflicts with either side of the
circuit split. 147 Therefore, one can only speculate as to how the Court would
decide on the matter.
141. David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Insurer Pockets-A Vote for Na-
tional Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REv. 427,
449 (2000).
142. Moore v. Capital Care, Inc. (Moore II), Nos. 04-7121 & 7122, slip op. at 12-13 (U.S.
D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2006). The court defines the make-whole doctrine as:
[1]n the absence of contrary statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, the
general rule under the doctrine of equitable subrogation is that where an insured is entitled to
receive recovery for the same loss from more than one source, e.g., the insurer and the tortfea-
sor, it is only after the insured has been fully compensated for all of the loss that the insurer
acquires a right to subrogation, or is entitled to enforce its subrogation rights. The rule applies
as well to instances in which the insured has recovered from the third party and the insurer at-
tempts to exercise its subrogation right by way of reimbursement against the insured's recov-
ery.
Id. Make-whole provisions prevent insurers from being reimbursed until after the beneficiary
has been fully compensated for losses suffered. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (8th ed.
2004).
143. Moore II, Nos. 04-7121 & 04-7122, slip op. at 12-13; Copeland Oaks v. Haupt, 209
F.3d 811, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2000) (requiring the beneficiary to be made whole before the in-
surer may enforce subrogation rights); Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521-22 (11 th Cir.
1997); Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n of Cal. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d
1389, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1995).
144. Copeland Oaks, 209 F.3d at 813 (italics omitted).
145. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 280-81 (1st Cir.
2000); Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997); Sunbeam-Oster Co.
Group Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1996).
146. See generally Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboffll), No. 05-260, slip
op. (U.S. May 15, 2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002).
147. See id The Knudson decision does not conflict with either side because the insurer
could not recover based solely on the beneficiary's lack of possession. Knudson, 534 U.S. at
214. The Sereboffll decision does not conflict with either side because there was clear and
specific language in the policy giving the insurer the right to fully recover from the settlement
funds. SereboffIll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
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3. The Possession Requirement
The third requirement-that the beneficiary possess the funds which the
insurer is seeking a trust or lien on-has been the turning point for the major-
ity of these cases. 148 In Knudson, the insurer could not recover because the
Special Needs Trust was not in the beneficiary's possession. 49 In Sereboff
III, the insurer was able to recover because the investment account was in the
beneficiaries' possession. 5 Therefore, if a beneficiary could allocate funds
so that they were not in his or her own possession, an ERISA insurer could
not be reimbursed from those funds.
Possession is having "[t]he right under which one may exercise control
over something to the exclusion of all others."'' One may have actual or
constructive possession over property. 5 2  Actual possession is having
"[p]hysical occupancy or control over property."' 53 Constructive possession
means having "[c]ontrol or dominion over [] property without actual... cus-
tody of it."' 54 Both of these types of possession satisfy the possession re-
quirement under the possession theory. 55 The next step in establishing
whether an insurer will be able to satisfy the possession requirement is de-
termining what types of funds one does or does not possess. An analysis of
common law may aid in this determination.
a. Possessory Funds
In Sereboff-III, the Court established that placing funds in an investment
account that the beneficiary has control over satisfies the possession re-
quirement. '56 In Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
148. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213. The Plan must seek funds within the control and posses-
sion of the beneficiary. Id.
149. Id. at214.
150. SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5.
151. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004).
152. Id. at 1201-02.
153. Id. at 1201.
154. Id.
155. See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 691 (7th
Cir. 2003). Since the funds were in the beneficiary's own account he had sole possession over
them and satisfied the possession requirement. Id. See also Bombardier Aerospace Employee
Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wamsbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
Since the funds were being held by the beneficiary's agent, the beneficiary had ultimate con-
trol over them giving him constructive possession. Id.
156. Sereboffv. Mid Ati. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
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Varco, 157 the beneficiary's attorney held the settlement funds in a reserve
account for the beneficiary which also satisfied the possession require-
ment.'58  In Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Willard,'59 the beneficiary agreed to have the settlement funds placed in the
court registry.160 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found this agreement
to establish that the beneficiary exercised control over the funds and deemed
him to have constructive possession of the funds.161 In Bombardier Aero-
space Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wamsbrough, 162
the settlement funds were being held in a bank account in the beneficiary's
attorneys' names.163 Since the attorneys were indisputably the beneficiary's
agents, the beneficiary had ultimate control over the funds which satisfied
constructive possession. These cases exemplify the courts' eagerness to en-
force reimbursement provisions, furthering Congress' ultimate goals of creat-
ing a uniform common law16' and encouraging employers to provide benefit
plans. 6
5
b. Non-possessory Funds
Despite insurers' best efforts, beneficiaries have on occasion been able
to avoid the enforcement of reimbursement provisions of ERISA plans. 1
66
One example is a Special Needs Trust. 167 In Knudson, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that if settlement funds are placed in a Special
Needs Trust, then those funds are not considered to be in the beneficiary's
possession. 68 A Special Needs Trust, also referred to as a Supplemental
Needs Trust, 169 is defined as: "A trust established to provide supplemental
income for a disabled beneficiary who is receiving or may be eligible to re-
157. 338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 684, 688.
159. 393 F. 3d 1119 (10th Cir. 2004).
160. Id. at 1121.
161. Id. at 1125.
162. 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 356.
164. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
165. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 4639-40.
166. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
167. Id. at 214.
168. Id.
169. Gail C. Eichstadt, Using Trusts to Provide for the Needs of an Adult Child with a
Disability: An Introduction to Family Concerns for Lawyers and a Primer on Trusts for Par-
ents, 45 S.D. L. REv. 622, 636 (2000).
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ceive government benefits."' 170 Another example is an un-cashed check.' 7'
In Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 172 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
established that an un-cashed check does not give a beneficiary possession of
funds even if he has the ability to cash it.'17 A third example is funds held in
a court registry.'74 In Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland,17 1 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that funds placed in the Mississippi Chancery
Court's registry were also not in the beneficiary's possession, contrary to the
finding in Willard. 76 These examples illustrate possible scenarios in which
beneficiaries may avoid the possession requirement.
V. THE LIKELY EFFECT OF SEREBOFF III AND THE PossEssIoN THEORY ON
FUTURE REIMBURSEMENT AND SUBROGATION CLAIMS BY INSURERS
"[An attorney's] task is to convert the requirements of the client into le-
gal solutions . . . "' "The combination of specific rules and an emphasis on
legal form and literalism can be used artificially, in a manipulative way to
circumvent or undermine the purpose of regulation," in order to serve a cli-
ent's needs. 17  Now that it has been established by the United States Su-
preme Court in Knudson and Sereboff II, that the standard for reimburse-
ment actions in ERISA cases is the possession theory, attorneys on both sides
will likely shape their legal solutions to conform to this standard.
Section A of this part will analyze how a beneficiary's attorney may try
to avoid enforcement of a subrogation or reimbursement provision of an
ERISA plan through the application or manipulation of case law and the law
of trusts. This section will also present the legal and ethical restraints on an
attorney's success. Section B identifies the steps an insurer's attorney must
take in order to satisfy the possession theory requirements and enforce a sub-
rogation or reimbursement provision.
170. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004).
171. See Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 544.
173. Id. at 548.
174. See Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2002).
175. Id. at 439.
176. Id. at 445; see Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the beneficiary had constructive possession of
the funds placed in the court registry satisfied the possession requirement).
177. Joseph McCahery & Sol Picciotto, Creative Lawyering and the Dynamics of Business
Regulation 240, in YVES DEZELAY & DAVID SUGARMAN, PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND
PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
MARKETS (1995).
178. Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 849 (1991).
[Vol. 31
206
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/1
2006] CREATIVE LA WYERING IN ERISA REIMBURSEMENTACTIONS 209
A. Lawyering on the Part of Beneficiaries
Despite the insurer's success in Sereboff III, the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Knudson and the appellate courts' rulings in Sevilla and
Bauhaus USA, Inc. still remain good law." 9 In all three of these cases, the
beneficiaries were successful, because the insurers were unable to meet all
the requirements of the possession theory.'80 The success of these benefici-
aries may give future beneficiaries and their attorneys hope that they too can
succeed in avoiding the enforcement of ERISA reimbursement provisions.
For instance, an attorney may attempt to have a beneficiary's third party set-
tlement proceeds placed in a Special Needs Trust since this act enabled the
Knudson beneficiary to succeed.' 8' However, this may not be as easy or
successful as one might think, since not every injured beneficiary is eligible
for a Special Needs Trust. 8 2  Further, even if a beneficiary is eligible and
successful in placing those funds in the Special Needs Trust, there is no
guarantee that the funds will be unattainable by the insurer. 
83
When the law does not support a client's case and an attorney is under
pressure to find a legal solution to the client's problem, that attorney may be
enticed to manipulate or circumvent the law, so that it appears to favor a par-
ticular client's case.' 84 For example, combining the ruling in Sevilla 85 with
the specifically identifiable res requirement of the possession theory'86 pre-
179. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 11
(U.S. May 15, 2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 204
(2002); Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus USA,
Inc., 292 F.3d at 445.
180. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214; Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus
USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 445.
181. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214.
182. See Eichstadt, supra note 169, at 636 (indicating that a Special Needs Trust must
meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(4)(A) (2000)). The requirements include:
A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is disabled... and which is es-
tablished for the benefit of such individual by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian of the indi-
vidual, or a court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of
such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the in-
dividual under a State plan under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
183. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220. The court stated that it did not decide on whether the
insurer could have sought equitable relief from the beneficiary's attorney or the trustee of the
Special Needs Trust. Id.
184. Bruce D. Black, The Use (or Abuse) of Expert Witnesses in Post-Daubert Employ-
ment Litigation, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 284 n.86 (2000) (quoting MERIT BENNETT,
LAW & THE HEART 25 (1997)).
185. Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548.
186. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wams-
brough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
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sents a possible loophole. Since the un-cashed check in Sevilla was not sub-
ject to equitable remedies,187 and cashing a check makes funds not specifi-
cally identifiable, 188 an inexperienced attorney may instruct his client to hold
onto the un-cashed check until after the insurer's suit is dismissed, then cash
it quickly, and hide the funds. Although at first glance this solution seems
feasible, such unscrupulous legal advice would likely subject an attorney to
professional sanctions, a malpractice suit, and possibly criminal charges.'89
Further, it will also likely prove unsuccessful for a couple of reasons. First,
the facts surrounding the Sevilla case were unique, since the beneficiary's
purpose for not cashing the check was to prevent another case from becom-
ing moot, not to avoid an obligation. 90 Second, a court may issue a prelimi-
nary injunction or temporary restraining order preventing the beneficiary
from cashing the check.'91
An attorney may also attempt to avoid the possession requirement by
having settlement proceeds placed in a court registry.'92 However, this will
also likely fail its intended purpose. '9' In Bauhaus USA, Inc., the beneficiary
was successful only because the funds were placed in the registry in anticipa-
tion of an interpleader action' 94 that never developed, not in an attempt to
evade a reimbursement provision. 95 Because these solutions will likely fail,
a beneficiary's attorney may look to the law of trusts for further assistance.
1. Basic Trusts
A trust arises when one person holds title to property "subject to an eq-
uitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another."''
96
A trust may be created inter vivos' 97 or by testament. 198 A trust may ex-
187. See Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 549-50.
188. See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
189. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(7)
(1980); 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Legal Malpractice-Inadequate Case Investigation §
2 (1978).
190. Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548 (noting the reason the check was not cashed was to avoid
mooting a collateral case).
191. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 2.11(1).
192. See, e.g., Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 441. In an interpleader action, property is held by an uninterested third party
until the ownership rights of that property are determined. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 837
(8th ed. 2004).
195. Bauhaus USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 441.
196. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1 (6th ed. 1987).
197. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTr AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 3.1 (5th ed.
2006). A trust created inter vivos is created during one's lifetime. Id
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pressed or implied. 199 Express trusts are those created through a written
document20 0 called a trust instrument, which details the powers, rights, du-
ties, and terms of the trust.2 0 1 Implied trusts are those created by courts be-
cause the facts of a particular case warrant their creation.20 2 Furthermore,
trusts can be either revocable or irrevocable, depending on the terms of the
trust. 
203
"[V]irtually all trust law is default law."' 20 4 This means that a settlor 20 5
can make any provisions, with respect to the trust, which the trustee 20 6 must
implement, as long as the provisions do not offend important rules and poli-
cies of the law of trusts.20 7
2. The Possession Requirement
Due to a settlor's ability to design the terms of the trust to his or her lik-
ing, the ERISA beneficiary may be able to set up an inter vivos express trust
in such a way as to avoid the possession requirement.2 8 One possibility is
the creation of a trust that mirrors a Special Needs Trust, except without the
eligibility requirements.20 9 This type of trust is a possible solution, since
placing funds in a Special Needs Trust enabled the beneficiary in Knudson to
avoid an ERISA reimbursement provision.210
Another possibility includes the creation of an Offshore Purpose Trust
for the settlement proceeds. 211 For example, a settlor may create this type of
198. A trust created by testament is created upon one's death. Id.
199. BOGERT, supra note 196, § 8.
200. Id.
201. Id. § 1.
202. Id. § 8.
203. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 (2003).
204. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
650 (1995).
205. A settlor is a person who creates a trust. BOGERT, supra note 196, § 1.
206. The trustee is the person who holds the title of the trust property, in trust, for the
beneficiary of the trust. Id.
207. 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 197, § 2.2.4; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2000)
(amended 2003).
208. See, e.g., Holdeen v. Ratterree, 270 F.2d 701, 706 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that due to
the "complete absence of control in the instrument itself... the settlor did not possess such
control as to be considered substantially the owner of [the trust] property"). See I SCOTT, ET
AL.,supra note 197, § 2.2.4, 3.1.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000) (requiring for eligibility that the beneficiary
of the funds be under the age of 65 and disabled).
210. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
211. 2 ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES: WEALTH PRESERVATION PLANNING WITH
DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 281-83 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 2005) [hereinafter
209
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trust to finance a child's education or to take care of a pet.21 If the settlor
would likely have paid for these expenses, then he or she would essentially
be receiving the benefits of the trust. 213 Before sending money overseas, a
settlor should first consult with a knowledgeable attorney and consider
whether such activity is financially worthwhile. Additional considerations
include: "[T]he purpose and term of the trust;" the laws and political stabil-
ity of the foreign jurisdiction; and the settlor's travel preferences.2"4
A third possibility includes placing the settlement funds in an irrevoca-
ble trust created for the benefit of the settlor's family members. 2 5 Because
an irrevocable trust is not within the control of the settlor, the possession
requirement cannot be met.2" 6 As such, it may be possible for the settlor's
family members to enjoy the benefits of the settlement funds, something the
settlor would likely prefer over having the insurance company receive the
funds.
In all of these cases, the funds would not be in the ERISA beneficiary's
possession. 2  Therefore, the insurer would be unable to satisfy this require-
ment of the possession theory. As a result, an ERISA beneficiary's attorney
might encourage the creation of one of these trusts.
3. Restrictions on the Use of Trusts
Even if an ERISA beneficiary is able to create one of these trusts and
have the third party agree to allocate the settlement funds to the trust, a court
may still have to approve the settlement.18 Courts addressing related issues
have concluded that "[a]n ERISA plan participant [cannot] unilaterally allo-
cate settlement proceeds to something other than medical expenses in order
ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES]. "[A] purpose trust is a trust established for a purpose rather
than for specified beneficiaries." Id. at 277. Although only a few states permit these trusts,
they may be easily formed offshore and "should be honored by U.S. courts." Id. at 281.
212. See id. at 280.
213. See id. at 279.
214. ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES, supra note 211, at 285.
215. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme,
102 CoM. L.J. 138, 150 (1997). "By making the trust irrevocable, the settlor relinquishes
control over the funds." Id.
216. Id.
217. 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (2006). See also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959). "The trustee is under a duty... to take and keep control of the trust
property." Id.
218. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207-08 (2002).
The settlement money was only disbursed after the court approved the settlement and allo-
cated the funds to the Special Needs Trust. Id. at 208.
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to evade subrogation.,, 2' 9 Additionally, in Knudson, the settlement proceeds
were placed in a Special Needs Trust pursuant to California Law, not by the
parties' discretion. 2 0 Thus, if the state in which the action arises does not
require settlement funds to be placed in a Special Needs Trust, it may be
even more difficult for a beneficiary to utilize this reimbursement evasion
tactic.
Other restrictions may prevent a beneficiary from utilizing trusts to
avoid reimbursement or subrogation, such as the requirement "that the trust
have a purpose that is lawful [and] not contrary to public policy. '22' If a
court determines that the settlor created a trust for an illegal or contrary to
public policy purpose, the trust will fail.2 2 Further, "[a]n intended trust or a
particular provision in the terms of the trust [instrument] may fail for illegal-
ity where ... the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust is to defraud
creditors or other third persons. "223 Although, the settlor will likely attempt
to convince a court that the purpose of the trust was not to defraud the in-
surer, but rather to ensure the education of a child or the well-being of his or
her family or pet, it will be an uphill battle.
Regardless of whether the beneficiary is successful in creating one of
these trusts, encouraging such activity may subject the attorney to sanc-
tions. 224 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that an attor-
ney "shall not ... counsel or assist his client in conduct that the [attorney]
knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
2 25
B. Lawyering on the Part of Insurers
As a result of Sereboff II, insurers now have United States Supreme
Court precedent in support of their actions to enforce ERISA reimbursement
219. Moore v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of the Nat'l Capital Area (Moore 1), 70 F. Supp.
2d 9, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The beneficiary claimed entitlement to all of the settlement pro-
ceeds because she had not yet been made whole for her injuries. Id. at 38. See Chitkin v.
Lincoln Nat'l Ins. Co., 879 F. Supp. 841, 862 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the reimburse-
ment provision permitted repayment from any settlement funds---except from strict liability-
regardless of how the settlement funds were allocated).
220. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207-08.
221. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a)(3) (2000) (amended 2003).
222. 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, § 9.6 (5th ed.
2006).
223. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (1959); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
224. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT DR 7-
102(A)(7) (1980).
225. Id.
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226provisions. 6 This will likely add to the increasing trend towards insurers
seeking enforcement of such provisions.227 Although less creativity is re-
quired on the part of the insurers' attorneys than those of beneficiaries, they
must still follow the proper procedures in order to be successful. First, the
insurers must make sure that the reimbursement provision in the ERISA plan
is signed by and enforceable against the beneficiary.228 This will likely sat-
isfy the belonging in good conscience requirement of the possession the-
ory.229 Second, the insurers' attorneys must act promptly in anticipation of,
or as a result of, the beneficiary receiving a third party settlement by seeking
a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 23' These orders
should require the beneficiary to set aside sufficient funds from the settle-
ment proceeds to fully reimburse the insurer.231 However, it is important that
the funds be set aside in an account that is subject to a constructive trust or
equitable lien, such as the beneficiary's investment account, a court registry,
or the beneficiary's attorney's bank account, so that the possession require-
ment is met.232 With these three possession theory requirements satisfied,
the insurers have a good chance at success.233
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Sereboff II insurer's success confirmed that pursuant to the civil
enforcement provision, section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, an insurer may succeed
in a reimbursement or subrogation action against a beneficiary for medical
expenses paid on the beneficiary's behalf.234 The United States Supreme
Court also clearly identified the requirements for enforcement of such provi-
226. Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
227. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
228. See Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot &
Wansbrough, 345 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the belonging in good conscience
requirement is satisfied when the beneficiary has signed an "express, unambiguous reim-
bursement provision").
229. See id.
230. See e.g., Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2. The insurer's attorney sought a pre-
liminary injunction and temporary restraining order to require the beneficiary to set aside
sufficient funds to reimburse it. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 5. See also Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004); see Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco,
338 F.3d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 2003).
233. Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5 (indicating that if these three requirements
are met, then the insurer will succeed).
234. Id. at 11.
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sions. 235 However, because there are cases which indicate that a beneficiary
may still be able to avoid reimbursing the insurer, Congress' goal of estab-
lishing a uniform common law may still be frustrated.23 6 Since a benefici-
ary's attorneys may seek to exploit possible loopholes in the possession the-
ory, there is the potential for ethical and professional conduct violations.2 37
Because of the increasing trend towards insurers seeking enforcement of
reimbursement provisions, 38 and the fact that the majority of Americans are
insured under ERISA,239 a more efficient solution than the three-pronged
analysis is necessary.
The clearest solution to this problem is to amend ERISA, specifically
indicating whether or not Congress intended for ERISA reimbursement pro-
visions to be enforceable.24 ° If the answer is "yes," the solution may be as
simple as adding the word "legal" to section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which
would enable insurers to enforce reimbursement provisions on contract theo-
ries. If the answer is "sometimes," which is more probable, perhaps a de-
tailed outline of the situations in which enforcement is appropriate should be
provided. If Congress is concerned that explicitly requiring the enforcement
of these provisions will pose an undue burden on beneficiaries, it should in-
clude a make-whole doctrine provision in its revision of the statute. This
provision would provide that an insurer may only be reimbursed after the
beneficiary has been fully compensated for losses suffered.24 ' This would
require the tortfeasor to fulfill his or her obligation to the injured party to his
or her ability.242 It will also require the insurer to pay for the expenses cov-
ered by the premium which it has already received. 43 Until this is done,
courts will continue to exercise their discretion and attorneys on both sides
will continue to exercise their own.
235. Id. at 4-5.
236. Compare Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (refusing to reimburse the insurer),
with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002) (requiring
reimbursement of the insurer).
237. See supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
238. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
239. Jost, supra note 44, at 187.
240. This solution is based on the fact that ERISA is silent on the issue of reimbursement
and subrogation. Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.3d 950,
958 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Baron, Public Policy, supra note 63, at 617.
241. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 975 (8th ed. 2004).
242. Kono, supra note 141, at 449.
243. Id.
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